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ABSTRACT
Autobiography in curriculum theory and practice is being more and more 
acknowledged as a major force leading toward the development of reflectively 
analytical teachers, reflexive practitioners, and discursively self-aware 
individuals. I look to two vital aspects of self-narration to explore.
I speak firstly of memory, without which narrative continuity would be 
impossible. Memory is as involved with learning as it is with storytelling, and I 
agree with Krell (1978) that “inquiry into memory and the theory of pedagogy go 
hand in hand” (p. 131). I eschew the models of memory provided by the 
behavioral sciences, empirical psychology, cognitive psychology, and the 
memory-as-a-mechanism model of neurophysiology for all these models end­
up vanishing into metaphor. I embrace metaphor and attempt a more open- 
ended approach through phenomenology to the experience of memory. I freely 
employ the literary arts for their evocation of long-term memory (as opposed to 
the basically short-term studies of psychology).
I maintain that memory is encoded as deep within language as the self 
and that it leads finally to the primordial narratives we call myths. Secondly, 
then, myth as foundational to both how and what we remember, and myth as 
present in the seam s between words, is traced through language and the work 
of archetypal psychology. Remembering mythically is epistrophe (Hillman, 
1979a). I use such memory and such myth to suggest the insubstantiality of the 
ego and of the subject which remembers, and to explore the meaning of a 
memory which must recoil against action to see through the self.
Chapter 1: introduction
The fact is that we have forgotten what memory is 
and can mean; and we make matters worse by 
repressing the fact of our own oblivion.”
(E. S. Casey, Remembering: A Phenomenological Study, p. 2)
§Approaches. Someone seems to have noticed that we are plunging into 
the future without a backward glance. Though we retain private memories, 
they have come to be structured within larger semiotic memory-forms 
(Barthes, 1957/72; Lyotard, 1984). Individual memory is absorbed by history, 
and curriculum becomes drafted into the production line. Such an ethos may 
well be perfectly acceptable as just another cultural quirk, were it not that the 
“backward glancing" of memory tells us not just where we have been but also 
gives us a sense of who we are. Without remembering, we exist only to 
serve the vehicle of our conveyance which is left, in effect, to choose its own 
course. To remember memory, two questions must be posed: what is 
memory and, more importantly, what is the experience of its action?
John Dewey should be given full credit here at the beginning for 
valorizing the mindfulness of the individual, opening the way to "qualitative” 
research in schooling and thus to lifewriting in curriculum through his ideas, 
including that of the organic unity of self and society (1929). Graham (1991) 
sums up Dewey’s pragmatism as, first,
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2a  theory of process based on a notion of activity in which both people 
and objects are a result of the process. Second, mind or 
consciousness itself is a  social product brought about through the 
continuous interaction of free agents. And third, all ends are 
provisional, changing; it is a process that allows, as in classic 
evolutionary terms, for novelty, and one that invalidates the idea of 
fixed goals, (p. 49)
Though the ideas of Dewey have remained influential in the
curriculum field, in the schools they have been reduced to an undercurrent in
the school-as-factory paradigm which gained ascendancy through two world
wars and a prolonged cold war (Apple, 1979). Dewey anticipated much of
the work being done now in autobiographical curriculum writing, a writing
which usually claims continental influences (Pinar & Grumet, 1976). His
understanding of the self was never akin to the student-as-empty-vessei
syndrome still commonly employed by those who seek to measure success
by the accumulated information a student has retained. Dewey clearly
opposed "self-discovery” by accumulation in his Ethics of 1932:
Except as  the outcome of arrested development, there is no such thing 
as a fixed, readymade, finished self. Every living self causes acts and 
is itself caused in return by what it does. AH voluntary action is a 
remaking of the self, since it creates new desires, instigates to new 
modes of endeavor, brings to light new conditions which institute new 
ends. Our personal identity is found in the thread of continuous 
development which binds together these changes. In the strictest 
sense, it is impossible for the self to stand still; it is becoming, and 
becoming for the better or the worse. (In Graham, 1991, p. 44)
Dewey’s realization of the social self does not seem to imply that the
individual is powerless; quite the opposite in fact. Compare Dewey’s (1929)
statement: “All education proceeds by the participation of the individual in
the social consciousness of the race” (p. 3) with that of the last lines of 
Joyce’s Stephen Dedalus in Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man: “I go ... to 
forge in the smithy of my soul the uncreated conscience of my race.”
Understanding that the self is capable of transformation and not just 
accumulation, curriculum studies have opened a broad perspective into a 
variety of qualitative approaches which question the school-industry 
paradigm (e.g., Eisner & Peshkin, 1990; Short, 1991; Schon, 1991; 
Haggerson & Bowman, 1992). These approaches usually call for more 
interpretation, less measurement, more description, less generalization, 
more experientialism, less depersonalization, and more personal 
involvement. In short, moving from the general to the specific, from the 
socially standardized to the personal and unique, assumptions about the role 
and place of memory have become engaged: public memory, professional 
memory, personal memory, and sometimes even expressive (or "fictional”) 
memory.
It is memory that I wish to explore in this essay. The areas of inquiry 
that most directly call upon the resources of personal memory are to do with 
the exploration of the lived realities of the persons who are teachers or 
students. This exploration calls for the narrativizing of experience, though 
this narrativizing may take such varied forms as ethnographic inquiry 
(Janesick, 1991), teacher lore (Schubert, 1991), narrative dialogue (Witherell 
& Noddings, 1991), teachers’ life histories (Goodson, 1988), teacher stories
(Pagano, 1990), narrative inquiry (Connelly & Clandinin, 1991), voices of 
teachers (Aoki, 1990), or, most important for my purposes, autobiography as 
research (Butt & Raymond, 1989) or methodology (Pinar & Grumet, 1976). 
The list is incomplete and too abbreviated to be fair to the intent of the 
authors, but an idea of the variety of approaches may be suggested.
All the above will be referred to generically, when necessary, as 
“lifewriting in curriculum.” I take the term “lifewriting” from a 1991 seminar 
with James Olney on “Lifewriting and Memory,” in which lifewriting was used 
in the broadest sense possible to encompass poetry (T. S. Eliot’s Four 
Quartets, 1944), case studies (Luria, 1968,1972; Sacks, 1985), novels 
(Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom! 1936/86; Hurston’s Their Eyes Were 
Watching God,1937), and various experimental autobiographies which shall 
be discussed in a later section. Lifewriting, then, is any writing which 
expresses, investigates, or seeks a memoried life—whether objectively or 
subjectively or intersubjectively, symbolically or factually. In autobiography, 
itself, the question of memory is inescapable, as it is generally taken to be the 
dividing line between it and “purely" fictional literature, whether memory is 
construed as historic or aesthetic. I shall suggest that it is also heuristic.
It should be noted that curriculum inquiry often calls on the memory 
that plays a central role in all phenomenological and hermeneutical 
discourse (Willis, 1991; Smith, 1991), though this memory may be 
understood as both personal and social because of the mutual implication of
5the personal and social in the hermeneutic circle (Gadamer, 1975). 
Furthermore, as curriculum theory draws inspiration from so many other 
fields, it regularly assum es ideas of memory drawn from the processor 
paradigm of experimental psychology (e.g., Ross, 1992), the narrative 
schemata of cognitive psychology (e.g., Bruner, 1987), not to mention 
psychoanalytic approaches from Freud (1900/65) to Lacan (1977). The 
mention of Lacan opens out language itself as  a container, or producer, of 
memory, especially in the fields of semiotics—as found, for example, in 
Barthes (1957/72)—and linguistics (Kristeva, 1989, among others). All of 
these traditions will be recalled in later chapters.
§Memory, Narrative, Myth: Self, Imagination, Metamorphosis.
Memory, self, and imagination seem to be entwined in ways that even the 
most arduous experimental techniques could never disentangle. Of course, 
definitions could be created within which conceptual data could be made to 
fit or not to fit. The problem with defining the above triumvirate is that each is 
so intimately involved with each other and with language that some say they 
are as much a manifestation of language as language is of them (Lacan, 
1977; Kristeva, 1989). Kerby (1991) states that “semiotics ... shifts this 
whole epistemological-metaphysical debate onto another level by firmly 
rejecting extralinguistic reference" (p. 10). It is not my purpose to disentangle 
these terms through incisive definitions and, as I say, I’m not sure it could be
done. But life histories, narrative inquiry, and autobiography all proceed with 
some notion of a referent—no matter how nebulous or disputable—for each 
of these terms.
This inquiry into the central concept of memory will proceed through 
the interpretation of several related concepts which are pivotal to its 
understanding. The concepts need to be explored in order to understand 
their substructures of inference. It is assumed that our language today has 
attained a particularity and complexity which was heretofore unknown 
(Bloomfield, 1982). Our dependency on an increasingly complex and 
expanding technological network has demanded a nominative heterotaxis— 
an abnormal structural arrangement of language—because of the need to 
continually give new names to the new sub-concepts and “things” emerging 
from the science industry and hyper-technology. Language has become 
such a heterotaxis because for the first time the development of nouns or 
names has preceded or eliminated the need for verbs. Philology has 
demonstrated that previously nominatives usually derived from verb forms, 
which are still hidden within most the names we employ today (Watkins, 
1982). As a  result, much of our speech and writing seem s to be more 
concrete and objectively referential than it may have been before. However 
“practical" this may be, a side effect is that language in general use seem s to 
have largely lost its sense of nuance, the reverberations from the subtle
interplay of meanings within a larger web of inference. Terms become things 
with a certainty which renders them “inert” (Whitehead, 1970).
This commonsensical view that language “means just what it says" is 
subverted by poets and other writers of literature who “play” with language— 
or allow language to play—beyond a strictly referential sense (Frye, 1957). 
The echoes and implications within speech and writing are employed to 
point away from concrete understanding to a de-literalized sense of 
inference. Language is purposefully used to suggest that which is not 
present (L6vi-Strauss, 1966). Its “meaning” is contained in the subtext of 
associations from the past—the memory contained within language—or in 
the deferral of meaning into the future. This sense of the infinite regress or 
indefinite postponement of meaning seem s to be what is implied in the 
Derridean neologism “differance” (1978). Aside from literary endeavours, it 
may be that the texts of post-structuralists (and other “post” genres) are the 
only place to find language being used to consciously to avoid strict 
reference or to hint at meanings beyond themselves, either in the subliminal 
awareness of metaphorical sources (Frye, 1957; Olney, 1972) or in the 
“traces” of memory’s  absence (Derrida, 1978).
It is my contention that writing which expects both author and reader to 
participate in the univocal assumption of meaning through representation of 
objective referents is more open to misunderstanding and the abuse of 
mixed m essages than is writing which is openly inferential, but not inferring
anything but more inferences. When the author and reader expect certain, 
specific denotations and connotations, they are more likely to project 
aspersions on each other when they find their meanings do not agree. In the 
latter case, meaning may seem at first unclear or elusive until that very 
elusiveness is felt, in a sense, a s  meaningful. It is only by returning language 
(and therefore life) to its “original difficulty” (Caputo, 1987), or to a sense of 
fluidity (Grinnell, 1973) and process (Whitehead, 1978), that a  sense of 
richness and depth can enliven our awareness of phenomenal reality. This 
approach accepts the uncertainty of private connotation and mutual meaning 
may be felt through language’s  “re-mystification,” as  in poetry.
A major part of this richness and depth is found in the echoes of the 
past contained in the words of the present. This does not just imply that there 
are fewer and simpler base-words at the “root" of our present plethora of 
referents, but that words reach back to a rhizomatous network which spreads 
over, finally, the unknown. Heidegger (1987) has said that “language can 
only have arisen from the overpowering, the strange and terrible" (p. 171).
Heidegger, of course, was a  metaphysician who himself spoke the 
poetry of being and who was claimed by phenomenologists and 
existentialists alike (Wahl, 1949). He approached philosophy with what 
Gadamer (1975) called the hermeneutical imagination, seeking out origins. 
The inquiry into the suggestion that language already has an intrinsic 
memory is reason to seek memory beyond mind. Furthermore, there are also
9memory within the body and the memory of “intersubjective participation," 
according to Edward S. Casey (1987b). Memory even functions to a limited 
extent in matter, as suggested by Bergson (1912) and largely corroborated 
by particle physics today (Wheeler, 1974; Toben & Wolf, 1982). Could it be 
that memory is not a  mental faculty at all but one of the primordial forces, of 
existence: “writing’s law of gravity” (Gunn, 1982, p. 5)?
Within the mind, however, memory produces both narratives and 
images—images implying all things sensory or somehow “felt." Smith (1991) 
says of Gadamer that “his hermeneutics supports all of the recent work in the 
study of narrative and story ... which proceeds from an affirmation of the 
traceably constitutive nature of human understanding and its roots in 
recollection and memory” (p. 194).
Aspects of memory, then, are understood to be found in stories, the 
nature of which leads me to my second central concept: narrative. Narrative 
is seen in this sense as the form taken by the foundational structures of self- 
awareness (Kirby, 1991), which we encounter consciously through memory, 
recollection, reminiscence, or reverie (Casey, 1987b). Kirby (1991) 
straightforwardly states: “The self, as implied subject, appears to be 
Inseparable from the narrative or life story it constructs for itself or otherwise 
inherits. The important point is that it is from this story that a sense of self is 
generated” (p. 6).
If words have memories, and memories often have a narrative 
structure, then the subconscious or peripherally-conscious narrative 
substructures of those structures can be designated as meta-narratives, as 
Lyotard (1984) refers to the determinants of culture and tradition; Kirby 
(1991) calls them prenarrative structures when referring to a less 
circumscribed, more “primitive” level of quasi-narrative (Crites, 1986). 
Prenarrative experience is already somewhat determined by the place, time, 
and traditions of one’s life, and, at a  deeper level, by the reverberation of 
ancient etymological and present phonetic entanglements. It also includes 
the repressed “unsaid" behind language (Lacan, 1977; Derrida, 1978).
This “unsaid" is the unspeakable of both past and present. It is the 
stuff of dreams, myths, and madness. Usually held repugnantly away as 
language’s derrtere, it is nevertheless as much a creative resource as are the 
“praiseworthy” official traditions. Kirby asserts that “self-narration is both a 
receptive and a creative activity, receptive in relation to embodying or 
expressing our prenarrative experience and creative in the way our 
conscious narratives inevitably refigure and augment the prenarrative level 
of experience” (p. 9).
Whether culturally formative, subversively chaotic, or aesthetically 
inspiring, I hope to reveal these narrative substructures to be identical with 
what has been called mythology (Kolakowski, 1972/1989; Connelly & 
Clandinin, 1991). As I shall define it as my third central concept, mythology is
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composed of myths which have been identified as the aural components of 
archetypal images (Kugler, 1978; Rasula, 1979). Words and myths “are twin 
creatures, springing from the same tendency to see reality imagistically or 
symbolically. Both language and myth are part of the sam e basic mental 
activity” (Avens, 1980, p. 88).
These three—memory, narrative, myth—will be shown to be the social 
components of our concept of self or, to put it another way, the self-concepts 
which we glimpse objectively: in passing, as it were. The three concepts can 
be imagined as pointing inward to a postulated essential self, and so to be 
components of it, or only to imply it through their activities (Kirby, 1991). An 
image of the self, then, can be said to have been discussed as  long as I was 
inquiring into the three aforementioned concepts. Self, then, is the fourth 
major conceptual question of this study, even if, upon closer investigation, 
this self seem s to waver or disappear entirely as an object of perception 
(Lacan, 1977; Foucault, 1988; Sprinker, 1980; Lejeune, 1989) leaving us 
with the sense “that we are not real” (Avens, 1980, p. 72).
This perception of the self, so dependent on the fantasies bred within 
our cultural framework and the myths we live (Hillman, 1975b; Campbell, 
1990), may largely determine our openness or closedness to experience. A 
Weltanschauung does not simply arrive one day; we grow within it and may 
find the possibility of experience outside of it incomprehensible. Imaginative 
production may be understood to be channeled by the above limitations, so
that perception is itself > ^aginatively guided and limited by that 
Weltanschauung (Heidegger, 1962; Whitehead, 1978; Perlman, 1988). The 
source of imagination—if such an idea has any sense to it—is then the only 
“true” subjectivity, though it can only be undifferentiated unconsciousness 
without the forms supplied by the world (Avens, 1980), including those forms 
of particle motion and organic instinct (Portmann, 1954/64; Wheeler, 1974). 
But imagination is understood to be more than a cause: It is that which 
apprehends through and beyond the body’s perceptions (Whitehead, 1978). 
As prenarrative combines with creativity to produce self-narratives for Kirby, 
the mythic images of the life-world may be thought to combine with the 
creative source to embody imagination—both public and private (Hillman, 
1977)—and this is the fifth primary concept of this inquiry.
Imagination is the wellspring of fantasy, according to the architect of 
archetypal psychology, and all our phenomenal constructions, perceptions, 
and attributes are fantasies (Hillman, 1983a). These fantasies may, more 
often than not, be less personal than the archetypal images that a  world-view 
views. Hillman understands that the withdrawal (or possibly theft) of 
archetypal projections from the world in our era of objective science has led 
to the fantasy of an interior region which has been psychologized as the 
subconscious or unconscious (Freud, 1900/1965; Hillman, 1975a).
Psychologizing is identical to what Hillman m eans by pathoiogizing. 
The fantasies behind our experiences of discrete phenomena are not all to
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be understood as handsome flying horses (imagination taking wing) or
wonder-full daydreams, but also as the pathological underside of our
daylight hopes. (How similar Hillman’s talk of ingressed images is to Lacan’s
of ingressed speech!) At night, our dreams reveal this death lure, this
pathologizing of archetypal contents, as Hillman (1979a) describes:
The imagination at night takes events out of life, and the bricoleur in 
the service of the death instinct scavenges and forages for day 
residues, removing more and more empirical trash of the personal 
world out of life and into psyche for the sake of its love. (p. 128)
In the day, our fantasies usually attempt to put the world together in a
meaningful fashion, to imagine integrated purposes, but fantasy—
imagination—both constructs and destructs:
Imagination works by deforming and forming at one and the same 
moment. . .  . The pathologized or deformed image is fundamental to 
alchemy and to the art of memory, both of which present complex 
methods of soul-making. It is the pathologized image in the dream, 
the bizarre, peculiar, sick or wounded figure—the disruptive 
element—to which we must look for the key to the dream-work. Here 
is where the formal cause of the dream is best doing its deformational 
work, striking its type into the plasticity of the imagination, (p. 128)
This “deforming” of daylight’s imaging is understood to be alchemical
(Jung, 1971): a reduction first to the basest substance to dismember memory
and a potential transmutation through a return to the dark source. This idea
of alchemical transmutation—a dramatic shift of awareness—is what I refer to
as metamorphosis (Ovid, 1976; Brown, 1966, 1970), my sixth and final central
concept, and surely the raison d'etre of lifewriting.
These six central concepts have deep etymological, and psychic roots 
and are subterraneanly interwoven. In a sense, I have imposed a linear 
perspective upon them so one seems to lead to another: memory leading 
vertically downward to the springs of imagination, which, according to 
Hillman (1979a, 1979b, 1983a) is the realm of soul-making, the depths of 
soul merging into death. It is in the position of such absolute otherness that 
metamorphosis is thought to take place. New being now returns vertically 
upward—metaphorically speaking—to emerge in a new world under a new 
sun. Such new being brings soul into the world—Hillman’s soul-making—so 
it may be paradoxically envisioned as the recuperation of “old” being.
§Caveats. This thesis stated so baldly should be open to much criticism: If 
it is truly new being, with a different sort of memory, in what sense could it be 
said to be the same person who had begun the process? If the process is 
seen as a vertical descent, does this imply that each individual, regardless of 
temporal-geographic-cultural circumstances, has the potential for the same 
soul-making regression? Are memory, story, myth, darkness (deformed 
imagination) the necessary steps or the exclusive formula for this “ritual"? If 
some souls prefer ascent or horizontality to such an atavistic-sounding 
regression, must they be understood to be incorrect? If I am quite content 
with the world out there and my self in here, am I under some compulsion to 
leave my city and enter into the wilderness?
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Sound questions which would destroy the ideation of these six 
concepts if they were to be taken as literal and necessary. But they are not.
At this stage, my purpose has been to state in advance the area and nature 
of my inquiring, not to proclaim any sort of universal guide to new being. In 
fact, I hope to show that the springs of imagination are more within the realm 
of memory than memory in the realm of imagination. “New” being cannot be 
known from here, if indeed there are such things to know.
Graham (1991) has suggested that autobiography “exists as yet in the 
mind of the educational community at large in an undertheorized state” (p. 2).
I wish to sketch the outlines of a memory-theory in support of the varied 
autobiographical endeavours underway in curriculum studies. However, 
here at the beginning, I must clearly state what my theorizing, speculating, 
and conjuring within memory do not imply.
This is not an experimental study with a control group and numerical 
data collection; memory will not be “designed” from the outside in. This is not 
a comparative review of all the curriculum theory which has made reference 
to memory, though representative selections will be reviewed. This is a 
review of neither all the philosophers’ writings on memory nor of all the artists 
expressing its purview. I am not going to “come into the fields and spacious 
palaces o f ... memory, where are treasures of countless images of things of 
every manner" (Augustine, 1948) and research the myriad works of historical
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autobiographers, though, of course, some of these will be present to some 
degree.
It is my purpose to seek a deeper understanding of the processes and 
“objects" of remembering through the application of the hermeneutic 
imagination and some journeying through my own “spacious palaces” and 
perhaps around some of my memorial lacunae. The phenomena of memory 
will be portrayed from speculative philosophical, hermeneutical, and 
narrative positions. The dynamic of the past conceptualized tends to 
emplace the assumed conceptualizer within it. Instead of merely reciting my 
memories, however, I shall attempt also to remember remembering: to seek 
out images of memory which may be called preconceptual. In this way I 
intend to examine memory by remembering its effects on me and, perhaps, 
my affects on it. Memory, like the sense of a moving present which it has 
been thought to evoke (Bergson, 1912; Merleau-Ponty, 1945/78), may be the 
medium through which we experience the world since it is finally of the world. 
This position has been suggested and defended by Bergson (1912,
1911/83), Whitehead (1978), Heidegger (1962, 1977, 1987), and Jung 
(1963,1971), among others. Of course, we, ourselves, are also of the world, 
but it is one of the themes of this document that therein precisely lies our 
amnesia, our “oblivion." Memory, itself, may have been subjugated in the 
subjectivism of a culturally-imposed individuality.
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With this possibility opened, memory can only be approached, it 
seem s to me, phenomenologically. circuitously and experientially, but 
without advancing the expectation of discovering within an authentic self 
which does the remembering—though psychic images of such a self may be 
found to abound. “If so, then the only adequate approach to im ages—which 
provide the primary content of ‘psychic experience’—will be phenomenology, 
which is designed precisely to describe ‘immediate experience’ in detail” 
(Casey, 1987a, p. 102).
What does it mean to remember? What “idea” of memory do we 
already hold? Do all peoples hold a similar idea? How do I experience 
memory “working”? Does memory “create” the self, the future? Is there non- 
representational memory? To attempt a response to such questions, the 
poets’ voices may have more legitimacy than those of the philosophers or 
psychologists because they experience memory in a less personally 
circumscribed, more receptive way. There may even be two separate roots 
(Dunne, 1988) or modes (Casey, 1987b; Kolakowski, 1972/89) of 
remembering, which I will speak of shortly and in the conclusion. If different 
memories create different selves, curricula may need less enclosure.
§Autobiographical Self; Autobiographical Truth. It is persuasively 
held that the self is a composition of memories without which it could not 
possibly exist (Campbell, Jeremy, 1989; Casey, 1987b; Sacks, 1987).
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Furthermore, these memories may only exist for the self in the present as 
stories or narratives, and action and experience may take place as  a plot 
advancement of these narratives (Frye, 1957; Crites, 1986). The question 
then arises whether the self actually makes decisions about present actions.
If the self is remembered for each decision, can it then take the action of 
choosing its own narratives of memory? Is such reconceptualization all that 
is needed for transformation? Or is the self merely another fictitious role in a 
larger, ongoing drama over which it has no control—is “every self the 
articulation of an intersubjectivity structured within and around the discourses 
available at any moment in time" (Sprinker, 1980, p. 325)?
The understanding of the self in lifewriting will have determinative 
effects on what kind of writing is produced and also in the manner in which 
memory is understood. The Freudian (1900/65) understanding of the self as 
an ego complex which develops as mediator between the libidinous desires 
of the id and the social controls of the superego has provided the 
superstructure for much later theorizing on memory and self. The ego 
complex is usually understood to have been subsumed by the social 
conscience—the superego—through which it attempts to redirect the needs 
of the id in a socially accepted manner. Because of the repression and 
suppression of those desires which ego finds unacceptable, the unconscious 
develops as the container of “irrepressible” memories and dreams. Worth 
noting here is that both dreams and memories—especially neurotic
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memories—are often disguised in symbolic form so that for Freud historical 
memories cannot always be separated from fantasies.
Madeleine Grumet, writing in “Psychoanalytic Foundations" in 1976, 
seemed to conceive of the currere project in similar terms: “In our discussion 
of currere a s  an application of ego psychology we are looking at the 
contributions of both consciousness and the unconscious to the structures of 
the ego" (p. 113). However, in another article from the same period, 
“Existential and Phenomenological Foundations" (1976b), she leans away 
from Freudian ego-psychology toward Husserl’s  transcendental ego for her 
conception of self with its attendant preconceptual memories.
Grumet’s collaborator at the time, William F. Pinar, seemed to employ 
a  more Jungian conception of the self, though it was never specifically 
identified as such. Currere was conceived by Pinar (1974) as  the verbal 
experience of the running-of-the-course, as opposed to the nominative, pre­
designed curriculum, or course-to-be-run. As the primary and still most fully 
developed method of autobiography in curriculum, currere employs 
psychoanalytic terms alongside those of existentialism and phenomenology 
and some post-structuralist tropes.
Pinar, coming from the literary arts, approached the ego in a Freudian 
sense, but as  artist and existentialist, understood this ego to be basically a 
delusion constructed by the repressive forces of social power structures:
“The method of currere is one way to work to liberate oneself from the web of
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political, cultural, and economic influences that are perhaps buried from
conscious view but nonetheless comprise the living web that is a person’s
biographic situation” (1981, p. 437). Liberate to what? Liberation, Pinar
indicates, is an ongoing process, both personally and socially, but he does
seem to obliquely point as well toward a transcendental ego which sounds
very much like the Self which is the culmination of Jung’s centering notion of
individuation away from the uncentered ego:
Just as one cannot peer directly into the sun but can more easily 
examine the earth it lights, so one cannot easily peer directly into the 
self. . . .  One’s effort is always to return to “the things themselves,” to 
experience that which is “preconceptual.” The aspiration is to unearth 
material hitherto submerged in unconsciousness. (1981, p. 442)
The question of remembering “the things in themselves" is of
paramount importance in any investigation of memory. Can we recall pure
experience, perceptions, or images without peering through a linguistic
subjectivity? The question is moot, but such conceptions as transcendence
or the Jungian Self cannot help but be tinged with such academically
outdated terms as spirit or soul, terms that seemed acceptable to Pinar in
1976 when he compared currere to Zen Buddhist meditation.
Interestingly, the satori or awakening in Zen is considered to be
linguistically impossible to describe—often dismissed in a self-effacing
manner as “nothing special”—but is explained by Suzuki (1954/64) as a
memory without an object: “The awakening is really the rediscovery or the
excavation of a long lost treasure” (p. 179); that is to say, koan-istically, the
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remembering of the face one had before conception. Preconceptual 
memory, image, soul, and Zen’s void will be invoked further throughout.
The question arises whether such an inner liberation leads to a private 
satori or individuation—a sort of self-actualization without an effect on the 
world—or whether the remembering beyond ego takes one directly into the 
language and symbol of the world. This is the position of post­
structuralists—who most often deny they have a “position” or are even post- 
structuralists. Politically inspired critical theorists, neo-Marxists, and the 
feminists of curriculum also see the self as  only an illusion, a 
“subjectification" of the power elite, and the search for it only “betrays a 
hunger for something outside, something beyond judgment according to 
which we might be absolutely certain—according to which any one of us 
might be the one presumed to know. This is, of course, the logic of 
domination” (Pagano, 1991, p. 201).
Individual memory in this view has no purpose whatsoever. Diagnault 
and Gauthier (1981) see  only the “paradigm of infinite regression” in seeking 
to remember the Self, transcendental ego, or the soul. This is precisely the 
point where the phenomenology of memory shades into the hermeneutics of 
memory which seeks no final essences but only the revelation of the 
intersubjectivity of all experience, where the sense of self is an afterthought 
of communal interaction. When we look for original memories or “when we 
look for pure perceptions we run the risk of an infinite regress” (Willis, 1991,
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p. 176). Every memory is a re-membering. This sense of memory is 
obviously and inextricably linked to the world since it must interpreted in 
symbols culturally understood, the chief symbol-system being language. I 
understand the pivotal role of language and this intermingling of part and 
whole to be two of the themes in the process of the hermeneutic circle, the 
third being the inherent creativity of interpretation (Smith, 1991). With this in 
mind, my research into memory must include the memory of the world—the 
memory within language and semiotics—as well as the memory within the 
presumably private self, or image of that self.
Dismissing the self as a fiction should not really have such an impact 
on what sort of experience remembering is. Dismissing anything as a fiction 
is just another way of falling into an infinite regress. It is like declaring that 
metaphors are not clear writing—as if there were any writing that was not 
metaphor (Olney, 1972). Language, itself, may dismissed as fiction—even 
though it seems to some like Lacan (1977), Derrida (1978), and Kristeva 
(1989) to be the only “reality” we have. The self may be just a fiction within a 
linguistic fiction within another fiction of “the world,” but we’re going to have 
to live with it either way, as Philippe Lejeune (1989) expostulates: “Telling 
the truth about the self, constituting the self as complete subject—it is a 
fantasy. In spite of the fact that autobiography is impossible, this in no way 
prevents it from existing” (p. 132). Olney (1980) suggests that for a self to 
deny its own existence is either "bravura” or “anxiety” when he states that
23
what they are still troubling about is the self and consciousness or 
knowledge of it, even though in a kind of bravura way some of them 
may be denying rather than affirming its reality or its possibility. And 
this is the crux of the matter, the heart of the explanation for the special 
appeal of autobiography to students of literature in recent times: it is a 
fascination with the self and its profound, its endless mysteries and, 
accompanying that fascination, an anxiety about the self, an anxiety 
about the dimness and vulnerability of that entity that no one has ever 
seen or touched or tasted, (p. 23)
This sensorily unavailable “entity” throws open the question of the 
possibility of there being a phenomenology of the self. Willis (1991) notes 
that Pinar and Grumet have largely departed from the fields of 
phenomenology, Grumet into using autobiography to develop feminist theory 
and as the foundation for teacher education, and Pinar for more abstract 
philosophical theorizing, neither seeking any longer to “peer into the sun" of 
an essential self:
The intuitive scanning of one’s own primary experience, which Pinar 
and Grumet suggest, is borrowed directly from the philosophical 
phenomenological tradition, although in elaborating it in their own 
ways appropriate to curriculum studies they have not pursued the 
traditional philosophic search for universal essences within 
experience, (p. 180)
Individual memory, then, can hardly be trustworthy as to its facticity. In 
this interpretation there is no unique soul which remembers.
Hermeneutically, to remember is to interpret and to interpret is to involve us 
in the semiotic world which created a space for our sense of self in the first 
place. We must always remember through the lens of who we think we are, 
and there may be all sorts of blind spots and wish fulfillments involved in
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such remembering. I have experienced it with friends or acquaintances 
when we have reminisced over occasions in which we had shared. Unless 
our stories had been shared together over the years to produce mutual 
memories, I have found the extent to which our memories have varied 
nothing short of astonishing. Both in detail and overall effect it has seemed 
we could not possibly have been at the same place at the same time. And 
my memory was so clear!
Truth in autobiography with regard to times, dates, and the unfolding 
of events has been questioned in autobiographical theory for a  long while. In 
the quest for truth, even autobiographers have had biographies written of 
them, Henry Miller being one example (Jay, 1978; Dearborn, 1991).
Mary McCarthy, in Memories of a Catholic Girlhood (1957), first told 
her narratives with all her “natural” judgmentalism and superiority, then 
checked the facts in italicized sections at the end of each chapter from 
records and relatives and wondered about the discrepancies and 
generalizations her own character had produced. Further backing the “law” 
of infinite regression, however, was that, opposed to her own opinions and 
memories in many cases, were simply other opinions and memories. She 
claims the writing and research were important experiences in themselves, 
however.
Going even further in the quest for truth is Ronald Fraser in his 
fascinating multi-layered recollection In Search of a Past: The Manor House,
Amnersfield 1933-1945 (1984). Fraser, himself a historical researcher, was 
this time his own historian. Recalling his basic impressions, he also gathers 
the memories of the servants who worked at the Manor House and their often 
opposing viewpoints on the events surrounding his childhood. As a third 
approach, he relinquishes the role of questioner to be questioned himself in 
psychoanalysis. The revelations come fast and furious but in the end nothing 
is resolved, as indicated by his analyst’s response to his (Fraser’s) pleas for 
a summative opinion. The analyst replies: “ ... ” The hint, it seems, is that it is 
in the writing, in the quest itself, that a sense of meaning—even meaning as 
an endless project—is discovered.
In Childhood (1983), Nathalie Sarraute tries a  different approach. 
Writing as an octogenarian, she allows two separate voices (at least) to 
recreate her past, one of which seems to be more frivolous and youthful and 
the other more stern and less forgiving. She attempts to be true to the facts of 
the past, yet succeeds in an evocation of personal experience which refuses 
to be hooked into a single self.
Though history, itself, has been seen as a fictitious concatenation by 
those who interpret its impossibly disparate events (Veyne, 1988; Young, 
1990), the above examples are unashamedly literary and not at all like the 
memoirs of the rich and famous. There is no pretence of historical fact, 
despite the unusual efforts to discover it. The truest past, the past as creative 
of self, it seems, is discovered in its portrayal and the experience of such
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portrayal. The addition of other voices may take a summative unity of 
experience beyond reach, but the additional dimensions express a truth to 
which a mere chronology can never attain. The paradox of symbology may 
not reveal a self but it opens out in the twilight realm of that from which selves 
are created, according to these artists. The literal succumbs to the literary in 
autobiography, which does not imply purposeful deception, as Pinar has 
noted, but an expansion of the Lebenswelt and the memorying which 
subtends It: “we aim, in autobiography, at truthfulness, not truth, at 
expanding and complicating the lived space in which we dwell, through 
which we experience the world—as that space expands, so does the world to 
which we have access” (quoted in Edgerton, 1992, p. 192).
This “truthfulness" seems to be a reference to honesty when delving 
into one’s personal store of memories, misguided as they may be, but it also 
implies the bold truthfulness necessary to doubt their eternal veracity. Such 
deconstructing and reconstructing is what Pinar (1992b) implies in his notion 
of “an architecture of self," what Edgerton (1992) interprets as “a construction 
that takes seriously the boundaries one has erected as well as dissolved" (p. 
188), or as Pinar (1992b) states simply: “What is planned and constructed 
can be deconstructed” (p. 395). Memory, then, must be considered fallible, 
subject to one’s present blueprints. But from where have the blueprints 
emerged? Surely, they can only have changed from memory’s creation
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through spontaneous inspiration—presumably in solitude—or through
dialogic insight, a merging of one’s  house blueprint into a community plan.
Spontaneous inspiration has no part in the doubting of both personal
memory and the social memory which forms it, according to the sociological
wing of the group of curricular theorists once called reconceptualists (Pinar,
1975, 1988b). This “wing” largely derives from the neo-Marxism of the
Frankfurt School and have more recently been characterized as  critical
theorists. Writers like Giroux and McLaren (1989) and Apple (1979)
understand the past to be purposeful deceptions of capitalistic power and
they work prolifically to reveal the “hidden” curriculum which supports the
ideological elite. They succeed in revealing the industrial support system
that schools are urged to become and the artifice of both public and private
memory, but there still seem s to be the suggestion that they are somehow
tuned in to a higher justice and deeper truth:
The interest of the critical tradition is not just persuasion but a 
predetermination to shape the social order in fixed directions; it 
requires material evidence of ideas translated into practice. The 
curricular agenda of the critical has the character of a blueprint 
operating in the name of justice. Pedagogy is concerned with 
mobilizing the social conscience of students into acts of naming and 
eradicating the evils of the times. (Smith, 1991, p. 196)
Apparently there is no point in personal remembering, a s  such activity
merely supports the ideological illusion of individuality. Remembering must
be done in like-minded groups basically to recall the social injustices to
which we have been heir. Pinar (1981) feels they have lost contact with their
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own inspirations and what they “are telling us when they insist upon the 
primacy of economic and political determinants of human life is that they 
themselves are so conditioned.. . .  Structurally they are no different from their 
counterparts on the Right. Both confess their vulnerability to the social by 
their preoccupation with if (p. 435). He could have added that 
hermeneutically or deconstructively speaking their interpretations can only 
be narratives open to the infinite regress of further interpretation. This is still 
a contentious point in the field, but it does seem that most thinkers who see 
memory as purely an ideological construct usually can only offer a 
truer—even if intricately subtle—ideological construct to replace it.
Madeleine Grumet (1991) now sees ideology embedded in our 
memories and our interpretations of them. Our imagined truths are more 
often merely the discourse of our place absorbed by the site of our bodies.
To diminish the concretization of such ideological identities and to open it to 
new perspectives, she asks for more self-criticism: “After years of working 
with autobiography I have learned to ask for multiple accounts in order to 
diminish coherence and the ideologies that accompany stories that attempt 
to bind together the varied moments of our lives into a logic of development, 
purpose, or necessity" (p. 108). This implies that such logic obscures a truth 
more than creates one. She does not have another ideology, however, with 
which to transform past memories. She instead seems to move her students 
to understand that they are themselves narrative constructs:
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Narrative is a  form for inquiry that can contain both the world and 
relations within which it becomes the focus for our attention, a  locus of 
concern, a system of meanings, in short, our world. The narrative 
encodes time and space. Like our bodies, it literally takes place. Its 
story line takes up time, as do we, from beginning to end” (p. 107).
Though narrative products, self and truth seem, in her regard, to be always
being storied, in process, and never grasped.
The only autobiographical theorist in curriculum today who may
believe in more truthful memories than those we first conjure up seems to be
Richard Butt and his colleague Danielle Raymond. Early on, Butt (1985)
employed such Freudian ideas as projection and defence-mechanisms to
explain the misconceptions in our narratives of memory. Such Freudian
terms imply a  self which uses delusion to maintain its identity schema. This
was later tempered with more existentialist and phenomenological terms as
revealed in the title of his 1990 essay, “Autobiographic Praxis and Self
Education: From Alienation to Authenticity.” By the authentic memory or the
authentic self, Butt may be only implying the “truthfulness” as suggested by
Pinar as  an approach and not the confessional outpouring of St. Augustine
or Rousseau or Freud’s patients, but this is uncertain.
The use of the term “authenticity” does suggest that there are truer
narratives than others, however, and Graham (1991) states this means Butt
and Raymond have not accepted language as being merely a system of
differences without actual referential signifieds:
It would appear that Butt and Raymond are committed from the outset 
to a view of language as a transparent medium and consequently
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consider that the value of a narrative account lies primarily in the 
extent to which it can be checked out for its correspondences to some 
previous event. In other words, Butt and Raymond seem to want an 
autobiographical narrative to resemble a  window that provides access 
to some preexisting reality uncontaminated by the writing process and 
the intentions of the writer, (p. 114)
According to Graham, this is a  motivating factor behind the
development of “collaborative autobiography” for Butt and Raymond (1987,
1989) and Butt, Raymond, and Yamagishi (1988). Graham notes the
emphasis on trust in the collaboration but also that “on the other hand, the
researchers’ desire to sit in on the teachers’ classrooms in order to check out
whether the teachers were telling the truth about themselves and their
practices provides a broad hint that they may be ambivalent about the status
of their own narratives of the teachers’ classrooms as fictional constructions
themselves" (p. 115).
In my view, Graham overstates his case. The teachers with whom Butt
and Raymond, and now Butt and Townsend (1990), work all wish to see
themselves more honestly and take responsibility for their own behavioral
blind spots. They have entered into collaborative autobiography less as a
search for final truth, than in an effort to overcome the defensive
programming of their own ego-schemata. If identity is intersubjective, as is
demanded by those who wonder at their own words, then collaborative
autobiography may well prove to be a way to ease the grip of narcissism
(Lasch, 1984) and to objectify the self, discovering the social interactions
which are always in the process of creating us.
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Butt does seem to accept an inescapable “isness” in personhood, as
well as a “condemned to be free" attitude, as  anyone who has been
influenced by Sartrean existentialism would be expected to accept, and Butt
(1990) tells us he has. He refers (1991), however, to the unique research
tool of his and Raymond’s as worthwhile not because of its true revelations of
self but because it is “energizing and empowering for teachers”:
Raymond and I evolved collaborative autobiography as a means for 
understanding teachers’ knowledge and development. The process 
provides a powerful means through which the teacher can express 
who she is and who she wishes to become. In our experience, it is 
very energizing and empowering for teachers. It enables significant 
renewal and professional development. This approach highlights 
storytelling as a dynamic and culturally appropriate form of pedagogy, 
(p. 273)
Finally, it seem s to me, the factualness of memory is not what is 
important to Butt or his collaborators. Fundamentally, he is most concerned 
with the meaning and experience of actual teachers engaged in teaching 
and, most often, on their terms: “In interpreting and reconstructing our past, 
present, and futures, we move beyond what we thought before through 
action. In exploring these notions through acting them out we are able to 
rehearse the possibility of transformation” (Butt, 1991, p. 276).
It is interesting to note that as  Pinar in recent years has largely 
forsaken the interactions of autobiographical work in graduate classes— 
certainly not attempting to take currere personally into the public schools— 
and has withdrawn into the Castelian abstractions of ever more esoteric 
autobiographic theory (Kincheloe & Pinar, 1991; Pinar & Reynolds, 1992),
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Butt has moved directly into the schools to work with teachers in the field 
(Butt, Raymond, Yamagishi, 1988; Butt, Townsend, Raymond, 1991).
There are two varying approaches to memory here, both of them 
necessary to our existence as humans but perhaps opposed even in origin 
(Neumann, 1954; Kolakowski, 1972/89). One sees memory as techne: a 
practical assistant to action; the other sees memory as memor: mindfulness, 
a recoil of the soul upon itself whose only product seem s to be actions, 
representations, and artifacts which serve the needs of the animal body not 
at all. Heidegger saw the difference this way: “Only now, within the widely 
and deeply grasped essence of memory, the contrast emerges between that 
firm hold on things, which the Romans called memoria tenere, and 
evanescence" (In Krell, 1990, p. 297).
Seeking a “firm hold,” even collaboratively with the full agreement of 
the collaborators, is not the architecture of self Pinar (1992b) envisions: “One 
danger of autobiography is further reification of these processes, and the 
construction of an unchanging edifice, a skyscraper proudly proclaiming its 
owner and occupants" (p. 406). Pinar’s blueprints of self are not mazes 
within which we can at last find our way because—collaboratively—the 
neighbours phone to tell us where we are; such deconstructing blueprints 
more resemble the runes of an anarchitecture whose self-constructions 
evanesce even as they are glimpsed. I will discuss this further as I discuss 
the self as aesthetic creation.
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Connelly and Clandinin (1991), narrative researchers in other
teachers’ stories, have given up the expectation of finding a true self behind
the stories they encounter. Somewhat uncomfortably, it seems, they admit:
There are more Ts" than person and researcher within each research 
participant. . . .  In narrative inquiry we see that the practices drawn out 
in the research situation are lodged in our personal knowledge of the 
world. One of our tasks in writing narrative accounts is to convey a 
sense of the complexity of all the T s ” all of the ways each of us have of 
knowing, (p. 140)
They accept no authentic, singular self but a plurality of selves, each,
presumably with its own memorial interpretations. How, then, it may be
wondered, do they manage to decide which accounts are “more authentic”
and which “less authentic"? They have developed their own system for
approximating the truth, it seems:
In our studies we use the notions of “adequacy” and “plausibility.” A 
“plausible” account is one that tends to “ring true.” It is an account of 
which one might say “I can see that happening.” Thus, while fantasy 
may be an invitational element in fictional narrative, plausibility exerts 
firmer tugs in empirical narratives, (p. 136)
In their notion of empirical narratives, they may find an ally in Grumet 
(1991), who feels autobiography should be subject to both a  sympathetic 
hearing and an expert review. This does not explain how some of the finest 
works of “pure” fiction so seduce us with their “adequacy” and “plausibility.” If 
the self is a  figment of social discourse, it must be wondered where spaces 
are opened for pure fictions in the first place, or if a  space within a  mythic sort 
of fiction opens out into the facticity of individual memory. Whence comes 
imagination or intuition into this culturally-determined intersubjectivity?
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Curricular autobiography has been somewhat appropriated as  a
mode of liberation for feminists (e.g., Benstock, 1988; Grumet, 1988; Pagano,
1990; Witherell & Noddings, 1991), or self-realization for marginal groups in
general. For such groups, the question of the ultimate reality of the self may
seem  unimportant. According to Edgerton (1992), the question is which self
to becom e—that offered by the larger society or the self seeking existence
within its own cultural memories:
Often, in “writing the self into existence” such authors are also actively 
engaged in writing an entire people along with them. This alters the 
context for theorizing about autobiography from the apparent context 
for much written autobiographical theory. This context, with its larger 
pedagogical and emancipatory project, can render arguments about 
“fictions of the self" pedantic, but, at the sam e time it renders the 
isolated, unified, “self-identical” self obsolete—a distortion, (p. 186)
Dewey and G. H. Mead, according to Graham (1991), understood long
ago that the self is social, and it is for this reason feminists have taken issue
with the individualism—either a s  self-referential or self-creative—of much
autobiographical writing and theory. Identity, it is claimed, is exclusively
relational, so claims to individualism only reflect the mutual projections of a
privileged—read employed white heterosexual male—minority. Friedman
(1988) claims both Georges Gusdorf and Jam es Olney in Olney’s 1980
collection of autobiographical essays ignore “the differences in socialization
in the construction of male and female gender identity” (pp. 34-35) and
perpetrate the myth of individuality presumably to the detriment of those, like
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women, who are either not so privileged or so inclined toward individuality. 
We recall ourselves differently through different socializations.
The argument may be “academic.” Individuality conceived as an 
impregnable castle, or a towering skyscraper, imagines itself as self-created 
and established behind its thick walls of self-defenses. Of course, such 
rugged individualism has no doubt about the correctness of its memories and 
values and so, like Dirty Harry, can discern the good “us” from the evil “them" 
and proceed, apparently, to blow the evil others away without remorse.
Socially constructed subjectivity, on the other hand, sometimes leans 
so far into the communal register that positions become rules and variance 
ceases to be tolerated. Mythically, this is the change from inspired prophets 
to priestly “orders.” Autobiography in support of feminist positions which 
remembers socialized injustice has been called empowering by many (e.g., 
Miller, 1987; Roman, Christian-Smith, Ellsworth, 1988) but there is a danger 
here of a presumption of knowing what true justice, or true selves are: an 
essentialism which ignores, again, the hermeneutic paradigm of infinite 
regression, as well as  forgetting that even "essential” selves must have 
developed as  places in some community.
William Pinar (1992b), politically feminist, reminds us that communal 
relations may be modified from “commodity” relations, but also that there is a 
time when even the most socially-oriented autobiographers must withdraw 
into a situation, if not of individualism, then certainly of isolation:
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Autobiography as alternately sublimated and desublimated modalities 
of self-self, self-other, and self-object relations, is itself an exclusion, 
an absence, in schools and in the public sphere generally. To engage 
oneself and others autobiographically reconnects the minimalized, 
psychological self of the public, political sphere as it de-commodifies 
interpersonal relations. Such engagement risks debasement if 
performed exclusively or primarily through speech, that presence of 
immediacy which recapitulates the momentariness of mass culture. 
Only through the “secondariness” of writing, solitarily, in a 
Kierkegaardian “soliloquy with oneself,” can the architect construct 
(and deconstruct) his presence to himself and to others in the world.
(p. 408)
Despite the different cultural and political projects of feminists in
general, it is possible that most women, for whatever reason, remember in
different ways than most men. Benstock (1988) has indicated in her
introductory chapter that
women's writings often proceed from anxiety rather than desire and 
are written under the sign of melancholia rather than mourning. These 
differences—which mark in a general sense a difference between 
male and female writing—give rise to a specially marked form of 
writing, one that situates the loss that is the spur to creation not in the 
past (as Freud and Lacan theorized) but rather in the future, reading 
its possibilities as the aging process itself, (p. 8)
Be that as it may, it seems that most can agree that self is a social
construct. This opens up problems when it is considered upon what site
such a self is constructed. To ignore the body, both in its unique placement
and its genetically specific drives and attributes, is to fall into behaviorism in
which there is no free-will allowed the person at all (except for the free-will of
the experts who decide what behaviors are most appropriate). Felicity
Nussbaum (1988) indicates that socially created subjectivity, of the kind
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described by Lacan or Foucault, does not imply that such a subject is unable
to participate in its own ongoing, shifting process, but can “adopt a position”
within the language-world:
This reformulated "self," then, is a product of specific discourse and 
social process. Individuals construct themselves as subjects through 
language, but individual subjects—rather than being the source of 
their own self-generated and self-expressive meaning—adopt 
positions available within language at a given moment. This 
disruption of the traditional self redefines the individual as a position, a 
locus where discourses intersect, and subjectivity as a social construct 
that is constantly being reorganized. The intersections between social 
relations and individual subject perpetually shift and change to 
produce an inconsistent and contradictory subject, (pp. 149, 150)
In my quest for memory, is there any use to looking toward the
individual, or some sort of inner essence, at all—even the body—, or should I
focus only on the larger memories of the language-world which has told us
who we are? Nussbaum indicates we are an intersection of discourses.
Was there any “being” in us before we were introduced to the world of others:
of language, but also the semiotics of faces, of touches, and of aural tones.
Martha Heyneman, in an article called “The Mother Tongue" (1992), is
ambivalent on this point. By looking at the stories of those who were
deprived of normal human contact of the sort described above in their
earliest years, she notes how fearful or “bestial” these beings were. (“Bestial”
may be an unfortunate choice of words, however, because many of the
“lower” animals are alone from the moment of hatching and seem  to survive
on genetically-programmed knowledge.)
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She mentions the famous experiment of Frederick II (1194-1250) of
Germany who had some children reared without sound or touch or facial
interplay to see if they would speak Greek or Hebrew or whatever. They all
died. Casper Hauser who spent his first years in a dungeon had great
difficulty in distinguishing things and learning depth perception as opposed
to a chaos of colours on a flat service. The Wild Boy of Aveyron never
learned anything to speak of. For humans—who can be sure of dolphins or
chimps?—early contact with the “mother tongue" seem s to be necessary for
identity and for life, itself. As the poet Rilke (1939) wrote, elegaically:
Mother, ... you arched over those new eyes
the friendly world, averting the one that was strange.
Where, oh where, are the years when you simply displaced 
for him, with your slender figure, the surging abyss?
Heyneman feels “There is a sense that one is calling another, and a
recognition that one has been called by others, out of darkness and
uncontrollable chaos” (p. 10). Her paramount example is Helen Keller who,
she notes, had nineteen months as an infant to experience those aspects of
the mother tongue to awaken her soul before being plunged into her
particular darkness and silence for the next six years. Helen became
articulate enough to attempt to explain the oblivion of her previous life:
Before my teacher came to me, I did not know that I am. I lived in a 
world that was a no-world. I cannot hope to describe adequately that 
unconscious, yet conscious time of nothingness. I did not know that I 
knew aught, or that I lived or acted or desired. I had neither will nor 
intellect. I was carried along to objects and acts by a certain blind 
natural impetus. I had a  mind which caused me to feel anger, 
satisfaction, desire. These two facts led those about me to suppose
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that I willed and thought. I can remember all this, not because I knew it 
was so, but because I have tactile memory. It enables me to
remember that I never contracted my forehead in the act of thinking___
I also recall factually the fact that never in a start of the body or a 
heartbeat did I feel that I loved or cared for anything. My inner life, 
then, was a blank without a past, present, or future. (Keller, 1910. The 
World I Live in. p. 113. In Heyneman, 1992, p. 11)
Personal memory, then, in these theories, cannot exceed itself; it
cannot go back to personal memories before the life-force was summoned
into the world by the mother tongue because there was no person there. In
the life-world, personal memories seem to be created in the shifting loci
“where discourses intersecf (Nussbaum), rather then gathering around a
central core of self. If one is to pursue memory, then, the quest must be into
the formative discourses which have intersected at the position of subjectivity
and continue to do so. Because of our intersubjectivity, our sense of self is
constantly changing, though primary memory and body memory provide us
with a sense of continuity (Casey, 1987b, next section). It is no wonder
memories are seldom, if ever, exact when our very identities are so
intermingled with those of others. In this situation, it must be admitted that
imagination is always active in our remembering.
But this too fails to escape the paradigm of infinite regression. If our
imagination is given a  vague sort of primacy and we can now announce our
autobiographies to be artistic fictions, it brings us no closer to the mystery of
how memory extends into the language-world. History, as noted, is most
often merely the “official version” of the past, a narrow sequencing of events
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according to present interpretation. Pinar (1992b) indicates that our
narratives of memory always reach back into the larger stories of our culture
and must do so. Not just the official history of a people but what we today
would call their literature and other arts provide the mythic context from which
our imagining takes the form for remembered life-stories:
Cultural myths are, of course, intertwined with personal myths. In one 
sense an architect of self works with the material of myths, especially 
its literary subgenre, stories. We tell stories about our families, our 
school history, etc., and in so doing interpret experience, creating 
fictions. Our personal stories occur in cultural stories, sometimes 
coinciding with the latter, sometimes told in opposition or denial of 
them. The point is that in a Nietzschean sense the self is fictive; it is an 
aesthetic creation, and the means by which the self is planned and 
“built” are story-telling and myth-making, (p. 394)
But if the self is an “aesthetic creation," a “mythmaking” project, it still
leaves the question moot as to the sources of such imaginative myths. Do
we remember and somehow reassemble the potential tales or inspired
visions within the language-world? Infinite regression again: We
understand inspiration to come from the “unconscious,” but is such an
unconscious within us as soul or biological potential, or “around” us in the
repressed unsaid of the linguistic? Why are some driven to “reassemble”
and others to remain assembled?
This approaches the peculiarly Western dichotomy referred to as  that
of the subject/object. In the mediaeval West, the study of alchemy first
seem ed to locate the unconscious within, as  in the depths of soul:
Mercurius ... is an absolutely primitive concept, a projection 
symbolizing the unconscious itself where nothing can be
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differentiated. He is in effect a  symbol of the subjective factor, the 
unconscious as a dynamic energetic substance correlated with other 
aspects of energy composing the cosmos. Its essence is 
symbol-production. . . .  Mercurius is the inchoate source of the 
conscious complex, the ego, which is the son of darkness and through 
which the “world” comes into existence. (Grinnell, 1973, p. 17)
In other cultures, especially those where a "within” simply has no
place, the source of all mystery was the world itself. For the Australian
Aborigine, the world was derived from the Dreamtime, and his existence
always a part of the Dreaming: “An Aborigine can never escape the sacred
history of his people. He is constantly in contact with a metaphysical
perspective which conditions his way of thinking and acting” (Cowan, 1992,
p. 64).
Each case indicates a supra-personal remembering or a potential for 
such, either in the encounter with the unconscious or with the gods who are 
always present. Imagining gives shape to the vague intuitions of memory so 
that self and world again intermingle like a  dream that can’t be grasped.
Such intuitions in our era have led to the idea that we have paid a price for 
projecting the gods (or God) far beyond Earth and introjecting our unique 
egos, our subjectivities, within. A. Vernon Woodworth (1989) has bluntly 
stated in his article, “Architecture and the Anima Mundi: Transformations in 
Sacred Space," that “the displacement of deities to a  heavenly region 
resulted in a lessening in the experience of sacred immanence, that is, of the 
Anima Mundi” (p. 135). It may be said that what we now somewhat
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disparagingly call imagination was taken from the world and introjected with 
our subjectivities, where, for those receptive, it still continues to work.
This imagination, I hope to show throughout this paper, is more a 
particular kind of reception to images conserved in memory than the reverse. 
Yeats in “The Second Coming" (1921) expressed his tendency to be subject 
to such spells or visions:
Hardly are those words out 
When a vast image out of Spiritus Mundi 
Troubles my sight, (lines 11-13)
The editors then proceed to quote Yeats to expand on his notion of
"Spritus Mundi”:
Or Anima Mundi, the Great Memory. “Before the mind’s  eye, whether 
in sleep or waking, came images that one was to discover presently in 
some book one had never read, and after looking in vain for 
explanation to the current theory of forgotten personal memory, I came 
to believe in a great memory passing on from generation to 
generation. . . . Our daily thought was certainly but the line of foam at 
the shallow edge of a vast luminous sea” (Per Arnica Siientia Lunae, 
“Anima Mundi,” § ii. In Allison, et al., 1983, p. 883).
Such a “Great Memory,” composed as  it is of images, speaks of a
preconceptual memory, the existence of which remains a controversial
question in these language-immersed times, and one which can never be
finally resolved (from our present emplacement). We certainly cannot think
our way to a preconceptual state, and direct experience of such a state can
have no memoried content, depending as it does on re-presentation. Aoki
(1991), however, still believes in the “mindfulness” of direct experience, and
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Zen masters did not seem to mind that their awareness was not explainable.
It was, after all, “nothing special" (Suzuki, 1954/64).
Autobiographical truth and the self of autobiography are going to have
to wait for someone else to locate their referents. I have unearthed
indications that, though memory cannot be “counted on” for self-certainty or
for truth, its very evanescence may lead it to images of a preconceptual state,
a  "dreamtime” which may be a sort of fount of imagination, though this can
never be known, that is, known conceptually. It may certainly be imagined.
But this is not to eschew the ego or the power of its critical concepts.
Heyneman’s (1992) description of the “spiritual path” may apply as well to
those who attempt to remember beyond words and it seem s a good place to
end this extended section:
It seem s ironic that later in life, if we pursue a spiritual path, we 
struggle with the ego, to still the stream of incessant chatter that began 
at our birth, and to realize our own nothingness, in order to make room 
in ourselves for something greater than the ego. But it takes a strong 
ego with a critical mind to distinguish what is genuinely greater from 
what is ersatz, and to surrender voluntarily to ... what one has been 
looking for all one’s life. If we had not been called out of nonbeing by 
our mother and father, or those who undertook to fill their places, there 
would be no pilgrim to set out on the search, (pp. 11, 12).
§Phenom ena of Rem em bering and Beyond. Edward Casey's 
Remembering: A Phenomenological Study (1987b), ten years in the writing 
and a follow-up to his Imagining: A Phenomenological Study (1976), and 
David Farrell Krell’s Of Memory, Reminiscence, and Writing: On the Verge
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(1990), which he claims has been in process since his research proposal for 
his dissertation in 1969, have been highly suggestive in my often pathless 
wanderings in the labyrinth of memory. Both are phenomenological studies, 
though Casey transcends the phenomenological method when he takes 
“memory beyond mind,” and Krell deconstructs his own writing in a 
fascinating manner as he allows into his text the whisperings of the literature 
that spoke to him in his investigations.
Casey’s book is a revelation, ultimately affirming for the Great Memory, 
or anima mundi, thus somewhat humbling for our proud humanistic—man 
the measure of all things—enterprise. Krell’s book is an astonishing tour de 
force which he considers “a long and interesting death" (p. x/). He begins by 
quoting himself when he was setting out that "Memory has a way of 
transforming any content into a wondrous appearance, bathing even the 
most traumatic event in a soothing light...” but concludes his preface with the 
resignation: “I wanted that soothing light for my writing, but it turned out to be 
a darkness. A darkness that irony and science could only disperse, never 
penetrate” (p. xii).
Krell, primarily known as a Heidegger scholar, has understood the 
erasure that Derridean post-structuralism requires. The very structure of 
language, its linear sentencing and its skyscraper constructions built by 
argument from the ground up, is the source of what we call sense and from 
which we derive meaning. It is the victory of logos over ...something, but this
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something has not been inscribed in language and cannot be inscribed into 
it without becoming another linear plank in the unending skyscraper. Krell 
has presented a magnetic text which succeeds more than anything outside of 
literature in evoking what a post-structure might be, what forgotten 6lan vital 
might lie in what the structure has dismissed as madness: “But this crisis in 
which reason is madder than madness—for reason is non-meaning and 
oblivion—and in which madness is more rational than reason, for it is closer 
to the wellspring of sense, however silent or murmuring—this crisis has 
always begun and is interminable” (Derrida, 1978, p. 62).
In this brief section, however, I shall delineate Casey’s work in order to 
make some foundational sense for the chapters to follow. Casey’s (1987b) 
position is that “plural modes of access to the remembered past are far more 
plentiful than philosophers and psychologists have managed to ascertain" (p. 
xi), though he does make exception for the cognitive-behavioral work of 
Marcia K. Johnson (1985). Because of these multifarious modes of 
remembering and its always “on the verge" aspect, Casey says that, unlike 
imagining, in “remembering, there is an unresolvable ‘restance’1—resistance 
as well as remainder—which calls for a  different approach" (p. xi).
Casey claims we are drawn away from the earthy burden of 
remembering toward Milan Kundera’s “unbearable lightness of being" (1985)
1 Derrida (1981)
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and Nietzsche’s “active forgetfulness" (1983). It is for this reason we turn to
the fascination of the computer:
The half-life induced by forgetting, its oblivious half-life, tempts us to 
attribute the full reality of remembering to machines. As if by a rigid 
law of compensation, the logic seems to be: the less responsibility I 
have for my own remembering, the more I can forget—ultimately, the 
more I can forget my own forgetting. And the more I can forget, the 
more responsibility I can ascribe to other entities: most conveniently to 
computers, or to my own brain or mind regarded as computerlike, (p. 3)
Casey makes several dichotomies, between which some structure can
be discerned. Being who we are, some structure is necessary for us to feel a
sense of place, and without a sense of place, according to Casey, there can
be no remembering. Casey traces philosophies on memory basically from
the works of Plato and those of Aristotle somewhat as follows: Those who
have followed the former he calls the “activist” tradition, and those of the
latter, the “passivist" tradition. Plato, of course, saw knowledge as
anamnesis, a  recovery of the forgotten truths from the realm of pure form or
pure ideas: active. Aristotle, on the contrary, understood memory as a waxen
tablet on which were inscribed the detritus of perceptual and intellectual
events: passive—there are correct memories and incorrect memories.
The passivist paradigm has prevailed as science has proved its
effectiveness and factual information has been documented in writing to
make it available to others. Facts are facts, are they not?
Only in the undercurrents of the occult and alchemy did the activist
paradigm continue, until Nietzsche dramatically arrived on the scene to
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announce the death of God and the end of history. Nietzsche pointed out 
that, like Luria’s “S.” (1968) who could recall nearly all the details with which 
he was confronted, too much memoried data would dissolve identity and 
make us insane. “S.” had to actively forget in order to carry on with his life, 
yet he did not possess a strong sense of self. Nietzsche advocated forgetting 
to avoid the horror—the “heaviness”—of realizing that all is an eternal return.
Heidegger deplored our recalling of the details of egoistic selfhood to 
cover over our forgetfulness of being. It was Heidegger who blamed Plato for 
taking memory from myth, from the gods, and internalizing it as though it 
were some sort of transcendent region for the esoteric elect. Heidegger
(1977), like Casey, recommends “commemorative thought” as a way to 
experience the body in place, to experience time in place, and to awaken to 
being. It was Merleau-Ponty (1978 ) who recognized the body as primary 
place of memory. In my Coda and conclusion, I shall expand somewhat on 
commemoration and body memory.
Freud and his heirs in psychoanalysis developed an active memory 
theory in which either the recovery of repressed memorial contents or the 
discovery of the need for forgetfulness would give the ego more scope to 
deal with the overwhelming moods or neurotic actions it found the body 
undergoing. Jung, of course, implied that memory and dream not only 
alleviate repression but provide dangerous but passable doorways to the 
bottomless contents of the collective unconscious.
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On the other hand, the passive tradition, according to Casey (1987b), 
“is still very much with us, whether it takes the form of a naive empiricism or of 
a  sophisticated model of information processing.” This is opposed to the 
activism “according to which memory involves the creative transformation of 
experience rather than its internalized reduplication in images or traces 
construed as  copies" (p. 15).
Activism is involved in all remembering to some extent in that a  search 
is often required to retrieve even “passive” contents. The objective 
experimentalists, usually calling themselves psychologists, are opposed by 
the activist originators of schema theory: “But it is not until recent times that 
full-fledged activist models of memory have been developed: e.g., in Jan e t’s 
idea of the retroactive transformation of memories by m eans of their 
narration^ ... in Bartlett’s theory of the evolving character of memories as 
these are reconstructed by various memorial schemata; and in Piaget’s 
similar theory that memories directly reflect changing schem es of 
accommodation to and assimilation of experience" (Casey, 1987b, p. 15).
Activism seem s to be liable to both negative and positive 
interpretations. Schema theory indicates that memories are processed, filed, 
censored, or altered to accommodate a  schematic self-representation which 
is usually unconsciously derived (Ross, 1992), or in-gathered from social, 
especially parental, suggestions. A schem a is mirror-image, an objectively
i Certainly worth noting for autobiographical theorists in curriculum.
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apprehended self. The more unconsciously such schemata are kept and 
held there, the less self-aware we are and the more prone to self-delusions— 
though often others around us, to their amusement or disgust, do not partake 
of those sam e delusions. Piaget (1973), however, has indicated that self­
development can lead to near absolute freedom in choosing what type of 
schema, what type of self, we wish to have, so we may choose a self more 
likely to be authentic and in tune with the world.
Such ideal free-choice, like choosing a self in a wine-cellar, is 
tempered by psychoanalysis, especially the idea that ego and body-image 
are learned through identification: “Psychoanalysis proposes a  model of 
mind that challenges the Cartesian-Lockean prototype. It challenges it not 
just by recognizing an unconscious dimension of fantasy and memory, but 
also by specifying that mind is ineluctably intersubjective in origin and import. 
Such is the implication of the idea of identification itself” (Casey, p. 243). 
Psychoanalysis, with its emphasis on active remembering, also tempers 
passivism.
Piaget’s optimism, and Casey’s own movement toward freedom in 
modes of interpreting the past is tempered in turn by Casey’s  own insistence 
on memory’s  “thick autonomy” (pp. 262-287), in which the very density of 
memory resists the attempts of consciousness to plumb its compelling 
depths. The mnemonist “S.” in Luria (1968) had to actively forget his
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inundation of memories to have even a semblance of identity, which points to
other difficulties with this model.
Krell (1989) wonders whether the activism of memory is in
consciousness, the schematic self, or is in another “nonspace": “What if that
activist paradigm held the secret of the vaunted ‘autonomy’ and ‘freedom’ of
remembering, a freedom exercised in the nonspace of the soul—a soul, to be
sure, infected by the body and its hollows?” (p. 253) He doubts that the act of
remembering can be separated from its narration, as Casey sometimes
implies. Memory as impressions on a wax tablet (Aristotle) is the very writing
from which our thinking on memory continues to derive, as Krell contends:
Memory is engrammatology, the gleaning of incised marks or engrams 
as though they were letters, vpanpaxa. - It will not do to flee the 
passivism of wax for a phenomenological activism. For the activist 
gleaning remains wholly embroiled in the passivist typography. 
“Freedom” is engrammatological; “truth” iconographic; and both are 
typographic, (p. 254)
Narrative proceeds by defining and dichotomizing. The 
dichotomization inherent in consciousness may be what leads us to fantasies 
of separation from the world or from each other, including the subject-object 
polarity. Consciousness must divide to grow. Aware of this, Casey’s review 
of his next dichotomies, primary and secondary memory (derived from 
William James), also imply some difficulties with Piaget’s optimism.
Secondary memory deals with those memories which in Whitehead’s
(1978) words have “perished” subjectively and become “objective occasions" 
which can affect us only through “efficient causation.” In other words they
have no direct influence on our immediate state of awareness. They must be 
“recalled" before they can be heard from. Primary memory, on the contrary, 
sounds suspiciously like self-schema or like Whitehead's "presentational 
immediacy”: It is the zone of collected habits—physical, cognitive, 
perceptual—from which we act and experience. It works mainly on an 
unconscious level but need not do so. To become conscious of primary 
memory is to become conscious of the "storied nature of the self” (Schank,
1990), or of our phenomenological “lived reality," but it must be born in mind 
that primary “memory” also contains body and place imperatives which may 
become, at best, subliminally conscious—but which are always aware.
Primary memory is referred to by Kerby (1991) as “character” or 
“habitus”: “This character is thus constituted by a more or less unified and 
unifying substrate of habitualities or dispositions, of act types exhibiting a 
lawfulness determined by prior sedimented ego properties [ego: a  pole of 
identity rather than a substantial entity]—what in medieval thought was 
termed a habitus” (p. 20).
For the alchemists, however, the dark side of character was the 
habitus. The unconscious motivations within this habitus were considered to 
be the primary source of all the self-deceptions, cruelties, and evil in 
individuals who imagined themselves as pure and good—negative 
motivations ultimately derived from the shadow-side of parents. Grinnell
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(1973), a modern alchemist, refers to these aspects as “rabid dog" which
fears the loving redemption metaphorized as flowing water:
For, as Jung says, there is [sic] evil and darkness in the parents which 
can only come to light in their offspring. And so collectively, childish, 
brutally short-sighted goals of pride and concupiscence which have 
hardened into a habitus reveal themselves as a sort of hydrophobic 
dog. . . .  It condenses into itself solar and lunar agencies at a bestial 
level in which evil has hardened into a habitus and the diseased eros 
passed on by the parents acts like the foaming rage of a rabid dog.
(pp. 104, 105)
Memory functioning within the habitus of the present is already 
whispering its stories of love, warning, purpose, and identity. It surrounds our 
thinking and feeling like a cloud of possibility and limitation. Our actions 
spring from the character we have become in our life-world drama. To 
realize our part and the rationalizations or loyalties which condition it, we 
must make conscious the narratives within which we are presently living, the 
“part" of the story we are presently acting out. Others have suggested we can 
make such things conscious through reflection, especially as reflected in a 
form of lifewriting. To write the self, however, is not to discover it. Like fractal 
geometry, the hermeneutic of memory promises only infinite regress.
Or does it? This habitus, this Lebenswelt, may consist of primary 
stories or first principles which stay with us always, but often it is a shifting 
pattern of narratives in which ideas and occasionally even values shift over 
time. Seeking the boundary of lived reality may indeed be to discover only 
whirling compasses and disorienting clouds. As Einstein predicted, a 
straight line out at some point arrives at its starting point. As Nietzsche
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declared, there is only the eternal return. A quest to discover the borders of
the habitus we are may have us travelling in circles—not an endless
regression but a labyrinthine journey which transforms the traveller.
Still, there are problems with Casey’s dichotomizing. Krell (1989)
asks: “Why does Casey accept the division into primary and secondary
remembering when, as he concedes, primary remembering does not even
pertain to memory?” (p. 262). Casey, himself, casts doubt on both his
active/passive and primary/secondary distinctions in his impressive final
chapters on body memory, place memory, and commemoration, all
considered in his section, “Pursuing Memory beyond Mind.”
“Body memory alludes to memory that is intrinsic to the body, to its
own ways of remembering: how we remember in and by and through the
body” (Casey, p. 147). One mundane example he gives is that of hearing the
whine of a  steel drill at a building site and immediately feeling pain in a tooth
which had been crowned weeks earlier. Casey asserts: “let me state baldly
that there is no memory without body memory’ (p. 172).
Marcel Proust, too, in all his concentrated efforts at memory, found that
the body of his narrator—not daytime recollections—brought about
significant connections with past things, places, and years:
My body, still too heavy with sleep to move, would endeavour to 
construe from the pattern of its tiredness the position of its various 
limbs, in order to deduce therefrom the direction of the wall, the 
location of the furniture, to piece together and give a  name to the 
house in which it lay. Its memory, the composite memory of its ribs, its 
knees, its shoulder-blades, offered it a whole series of rooms in which
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it had at one time or another slept, while the unseen series of rooms in 
which it had at one time or another slept, while the unseen walls, 
shifting and adapting themselves to the shape of each successive 
room that it remembered, whirled round it in the dark. And even 
before my brain, lingering in cogitation over when things had 
happened and what they had looked like, had reassembled the 
circumstances sufficiently to identify the room, it, my body, would recall 
from each room in succession the style of the bed, the position of the 
doors, the angle at which the sunlight came in at the windows, 
whether there was a passage outside, what I had had in mind when I 
went to sleep and found there when I awoke. (1981,1, p. 6)
Body memory adds the dimension of depth to remembering, though its
actions are not subject in themselves to recollection. Body memory is
contained in primary memory. Casey suggests that we can use Whitehead’s
notion of causal efficacy “as providing the most promising basis for
understanding the deep ingrediency of body memory in memory generally”
(p. 173). Causal efficacy, a sort of past prehension, precedes external
perception and has an aspect Whitehead specifically calls bodily efficacy. I
address a more thorough discussion of Whitehead, time, and memory in
chapter 3.
Body memory is seen by Casey as “crucially interstitial in status. The 
basic borderline it occupies is traced between mind and place: it is their 
middle term, their tertium quid“ (p. 180). In discussing place memory, Casey 
makes his strongest case for a deeper, non-narrative memory. He cites the 
Pythagorean Archytas as declaring that place is “the first of all beings, since 
everything that exists is in a place and cannot exist without a place” (p. 184). 
He distinguishes place from mere site, a geometric space like any other:
55
It is the nature of place, in contradistinction from site, to encourage and 
support such distinctiveness, thereby enhancing memorability. 
Requisite to any full understanding of memory of place is thus a 
recognition of the way in which place itself aids in remembering. It 
does so precisely as being well suited to contain memories—to hold 
and preserve them. (p. 186)
Place haunts Proust’s narrator as being evocative of memories. Each
place has its own resonance: “Combray," “Balbec," “Paris,” “Doncieres," etc.
Joyce had to leave the place of his birth to remember it without being
overwhelmed by it. Henry Miller and D. H. Lawrence found different places
to inspire very different writing. Lawrence Durrell (1969) has written that
“human beings are expressions of their landscapes” (p. 157). Place makes
us inhabitants of the world. It contains us and orients us, as Casey twice
quotes John Russell observing:
“Where am I?” is, after all, one of the most poignant of human 
formulations. It speaks for an anxiety that is intense, recurrent, and all 
but unbearable. Not to know where we are is torment, and not to have 
a sense of place is a  most sinister deprivation. (“How Art Makes Us 
Feel at Home in the World,” New York Times, April 12,1981. In 
Casey, p. 195)
It is interesting to note that upon awakening from unconsciousness no 
one asks, “When am I?” We need only think of places from our personal 
pasts to have all sorts memories evoked: sensory glimmers, emotions, 
persons, pets, joy, trauma, or, perhaps, nervous lacunae.
The very fact of spending our early, formative years in a house may 
have led us to envision our minds as having secret closets, forbidden 
bedrooms, hidden nooks and crannies, cluttered attics, and foreboding but
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compelling cellars. Other cultures have different psychic environments: think
only of the difference in the space or emplacement of memory between the
Amazonian's life-drunk enclosure in the thick jungle and the arid, open
sandscapes of the Arab nomads.
Casey feels time as we commonly understand it—a succession of
instants or points—only disperses memory:
By its very immobility—through the stolid concreteness of things set 
within pathways and horizons—place acts to contain time itself. This 
is not to trivialize time but to make it into a dimension of space through 
the active influence of place. On the other hand, time is trivialized 
when it is reduced to calendrical-historical dates, (p. 214)
It may be said we pass through places, but, in a sense, their memory
continues to contain us. Time, on the other hand, just passes, like the wind,
and only “bending boughs" and the mirror speak of its passing. We do not
need memory’s  narratives,—unless place is considered a prenarrative—
place will suffice to become lost in what Casey calls “ruminescences”i (p. 49,
p. 112). But narrative, especially autobiographical writing about or within
particular places, may well be a via regia, a  royal road, to bringing to
consciousness or interpreting the affective meaning of such places. Place
memory, which includes bodily memory, might well be the natural “place” to
begin “an architecture of self,” a s  suggested by William Pinar (1992b). An
1 “Casey coins the word ruminescence, which combines ‘reminiscence’ 
and ‘rumination,’ in order to capture the mood or emotional state that often 
accompanies remembering. (Perhaps ‘luminescence’ and the ‘numinous’ 
resound there as well.)” (Krell, 1989, p. 259)
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architect of self needs a place to construct, even if that place must
occasionally be deconstructed to a site for the next constructive endeavour.
“ ‘Commemoration’ means an intensified remembering" (Casey, p.
217). Though Casey uses it in its public sense as an occasion for paying
homage to events and people one has never experienced or met, he also
notes that here, in this remembering, language is essential. As Krell (1989)
has noted of his chapters on body and place memory: “Everything depends
on Casey’s being able to separate off the narrative from the memory” (p.
255). In the less obvious—compared to official ceremonies—
commemorabilia of language, itself, Casey here gives in to narrative and
points to the supra-personal remembering found intersubjectively:
Could it be that in its communal-discursive aspect commemorating 
forms a part of all remembering? If so, this would imply that there is no 
remembering of any kind that is not in some sense verbal or verbally- 
based: if not occurring expressly in language, then arising through its 
agency. Just as commemoration is a calling to remembrance through 
language—through ritual-cum-text, ritual as text—so memory is 
indeed a matter of "re-call.” Might it even be that recollection, 
seemingly dependent upon images alone, occurs as re-collection 
through language? Can there be such a thing as a purely renascent 
image that counts as a memory—or a purely bodily action that counts 
as a commemoration—without the intervention of words at some 
significant stage? (p. 233)
I will be returning to the memory within language at several stages in 
the pages to come, as well as to the implications for consciousness. Suffice 
to say at this stage that Casey points directly to commemoration as 
participation of the sort written about by L6vy-Bruhl (1926/85). Since our 
particular type of subjectively-centered consciousness expands through
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division—creation of new dichotomies and definitions—Casey understands 
that at some point separate identity is overcome, as in Yeats’ “Great Memory" 
or Anima Mundi: “In short, whenever we become engaged in 
commemorative activity—whether this occurs in a dyadic or a polyadic 
context—representation cedes place to participation” (p. 251).
§Preview. Commemoration may take place unconsciously and it is not to 
be identified with history. The “Linguistics” section of chapter 4 extends this 
point. Casey’s last section on “The Thick Autonomy of Memory”will be 
discussed in my final chapter, as it seem s to culminate in a sense of memory, 
in line with Krell’s, which reveals memory as a worldly force, as, in fact, fate.
In my awaiting chapters, I pursue memory along the rhizoid network of 
its roots in memor, or mindfulness, as  opposed to memory as tekne, a sort 
practical assistant to constructive action. To use another dichotomy, I rarely 
follow the mode of cognitive functioning defined by Bruner (1987) as the 
scientific methods which establish formal, empirical proof, but instead pursue 
his other mode, narrative, which establishes not truth but "verisimilitude” 
—parallel, I think, to Pinar’s “truthfulness" (p. 25). In other words, I pursue, 
plead, and evoke memory through the labyrinthine pathways of story and 
theory no matter where they lead, rather than examining memory to be used 
specifically as  a tool in autobiographical or other classrooms.
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My inquiry, then, is neither a cognitive psychological one nor an
analytical one. I consider it to be phenomenological in that I seek to perceive
below the layers of interpretation in the direction of memory’s “centre,”
always recognizing that any centre re-cognized is already a secondary
cognition. Perception must be a perception of this memory (or a memory of
the memory) and it is already subject to interpretation. In this way, this study
is also hermeneutical:
There is a similar risk in treating phenomenology and hermeneutics 
separately. First, since we are humans, there may not be at the center 
of our life-worlds any pure perceptions or feelings untainted by the 
meanings we impose upon them. . . . Second, when we look for pure 
perceptions we run the risk of an infinite regress. (Willis, 1991, p.
176)
Because of this hermeneutical element, I felt it incumbent upon me to
include me, the researcher, as subject of inquiry. All writing is in some sense
autobiographical and narrational, but since this will be made explicit I felt it
necessary to encompass this whole inquiry with strong narrational elements.
I approach the phenomenon of memory within what Smith (1991) has called
the hermeneutic imagination. The hermeneutic imagination, Smith says,
shows how meaning is arrived at “referentialty and relationally” and avoids
conceptual or categorial authority:
The conversational quality of hermeneutic truth points to the 
requirement that any study carried on in the name of hermeneutics 
should provide a report of the researcher’s own transformations 
undergone in the process of the inquiry; a showing of the dialogical 
journey, we might call it" ( pp. 197-198).
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Narrative theory, as well as the hermeneutic imagination, demands an
explicit involvement of the researcher in his/her research. In some way, the
researcher is the research. Language may come to the subject from the
world, but the subject (or the self) becomes the language-conveyer of the
world into the future. The narrativist, Kerby (1991), also asks for investigation
of the subject of language:
But what now of the subject who is, in some sense, the source of 
language? If on one hand language cannot be separated from the 
world as we know it, then on the other hand we surely cannot extricate 
ourselves from language. It is this other dimension, that of the human 
subject or language user, that particularly needs to be investigated 
today..., for why should we exempt ourselves from the very critique that 
we so readily apply to the world around us? (p. 3)
The narratives of my past—the narratives of the subject—seem to work
within larger narratives which are usually less easily “heard." These are
myths which can be understood as cultural ideologies (Barthes, 1957/72) or
as Lyotard (1984) calls them, meta-narratives. But there is a more
imaginative, less-closured sense of myth within and beyond the narratives of
our remembering: “Myths do not ground, they open" (Hillman, 1979, p. 89).
The memory in language becomes mythic when deconstructed far enough.
These ancient and modern myths are the fabric of the stories of our lives, I
believe. As I will suggest in chapter 4.
Myth would not allow itself to be ignored in this study, intervening like
a fatal attraction whenever my ruminescence wandered into primordial terra
incognita. Theory is, after all, also derived from theoria, a reference to an
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Ancient Greek delegation from a  polis “going to see” a god (theos) in its 
temple, or going to consult an oracle (Morris, 1982). So, in this curriculum 
theorizing, my second chapter is a sort of intellectual autobiography charting 
my course betwixt and between mythology and pedagogy.
Chapter 3 explores the hints of chapter 2 with speculative philosophy 
drawn mainly from the work of Bergson and Whitehead. It freely speculates 
on the possibilities opened out in the space of so-called postmodern science 
(Griffin, 1988) and visionary physics (Toben & Wolf, 1982) about the force of 
memory in the world, including the uncertain world of particle physics.
I go directly into myth in chapter 4, reviewing the mythic idea of 
memory as eternal return (Eliade, 1954, 1963) or profane separation from the 
world (Eliade, 1959). Then I approach myth as a primordial form of language 
(Kristeva, 1989) and as the “solid" images which Jung and Hillman consider 
to have preceded internalized conception. Images, appearing from the 
(sudden?) expansion of awareness through mindfulness, are approached as 
the archetypal source of imagining. Archetypal psychology as  a unique 
approach to curriculum theorizing has been seldom invoked, except in the 
work of Ronald E. Padgham (1985, 1989) and David Jardine (1992).
Chapter 5 changes its main source of research materials to those 
drawn from the mythopoeic memory previously invoked. The poetic and the 
paradoxes of post-structuralism, as well as some inspirations drawn from the 
vast literature of Eastern sacred writing, are used to support a more personal
autobiographical chapter than chapter 2 —recalling fantasies and underlying 
emotional patterns—somewhat along the lines of Jung’s Memories, Dreams, 
Reflections (1963), though hardly of such quality or depth. Here, I 
experiment with creative style in an attempt to summon the realm of 
archetypal presences and indicate potentials for metamorphosis.
My last chapter’s title, "Coda" indicates that it is not a conclusion to 
careful, cautious, and logical arguments which have built one upon another 
from chapter 1 through 5 to a relentless and irresistible conclusion. Instead, I 
attempt to summarize the major points concerning memory and 
autobiography I have portrayed. I further take some of the residue of my 
theorizing on memory and suggest an approach for narrativizing or 
deconstructing the habitus of students, and evoking the imaginal springs of 
memory to desired “architectures.”
C hapter 2: Abyssal Masks
Transparency. To let the light not on but in or through.
To look not at the text but through it; to see between the lines; 
to see language as lace, black on white; or white on black, 
as sky at night, or in the space on which our dreams are traced.
(N.O. Brown, Love's Body, p. 259)
§Mythic Conflict: Hill Gods, Town Gods. Mythology and pedagogy 
have been Interrelated from the moment of my first encounter with teaching. 
My first time in front of a class entwined the two forever (ike the serpents 
around the caduceus of Hermes. In the strongest sense of myth as being a 
sort of psychic substrata, of course, not only pedagogy but studenting and 
even my wild childhood play in the sandhills outside of town were based on 
vague storylines which could be traced (had there been anyone to do so) to 
the ancient cultural narratives collectively called myths. Every crumbling 
tunnel I explored was a labyrinthine quest, each "King of the Castle" battle 
royale on a  steep but soft sandhill was a fight to the finish for temporary glory; 
like the single year of kingship for the consort of the eternal queen, like the 
Achillean life—glory over longevity! Battles and explorations, tests of 
courage and endurance: were they initiations of the soul for the heroic life to 
come?
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The slower initiation through the school system—which took piace in 
the de-natured town—only seemed repressive and confining. I did not know 
that its cellular grouping, its cloistering, its ability hierarchy, its graded 
progression, and its teachers who kept order and knew the knowledge for 
which we were expected to strive were all part of another mythic 
complex—going back through mediaeval Europe and the Roman 
dispensation, to Plato (and Apollo), and to Christianity and the ultimate 
absent father of monotheism.
It seemed the two mythic cycles I lived were usually in conflict. One 
was physically aware, outside the school, outside the home, outside the 
town, and it led to powerful impressions of both some imminence and an 
immanence. Something was present, was “far more deeply interfused” 
(Wordsworth, 1798) and always there was the rich sense of Nature waiting, 
of something ...about to happen. The power of direct enculturation—parents, 
teachers, everyone—was such, however, that a life without school never was 
really seen as an option. I was pushed by my parents, got my marks, and 
attempted to preserve the feral Pan, or the hero-in-waiting, in my soul. The 
journeys seemed parallel but, in an open universe, forever separate.
Years later, my first pedagogical experience was foisted upon me and 
the mythic seeker met the mythic priest. The experience was both unsought 
and, in some way, sought. It occurred with the kind of meaningful
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randomness C. G. Jung (1971) called synchronicity. It may be too early in 
this paper to make any pagan references to fate.
I had recently returned from Europe where I had spent almost all my 
time in Greece. The trip had begun as one of those post-baccalaureate 
jaunts to the continent with a few friends. I was morose, however, and found 
the company of my two friends unbearable, as they found mine. We parted 
company in three separate directions at Dusseldorf, Jake going to East 
Berlin, Bryan to France and Spain, and me to Greece. There I would find 
some release from the word-clamps around my head and find authors to 
guide me back into the world from my Icarian madness to transcend it. After 
nine months, I found my way through North Africa to France and flew off in 
sunny spring. I arrived at Dorval Airport in Montreal with $2 in a blizzard.
Back in Lethbridge, I found the small city from where I had graduated quietly 
snowed in, somnolent under 7-foot drifts. I was twenty-two.
Setsuko called me. She was a strange-beautiful Japanese-Canadian 
girl who had been my friend, my clandestine lover, and who, more 
importantly, had taken the English department's upper level course called 
"Mythology" with me. She had been the young professor's favourite, and it 
was she and her artist friend who had read the most personal, most symbolic 
papers, seeing aspects of their lives in specific Hellenic deities. I, on the 
other hand, had been striving to squeeze my mythic universe into this one, 
rather than the other way, and I had read a paper on the historicity of the
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Mycenean Empire and the fall of Troy, and the likely reality of the lives of 
Agamemnon, Clytaemnestra, Orestes, and Elektra. I was out of tune in my 
approach and had stuttered through my paper. I considered the course a 
humiliation and humbly had accepted my ‘B’. Now, after returning from the 
land of myth, Setsuko brought it all back to me again.
A student teacher was attempting to inculcate a  language arts unit on 
mythology into a grade nine class at Hamilton Junior High. It seem s the 
students found no relevance in the subject. The student teacher had heard 
of the young professor of mythology and had asked him to do a presentation. 
The professor was either indisposed or ill-disposed so he had called 
Setsuko to speak instead. She had many excuses, but mainly this 
poet/dancer/insurance agent was anxious about speaking to a roomful of 
hostile grade nines. She had heard I was back and offered me a lemon 
meringue pie if I would speak in her place.
Unable to resist such forces (and others, no doubt), I found myself 
being introduced to a large class silently staring at me with a  mixture of 
determination and blatant curiosity. It was like that: My earlier whirl of 
doubts, wishes, other timetables, and rough planmaking simply evaporated 
and, suddenly transported it seemed, I found myself there being sized up.
I probably was something unusual at that time in that place. The 
student teacher, my age, had affected a neatly-trimmed beard, tweed jacket 
and a tie, and I noted the curved pipe he carried in his pocket. I still had
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longish hair and my North African tan had not yet faded. I was wearing a 
shirt which looked Slavic or 19th century: flowered chest panel, the rest 
white, no collar, and insewn arm garters. No one had to know the label said 
"Funky, Groovy Fashions." I was introduced as just having returned from a 
year in Greece.
At this time, I had read my share of mythic tales, literature, and my old 
major, philosophy. I had not, however, read many of the interpreters of myth 
who have become so popular today. I had dug up a little Freud and a little 
Jung, and in anthropology a little more of the French structuralist, Claude 
L§vi-Strauss (1966), the animist, Tylor (1891/1958), and the functionalists, 
Durkheim (1915/68) and Malinowski (1926). In literature courses, I had 
encountered Robert Graves (1948/72, 1960/80),with his notion of myth being 
patriarchal propaganda to cover up and validate the overthrow of the "White 
Goddess" by Indo-European hordes, and the enigmatic Northrop Frye 
(1951/84), who like Jung and L6vi-Strauss in their way, perceived universal 
patterns in myth and literature. These views seemed too scientific or too 
abstract to satisfy my understanding at the time, yet myth felt strangely 
meaningful and there was a need in me to know why.
The only writers who had understood myth in a way that stirred me 
deeply by then were the psychiatrist, Rollo May (1969, 1970), who named the 
daimonic as any force capable of possessing the daily mind, and that 
avenger of the id, Norman O. Brown, who in his Life Against Death (1959)
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proclaimed that the repression imposed by the superego in its abhorrence of 
desire was driving us to yearn for the apocalyptic grande finale.
When I heard from Setsuko, I had been immersed in the netherworld 
of Henderson and Oakes' Wisdom of the Serpent (1963), and that was what 
led me into my ravings at Hamilton Jr. High about each of us having a 
personal quest to transform or transcend our "chronic" selves, but which our 
word-walled consciousness so  reasonably resisted.
The students listened, I felt, with some intensity and Setsuko watched 
with shining eyes. I found myself warming to my subject as though I had 
never talked about anything so important in my life before. I forgot to stutter. I 
even said that school systems and too rigid long-term plans can get in the 
way of the quest for discovery and integration of the soul. They loved the hint 
of anarchy and many who likely never listened due to some sort of passive 
resistance listened now. I was telling them they weren't just prisoners of an 
imposed educational system, the monastery myth of fallen life.
At the mention of the school system, the questions started. The 
late-sixties’ bugaboo of "relevance" rose up alive and well in the seventies. “I 
mean, how is this mythology going to help get us jobs?” Ah, the new 
relevance of the ‘Me’ generation, I thought, and I went to town asking them if 
that's all they thought education was about. I sat down on the teacher's desk 
and a wide-ranging dialogue ensued on the purposes of education and the
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school system. Most, it was revealed, simply had assumed that school was 
what eventually led to gainful employment: security.
I knew employment was important (though I was without it at that time), 
but felt the need for them to hear other voices. I asked them if they thought 
their lives were only about getting jobs and then hanging on; I asked if, 
perhaps, some courses were not trying also trying to raise their 
consciousnesses. When they wanted to know more I found myself saying 
things I had never thought through: I brought up the things they cared about, 
like relationships, like adventures. I said mythology provides models for 
each of our silent seeking. It activates the winged horse of imagination to 
invigorate our lives and provides them with a sense of journey, of 
significance. Through myth, we realize we deal on a daily basis with such 
things as fate, dragons, sirens, and lotus-eaters—the trials and temptations 
along the path of the journey through life. I had trouble describing the goal; it 
always seemed to be a princess or golden ring, or golden fleece, or holy 
grail, but sometimes it was out and out apotheosis (as it was for Herakles and 
Psyche and Siddhartha).
This brought out the obligatory questions about Christianity, which has 
its own ideas about eternal life. The discussion got quite lively when I 
pointed out that the serpent in Middle Eastern myths is more often than not 
the guide who leads to wisdom (Henderson & Oakes). The Gilgamesh story 
indicates that the serpent is eternal (Richardson, 1989). The sacred tree
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associated with it is often interpreted as the image of the Goddess, herself 
(Henderson & Oakes; Brown, 1966; Godwin, 1981).
Now came the Garden of Eden questions. Here I tried a little Robert 
Graves on the old patriarchal paradise. I noted that God did not want 
humanity to gain knowledge. As in other myths, it was the serpent who led 
them to understanding. God wanted humanity to remain a witless animal to 
keep his garden. When he realized his garden-keepers had “eaten of the 
tree of knowledge,’’—that is, become conscious, thinking beings—he cast 
them out into the world where all the hardships of life would become our 
experience. Naturally, there was the usual cry that Adam and Eve were 
being punished for disobedience in listening to Satan (and there was implied 
blame on Eve, too). I reminded them that there was another tree in the 
garden that God felt he had to protect at all costs: “Behold, the man is 
become as one of us, to know good and evil: and now, lest he put forth his 
hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live forever” (Genesis 
3:23). This was the tree of eternal life, and, to avoid the possibility that 
humanity become as gods. Yahweh cast them out for he is “a jealous God” 
(Exodus 20:5), presumably aware of the tree of life’s association with the 
Magna Mater.
I closed, leaving them in some consternation by saying that many of 
the pagan myths implied the potential for using the serpent of wisdom to 
actually transcend our physical limitations here on Earth and "become as
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gods." Yahweh, himself, may be understood as the archetypal dragon 
protector of the ultimate boon (Campbell, 1949) who wished to keep us 
unconscious and who yet wishes to keep us mortal. Some may have thought 
me a Satanist. I was not, but I did not know at that time that I had 
rediscovered Gnosticism (Godwin, 1981).
It was a day, no doubt, that changed me forever. The young people 
walked me to Setsuko's car, jabbering at me and asking questions about 
Greece all the way. I talked to the student-teacher a couple of weeks later 
and he told me they were still talking about the presentation. I found this 
pleasant for the ego, of course, but also humbling. I had gone right from my 
nice planned talk on mythic heroes as good examples and had indicated 
instead a “pagan path of perfidy." I found myself as much surprised by the 
words cascading from me as were the students. I decided my "third eye" had 
worked so well because (a) I truly was excited about—had given myself to— 
my subject-matter, and (b) I took the plunge when their questions led me to 
unexpected waters. Of course, I had neither contract nor paycheque.
Of course, such a one-shot encounter filled me with inflated ideas of 
my pedagogic potential. I still did not intend to become a teacher, but a 
sense of destiny hovered about me. I would be on the watch for dangerous 
ideas which could limit or forbid my freely chosen quest.
After moving north to Edmonton and roughing out a novel, I soon 
found the need for bare essentials overcame any artistic impulse. I worked
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here and there, ice-cream maker to construction labourer, but, after a day on 
such jobs, i was simply too tired or bored to write.
Writing had become my Pegasus. I had travelled but had found 
mainly thieves, self-deceivers, and crowds. It is only now, looking back 
through the seven veils of memory, that I realize that such on the road strife is 
the very stuff of adventure. Then, however, I had determined to pursue my 
quest on paper. Failure to become successful did not deter me. It was like 
standing up to the gangs in high school, 1 told myself. You might not win the 
first round, but if you just keep getting back up, you have shown some nobility 
of soul. If I became a poor unknown writer, at least I would be a man whose 
inner quest continued its night-sea journeying (Campbell, 1949).
I had left Canada for Greece in near pathological condition. During 
my B.A. days, my readings had ail grown from experiences which were 
aimed at mystical awareness, at transcendence. Aldous Huxley (1956) and 
Tim Leary (1965) had urged me up and out. I had read the Tibetan Book of 
the Dead (1931/60), perhaps containing a message I should have heeded 
about the “place” of ultimate transcendence: nowhere at all. I had 
experienced a rapturous self-transcendent unity with Nature, it seemed, but 
had also afterward been sucked back within subjectivity, unable to explain.
I had gone to philosophy because I so desperately needed answers. I 
discovered only more questions and that what anyone says is somehow 
wrong or incomplete. Thinking became an obsession which I hated, not
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even sure the thoughts I heard were any longer my own. My own memories 
seemed to sink toward an unnameable dread. In my yearning to realize 
myself beyond my body and mind, I had ironically become a prisoner within 
the mind's echo chambers, and the body had not been transcended but was 
instead dragged around like a useless appendage. I lost interest in sports, 
socializing, and even in sex. There was so much noise! I slunk through 
graduation, and it was then I went to Europe.
Aside from merely being in Greece, it was two novelists who reminded 
me of the life given by Nature to be lived, even if we can't discern why. I read 
my first Henry Miller book at the mega-ancient sacred temple ruins of 
Dodona (Dodoni, today), where I had arrived on my motorbike. It is said to 
have once had a great oak (shades of the Goddess) which whispered clues 
to the seeker's destiny. I listened, but heard only the buzzing of great black 
bees. Doggedly, I sat down and opened Miller's Tropic of Cancer (1959) to 
the first page: “I have no money, no resources, no hopes. I am the happiest 
man alive.”
What could this mean? Was something getting through? Later in 
Athens, I read the vitriol of Tropic of Capricorn (1961) and Black Spring 
(1963a), but I also encountered Miller's light-filled but definitely earthy paean 
to Greece, The Colossus of Maroussi (1963b), and I was in Greece.
The other text which inspired me to affirmation, to freeing myself from 
the living death of having to know the why of being here—untranscended at
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that—was Zorba the Greek, by Greece's own Nikos Kazantzakis (1953).
Zorba never knew why either, but he lived fully from the heart in spite of it. 
Faced with a mishap? Why, dance! In his last moments, he sprang from his 
deathbed, threw open the window and crowed like a dawn rooster, and died: 
The release from having or knowing: existentialist gusto!
This literary legacy was with me in Edmonton. I met other fledgling 
authors and artists and we formed a raucous bohemian circle. I had 
rediscovered my body and Dionysos waged a continual war with Apollo for 
my time. I felt very much alive, unencumbered with morals or philosophy, 
and slapping out pages daily on my 1936 German typewriter. I joined my 
sister's academic crowd who gathered around the fireplace and took turns 
reading modern poetry. In the quiet stillness by the fire, concentrated 
suggestion flowed out so unforced and so strangely clear that I can quote it 
by memory still, or, perhaps, I am the one recalled by it.
It was at this time, that Setsuko sent me Joseph Campbell's Hero of a 
Thousand Faces (1949) and I obtained Henri Frankfort's Before Philosophy 
1946/61). Hero, like Wisdom of the Serpent, seemingly looked at myths 
worldwide and concluded they were all variations of one archetypal 
"monomyth": the hero’s quest. This monomyth Campbell structures into such 
parts as "the call to adventure," "the refusal of the call," "crossing the 
threshold of adventure," "attainment of magic talisman or divine assistance," 
"the trials," and, at the apex of adventure, "the attainment of the boon and the
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sacred marriage." This is followed by the just-as-perilous "return" and "the 
re-crossing of the threshold of adventure with the boon."
This academic fantasy reunited me with the child in the sandhills and 
the riverside groves. Of course there is a quest, and each of us must deal 
with it (if only to burn all our energy ignoring its call!). Campbell uses his 
Jungian background to explain the monomyth as a symbol of our necessary 
journey into the unconscious to reunite with its lost contents, its "pearls of 
wisdom," in a hieros gamos, or sacred marriage. He considers it a sacred 
social duty, honouring life, to return after the conquest to teach others of the 
wonders of the hidden eternal realm, like a bodhisattva, like himself it is to be 
supposed (Segal, 1990). From this return, society is revitalized. It finds new 
energy to evolve or transform. The thought of teaching as a kind of sacred 
quest did trickle through—but had I thus far received the boon?.
"Myth and Reality” (1946/61), the introductory essay by the husband 
and wife team of H. and H. A. Frankfort in Before Philosophy, was the first to 
reveal to me the absolute otherness of mythic consciousness—that people 
who lived in a mythic world were not merely trying to explain things but failing 
to do so truly because of the lack of an exact science. They, in fact, 
experienced an entirely different world. For the mythic mind, “the distinction 
between subjective and objective knowledge is meaningless.. . .
Meaningless, also, is our contrast between reality and appearance.
Whatever is capable of affecting mind, feeling, or will has thereby established
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its undoubted reality” (p. 20). It sounds like phenomenological philosophy,
but the Frankforts describe the mythic mind as experiencing a very limited
sense of personal self, a  self which was buffeted about by emotions,
memories, visions, and apprehensions that came to it from the surrounding
world in which it partook. This sense of self could even be paradoxically
maintained while wholly identifying with something else "outside" in the
world: an animal, an object, another person, or even an ancestor or demon.
After certain earlier experiences I had sought for years to validate
through explanation, I was pleased to find (outside of the Eastern mystical
tradition) that such ego-transcending identification with natural forces was
considered the usual state before the days of rational imperialism. My
brother-in-law recommended Levy-Bruhl—whom we had somehow missed
in my anthropology courses—for corroboration. In his writings I was intrigued
to discover his concept of participation mystique, with its hints of
extra-sensory powers and perceptions:
In the collective representations of primitive mentality, objects, beings, 
phenomena can be, though in a way incomprehensible to us, both 
themselves and something other than themselves. In a fashion which 
is no less incomprehensible, they give forth and they receive mystic 
powers, virtues, qualities, influences, which make themselves felt 
outside, without ceasing to remain what they are. . . .  [Primitives] 
depend upon a participation which is represented in very varied forms: 
contact, transference, sympathy, telekinesis, etc. (1926/85, pp. 76, 77)
Obviously, such an awareness will never develop skeptical science,
construct a compulsory school system, or build a civilization. Yet I found
these ideas irresistibly attractive—in themselves and in my pursuit. I
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imagined myself writing best in a kind of trance or possession, perhaps, by 
some daimonic muse or third eye. It is no wonder, I thought then, that artists 
tend to be eccentrics: we were shamans in contact with hidden planes of 
reality who despised our own personae, and often those of others.
There was a great deal of trepidation when I found myself signing up 
for the one year Professional Diploma/After Degree program in Education at 
the University of Alberta in Edmonton. I could not believe I was going to be a 
student again: I was an ancient 23! I was on a quest! But I was also 
determined. If my experiences had found their way into any kind of 
knowledge which had truth-value for me, then it could be and must be 
defended, even if in my intensity my knowledge-certainty was somewhat rigid 
and intolerant of the knowledge-certainty of others.
It was academic war: I wrote an 80-page paper in my Secondary 
English Curriculum class (while student teaching) summing up from various 
perspectives my emerging worldview. It was humbly titled, “Prolegomena to 
Any Future Educational Thought That There Ever Be Whatsoever.” Despite 
more than fulfilling all research, length, and reason requirements, my 
cajoling and condescension so infuriated Professor Martin that he mocked 
me in comments like “the great Nixon speaks!" and "ugh!” and gave me a ‘B’.
In Educational Psychology I fought the Skinnerians who might 
condition me from my quest and leave me content. In Educational 
Philosophy, I struggled to find a place for "free will" against the professor's
"hard determinism" (and found it in "creative breakthroughs"). In a very 
different Educational Psychology course—this one "third force" encounter 
and touchy/Feely sensitivity groups—I rebelled against the pressure upon me 
at a workshop to plead for acceptance and declared I didn’t “give a shit’ what 
anyone in the circle thought about me. After being verbally and very nearly 
physically abused, I realized the imperative to "love" can be as totalitarian as 
any other. Setsuko (now my pregnant wife), who had come along, reminded 
me there were credits involved here so I later managed to bite the bullet and 
work the circle into a hugging frenzy.
Having preserved the sanctity of my intuition from the wolves of 
academia, it was a major change—again from the Apollonian/Athenian 
paradigm down to the Hermetic/Dionysian—to find myself involved in a 
six-week intensive summer drama workshop. I'd had only one job interview 
after finishing the PD/AD program with 1st Class Honours in May, but it had 
been in Jasper (a Rocky Mountain resort town similar to Banff but less 
commercialized). They offered me the job of 2/5 time nonacademic English 
teaching and 3/5 time Drama instruction before I left town after the interview 
and mini-teaching day. As a result I had to allow in the god of masks, 
Dionysos, and learn something of developmental drama before I could begin 
in the Fall. I became immersed and emotionally entangled in the 6-week 
3-hour per day sessions, at the same time as Setsuko and Namiko Athena,
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our new daughter, seemed to be forming a circle of two. Perhaps the seeds 
of a  marital fleur du mal were planted then.
§Threshold: Pedagogy as Quest. And we were there, in Canada's 
Rocky Mountains, in the railroad town of Jasper, and I was a real teacher. My 
mother had been a  teacher and it had seem ed too undynamic as a life so I 
had decided earlier never to be one: There were strange readings to do and 
mythical novels to write. I had to live, however, and teaching could provide 
the bread and leave the time for my own pursuits (I thought). Moreover, I was 
now a man with a wife and a child and that new duty seemed very important 
indeed. I should have realized that the hermetic transmutations of authors, 
the baggage of a  day's teaching, and the stability demanded by fatherhood 
were an unnatural menage a trois.
I began to teach and all my dreams, experiences, and readings arose 
in my heart. I had hated school because it had tried to tell me who I was and, 
worse, who I must be. It had attempted to obliterate the memories of my own, 
true life and had superimposed a generic past. Its dogma had seem ed like 
some plot to subvert my natural destiny. Yet I had survived, and now I was 
tense with purpose, even if this purpose was a teleology hidden in the centre 
of my mazelike quest. My students, too, would be aroused from their 
amnesiac apathy. I knew a second purpose: I was a man with a mission!
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Campbell's lessons rested in my soul more strongly than those of 
Frankfort or Levy-Bruhl. I translated his call to the mythic quest in my own 
style: With each class, each day, I set out to save the world.
To save the world, each of us has to save him or herself first. To do so, 
one must cross the threshold of adventure, deal with her/his demons and 
magical guides, and attain the crystal centre of the authentic Self. One must 
not allow "The Plot" to pacify him or to absorb her identity, because this 
establishment conspiracy's only purpose is to perpetuate itself indefinitely. 
This leads to personal stagnation and eventually to the despair which 
manifests in cultural suicide. An ego identified with The Plot has the same 
purpose: security and perpetuation. But since personal security is never 
absolutely attainable (the future being uncertain and the end always being 
near) a social ego also has the same pathology: neurotic anxiety, commonly 
called insecurity (which may occasionally collapse into paranoid despair).
The border guardians of this Plot are Fear and Desire. The Plot 
conditions us to believe security is our most important goal: It is to be desired 
above all else, just as destitution, its alternate, is to be feared. These twins, 
Fear and Desire, are the children of Insecurity, so it should be no surprise 
that their purpose is to drive us into needing Security, who is their offspring. 
But since the desire for Security has such origins, it can be seen that its 
shadow, fear of not attaining that desire, is always with it, as well. Expanding 
concurrently with the drive to security is the fall to despair. The shadow of the
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desire to succeed is the desire to fail (or, to put it another way, the fear of 
succeeding).
The border being guarded by these twins (like the ferocious temple 
guardians in many locations of the Far East) is, of course, none other than 
“the threshold of adventure.” To accept the call to adventure, the quest for 
the pre-ego Self (Jung, 1971; Eliot, 1944), one must pass between the 
socially created guardians. This does not necessarily have anything to do 
with becoming socially anarchistic. It seemed to me at the time that the most 
quiescent-appearing citizen could in fact be a secret hero on the quest for the 
"pearl beyond price" with which s/he could return and renew the world 
through transforming the relations of the world's creatures. Similarly, one is 
supposed to have emerged from an Eastern temple transformed, having 
been in the transcendent presence of a  deity.
The nature of the ultimate boon, the pre-ego Self, remained unclear to 
me. Still young and vigoroso, I could not help imagining the goal of the quest 
to be a conquest, and the return bringing back some sort of sacred loot. The 
heroic ego was strong in me, influenced by Campbell's monomyth and 
implicit monotheism. I would have done well to have studied the 
animistic/polytheistic implications of Frankfort and Levy-Bruhl more deeply.
Dan Lindley (1991) has named three stages teachers go through. The 
first stage is adjusting to being in a  classroom full of kids. Most teachers 
respond by emphasizing their separation. They display their status as
teachers and as adults. They act out of the senex archetype: serious, old, 
and ordered—and often find the children or adolescents respond by being 
irrepressible puer types: childlike, playful, and anarchic (Hillman, 1983b).
The second stage occurs when the teacher identifies with her/his role as 
teacher and becomes comfortable there. This is senex in the guise of the 
intellectual traditionalist, the wise man or wise woman. Stage 2 teachers are 
stars of such things as STAR testing . 1 Most teachers stay there, perpetuating 
a  system. Stage 3 is the transformation of the teacher into "absolute 
individuality" (Lindley). Here the everpresent puer is recovered, and the 
teacher has learned it is okay to be his or her authentic self when with a 
class.
It should be noted that this "authentic self" is not the same self the 
teacher had repressed at the beginning of her/his career. This puer has 
been reality-tempered through mediation with the senex. Too pure a puer on 
the part of a teacher, and the class feel it incumbent on them to be serious, 
ordered, and "old." This authentic self may or may not be the same as the 
(capitalized) Self which is discovered at the end of Jung's individuation 
process. Jung's Self has no mask or persona in and of itself, but is an 
archetype which uses a persona and its personality to unite with the world.
It should be clear by now that I began my teaching career as a 
missionary anarchist, a  stage not recognized by Lindley. I preached
i Louisiana state’s teacher evaluations under Gov. Buddy Roemer
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intensely about remembering who you are, speaking up when oppressed, 
and listening to the voices within (whose source I conceived as deities). I 
told them that whether they were "rejects" or valedictorians, they were all 
slaves of a system. But to be rebel to your own destruction, I told them, is 
only to glorify the victor. To be a rebel who always sweats the small stuff is to 
be just a rebel in short pants. Freedom exists in going through the given—by 
choice—but also keeping a private self in reserve. It means the burden of 
making each decision on your own, even if that decision agrees with the one 
made by the powers-that-be. In short, freedom is possible—but freedom is 
the greatest responsibility of all. I had no Mount but I walked on desks.
This worked great for the first while; the kids were hugely entertained. 
The class-most-warned-about was my English 013 group, newly 
de-streamed from their academic mainstream cohorts. They were, for the 
most part, transfixed by my near-Swaggertian performances. I taught the 
more subtle poems of Wordsworth, Shelley, Keats, Tennyson, and Dylan 
Thomas. I taught very few short stories, but had them write them instead. 
Often I read aloud to them. If their attention lagged and whispering broke out,
I would get louder, until I was real loud. When that wore out, I would read 
while walking up and down the rows of the student desks. Yes, they enjoyed 
me, the entertainer. Maybe they were pleased by my faith, I don’t know.
I taught Drama the same way, with energy, and some subtlety. I was 
not concerned, at first, with play-production (as the realist, retiring
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Englishman former Drama teacher had insisted). I used my notes from my 
summer course and various guide books, especially Brian Way's 
Development Through Drama (1967) which roused in me the fervour for 
deepening consciousness, exploring psychic complexes, and opening 
personalities to hidden wells of emotion and deeper springs of inspiration. 
Here, it seemed, was a finer, more ancient way to get others to cross the 
threshold of adventure: No need to harangue them into taking the bold step 
away from ego-identification and into the Sacred Way of the Mysteries. 1 
Now they could experiment with imaginative adventures and 
imaginative identities, either mimicked from the world or "called-up" from 
among the repressed personality complexes below. Their quests could now 
begin where all quests, all myths, and all knowledge began: in memorial 
images and stories, like Jung’s  archetypes (1971).
I learned how to teach from my Drama classes faster than my English 
ones. In English, it took little time for me to realize that many of my students 
had lost the faith in themselves to even venture a guess of their own as to a 
poem's meaning, much less to write a narrative that someone else might 
read (that Mr. Nixon might even read aloud!). Moreover, though they rode 
happily along when I carried them with my missionary energy, when I 
showed up more subdued or wanted them to work in group or on their own, 
they simply fell back into habits revealing a complete disinterest in scholastic
i Leading from Athens, the “Sacred Way” was the brick-walled road to 
Eleusis where the famed mystery rites were performed (Godwin, 1981).
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activities. No wonder, of course: the system had told them that nothing was 
expected of them academically. My only response was another “Don't let 
them tell you who you are or what you can do!” type of speech. It worked, but 
only when I led. Was I creating followers?
In Drama, my classes were composed of mixed grade levels, though 
they did separate high school (10, 11, 12) from junior high. No one had told 
the administrators that the gap between grades 7 and 9 was much vaster 
than two grade levels. They all did fine in drama games, in physical 
movement, in passive imaginative exercises, and in small group work. But 
when actual improvisational work involved the grade levels mixing, the 
resistance was Spartan. The difference in size made the grade nines 
dominative, but the emotional gap was often insurmountable.
My initial response had been, a s  usual, to fire up my rocket boosters, 
move rapidly from group to group, make sure everyone was involved, and 
often shoot off ideas and/or roles if they were lacking. I wanted them to 
discover, but if they did not seem to do so or not do so rapidly enough for me,
I would put the director's ring in their collective nose and pull.
I soon built a reputation in Jasper Jr./Sr. High School for being an 
effective rookie who simultaneously was plagued with class control 
problems. My first semester was an initiation through fire: I had no 
preparation time, taught Drama all morning and English all afternoon. I 
inspired my students, yes, but my inspiration was sometimes misunderstood
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as a direction to break rules. I was so teacher-centered that I may have 
seemed a Pied Piper, and when, at last, my adrenaline levels evened out 
and I ceased to play, many of my students simply found themselves lost in 
the woods and they responded with appropriate frustration.
In Drama class, however, I soon learned to let the groups work out 
their own projects. I discovered my patience could have an insistence of its 
own and that sudden inspiration on their part was often the result. I let them 
work out their thematic improvs as they felt, and finally I began to learn with 
them. Though I received many complaints about noise levels, our little reality 
creations would sometimes lead to insight, or to laughter, or to tears. The 
junior highs proved to be die most spontaneous and open to experimental 
experience, though they could also be volatile.
My fixation with the mythological guides behind the cloistered 
classroom representation of advancing levels continued to assert itself. That 
spring, I wrote a  play called The Three Fates set mainly in some 
cloud-bedecked Kingdom of the Gods: The gods play happily, pleased to 
exist because mankind worships and obeys them. The creators on Earth, 
however, have no need of gods for they create or discover as a way of life. 
When creativity becomes universal, the dominance of the gods will end. In 
anger, the King God wishes to destroy these creators but his Old Seer 
reminds him he would then have to destroy all the human race since
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everyone is a potential creator in his or her own way. (That would be the 
gods' fall, too, since gods need worship for their existence.)
Frustrated, the King God sends the Old Seer into the timeless centre of 
the Abyss to meet the Three Fates. Not from obedience, but foreknowledge, 
they agree to pretend they are the King God's prisoners and thus withhold 
the spark of creativity from the cosmos. The earthly creators cease alright, 
but the gods and their courtiers become apathetic, as well, and no longer 
even have the inspiration for play, no matter how decadent. The beautiful 
human dancer the King of the gods had amorously pursued is now willing to 
submit, because without a destiny “nothing matters anyway” (Nixon, 
unpublished). He realizes that he no longer cares about obtaining his prize 
and in understanding and (existential?) sadness, he has the Seer set the 
Fates free. Creation and destiny are activated. The play ends with the 
creators on Earth in intense activity, and the gods and their minions playing 
heartily, despite the knowledge of their eventual fate: amor fati.
This play was done by my exuberant junior highs. It had shows in 
many places and was clearly superior as a production to any junior high 
festival winners at that time. I felt it was worth mentioning in some detail 
here, because the "philosophy" is both existential and romantic, as I presume 
my philosophy is even to this day. As I imagine it, the power of imagination is 
the first principle of creation; it is found in “commemoration" (Casey, 1987b) 
or the lowermost molten strata of the deep unconscious and it is in the air of
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the sunlit woods of the world. But when imagination submits to order and 
control, it ceases its main activity, and the source of culture is lost.
The first manifestations of imagination are the galactic vortices or 
gravital complexes to which Jung (1953 ff.) applied the term, archetypes or 
“primordial images,” but Jam es Hillman (1975b, 1983a) considers these so 
inchoate in themselves as to be meaningless. As imagination imaginates 
these whorls of potential into images, we find ourselves facing the “Gods” 
(Hillman, 1980. Hillman’s capitalization). Any god-image may partake of 
essences of one or more ineffable archetypes, so god-image and archetype 
are related but not necessarily identical. Like storm centres, they are always 
in motion and exist only as part of a continuum by their differentiation from 
other storm centres. When the god-image has constellated enough 
essences to be representable, to be a face for us to face, experience 
imagined for the god becomes inevitable, as well as a gravital complex of 
memory-associations.
The experiences of the gods with each other and with us are created 
and repeated as the foundational narratives of a culture, the field of stories 
and images we term mythology. We are each cultural products, afloat in 
culture' and these primal narratives chart the flow of emotion, the dart of 
thought, the stuff of dreams, and, perhaps, a culture's destiny (Hillman,
1986). When we tell our own stories, whether personal vignette or doctoral 
dissertation, they strut and fret within the preinscribed courses of the primal
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mythic riverbeds (Frye, 1951/B4). Mythologies, themselves, need not be 
linguistic representations; they may be found as  well in the form of ritual or 
iconography. All are representations of the paradox of the imaginal; both 
here and not here, both private and communal, both cultural and natural.
Jung’s  archetypal explanation of myth is sometimes understood to be 
reductionist (Keller, 1989), to leave us as predetermined as behaviorists or 
neurobiologists would expect. If the archetypes are merely generic instincts, 
then this may well be so. In that case, the drive runs its course, the individual 
leaves the stage and is heard no more, culture stagnates into meaningless 
repetition—eternal return?—and eventually dies of boredom or is replaced.
My play had drawn strange links between free expression and 
fatalism, and I continued to attempt mediation. It is here where I saw the 
necessity of the journey of the mythic hero. I had by now completed Joseph 
Campbell's 4-part Masks of God series, and the lesson had been deeply 
ingrained in me that, unlike The Hero of a Thousand Faces who seemed 
bent on conquest, the cultural paragon of Masks was understood as a 
shaman, an artist, or a seer. S/he was a transformer of culture who broke 
new ground or changed the airwaves—so unlike the priests of tradition or the 
enforcers thereof. Campbell claimed a  direct link between the early neolithic 
religious visionaries and cave painters of his Primitive Mythology (1969) and 
the writers, dreamers, and artists of the twentieth century West of his Creative 
Mythology (1968).
Still, I had carved my psychic image out of Homer, and the hero 
archetype smoldered beneath the surface. My favourite poem was "I Am A 
Cowboy in The Boat of Ra," by Ishmael Reed (1969). I continued to feel 
oppressed by systemization, and this was not helped in Jasper by a painfully 
plodding principal who had received his master's degree with a thesis on 
flytying methods for fishing.
I had most success with those needing identity or recognition. The 
core of the original English 013 rowdies managed to graduate and bought 
T-shirts proudly proclaiming themselves "Yahoos,” as i had once named 
them. A group of the nonacademic lads had done a play with me on some 
down-and-out bums in New York. They rehearsed more than I asked and 
when the performance came it was the first time as director I could sit in the 
audience and confidently watch a flawless performance.
§Mythic Amnesia: Pedagogy a s  Conquest. My romantic hero of the 
oppressed, however, was, perhaps, arrogant in being so. Many began to 
consider me a  troublemaker (my social climbing spouse among them).
When things began to bog down in gossip and quarrels, I simply 
romanticized myself into an existential hero. My actions accorded with my 
memories of them; others’ memories were too self-centered to recall fairly. 
Less the choice of abyss or treasure than the Sisyphean struggle, itself: 
Onward, without hope, without glory, without love.
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When I quit, I loaded my backpack and hiked the 120 miles around the 
north boundary of Jasper Park alone. On the 11-day journey, I toted along 
Kazantzakis's epic poem, The Odyssey: A Modern Sequel (1958). In that 
tome, Odysseus becomes the paragon of the determination to live for its own 
sake: “Life is an uphill struggle, against impossible odds, totally devoid of 
hope” (p. 297). When I wandered my despairing way into a little room near 
English Bay in Vancouver, I kept that phrase above my bed. I knew that if I 
could rouse myself to work on my ancient typewriter after facing that 
m essage each day I could deal with anything.
I completed my novel and rejected it. I dabbled in Tibetan meditation 
(the poster had proclaimed: 'The Battle of Ego"). Relationships were short. I 
went broke and found myself all at sea  as a deckhand on a fishing boat. It 
was when I was seasick on the rocking deck in the pelting rain and gutting 
my 100th salmon that the thought of teaching again trickled in.
I wrote to various jobs and while I waited for a response I waited tables 
and lived in East Vancouver on Gravely Street. Plagued with remorse and 
self-doubts, I began to fear. I feared becoming a social outcast, a lost soul. I 
feared disintegration. It occurred to me that if living is the only reason to live 
then survival is its own purpose. Maybe I had been wrong to buck the system 
(or to have done so openly). Setsuko had once said, “Icarus should have 
flown at night.”
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Setsuko, Namiko: Maybe I had been wrong not to follow Setsuko’s 
daily lectures on guidelines for upward social mobility, for societal conquest. 
Where was I now—Gravely Street? For the first time, I was ready to work as 
a  teacher, rather than live as one. Could it be that fear is the strongest 
impetus to conformity?
Another perspective on the hero myth found its way in timely fashion 
into my hands through Erich Neumann's Origins and History of 
Consciousness (1954). Applying an array of ancient texts and mythic tales, 
Neumann illustrates Jung's basic notion of the first half of life requiring 
"heroic" ego development and separation from the collective unconscious 
and the second half an integration of the ego with its source. Neumann goes 
beyond the noncommittal imagery of Jung’s labels, however, and identifies 
the primal source as the Great Mother or, simply, the Goddess. And he 
identifies the psychic danger of ego-inflation (or hubris): “The stronger the 
masculine ego consciousness becomes, the more it is aware of the 
emasculating, bewitching, deadly, and stupefying nature of the Great 
Goddess" (p. 63).
This awareness may manifest as  terror, and thus repression, of all 
things female, as so many misogynist myths testify; or it may act out the 
repression as  a desire for the absolute escape of death (as in the phallic 
power contests of "missile envy"). More controversially, the ego may also, 
according to Neumann, abnegate this repression and seek identity with the
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memory of the passive “Great Goddess Unconsciousness,” resulting in the 
feminization of the masculine ego. He understands all self-directed 
consciousness to be a masculine, heroic endeavour—whether undertaken 
by man or woman—and unconscious quiescence to be the yin principle.
Whatever the truth may be, I knew I was fast approaching 30 and 
needed to change. Perhaps the time of battles, ego and otherwise, had 
ended and I could now work, as  they say, within the system. Foolishly, I 
imagined the system to be somehow similar to the collective unconscious, to 
Neumann’s Great Goddess as bride. When I got the temporary appointment 
in Crawford Bay, British Columbia, I unknowingly was entering into Lindley’s 
second stage of teaching (though 1 had completely inverted stage one).
There have been many critics who have accused the institution of 
schooling in North America as having a secret agenda to ensure the 
continuance of privilege (see chapter 1), or, at least, as mimicking a social 
structure which oppresses (Anyon, 1988). Paulo Freire (1984) talks of the 
dream of many oppressed being to become an oppressor. I was now 
determined to do the right thing, keep a low profile, and to pass the students 
through the system in an orderly procession. I do not know if I wished to be 
an oppressor, but I was certainly ready to be a repressor of all my notions of 
retaining the early vision which had to do with authenticity of experience in 
Nature, and the private quest to realize in consciousness the patient
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presence I had felt guiding me there. Of course, this was denial. Of course, it 
did not work.
When I was a kid, I had never been happy playing the games the other 
kids seemed to be content with. Cowboys soon got tiring, but when I did play 
I became neither Roy Rogers, Kid Colt, nor Rex Allen. I made up a tough 
character who seemed to me to have the essence of the lone frontier hero. I 
called him "Kid Trouble." He seemed to follow me into later life. It was a 
shock of recognition to leam the name, Odysseus, also seems to translate as 
"trouble" (Finley, 1977).
My pedagogical odyssey continued in this way in Crawford Bay and 
later in my two and a half years in the consolidated high school in Crowsnest 
Pass, Alberta. I did unit plans. I shouted in class. I attempted to keep order, 
even in my junior high Drama classes. Some kids liked me, some did not. 
Trouble came in this incarnation in Crawford Bay when the seniors 
complained I was too separate, too judgmental, that I gave their opinions no 
place.
It seemed to me I was willing to discuss, to exchange ideas, but these 
students in an isolated valley on Kootenay Lake in central British Columbia 
were all too ready to make sweeping statements based on nothing, or 
hearsay, at best: “My cousin saw a million Paki immigrants getting off planes 
in Calgary!” This was fearful in an area where the mines and most of the 
lumbering had closed. I demanded facts. An opinion without a rational
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backup meant nothing. I was confronting naked irrationality (like that found 
in Nature) and I was siding with the order and control of the god of culture, 
Apollo, and the god of authority, Zeus.
When a  large grade twelve girl from one of the few prosperous 
families in the valley attempted to get too rambunctious in class, I sternly had 
her sit down. Still, she stayed after class and began to openly flirt, and I 
rather rudely (and nervously) sent her home. Like a bad TV-movie, she 
complained to the principal that I had kept her after school and come on to 
her. I was fully exonerated by witnesses who had heard me rebuking her 
foolishness but the whole valley had cabin fever after a  long winter and 
gossiped hungrily. I was glad to leave.
After a year of doing theatre in Calgary (with only modest success but 
with the triumphal return of Dionysos), I took the job in Crowsnest Pass, away 
from the temptations of Calgary. Again, I was determined to do it right; again,
I was going to labour at this job and defeat it. I did it their way. My students 
were rebellious—more than I had ever experienced anywhere—and I was 
miserable. I read only science fiction and, miserably, determined to stick it 
out. I do not think I was an ideal teacher. When they began to push 
compensatory classes for slow learners at me and the small town was too 
concerned about whom I was dating (and when, and where), I retired again.
I was the sam e age at which Alexander the Great and Jesu s of Nazareth had 
died—after fulfilling their destinies.
By that time, it seemed clear to me that my destiny had long ago gone 
on without me. Years before, I had been sent to Concordia, a St. John's 
Lutheran boarding school in Edmonton, Alberta, at the beginning of grade 
ten (our family of four each leaving Saskatchewan for a  new locale). I read 
nothing, it seemed, but myth and Ancient Greek literature and history. I had 
the opportunity at Concordia to study Latin, which would lead me into a major 
in Classics—Ancient Greek and Roman Language and Civilization—upon 
beginning university. For various reasons, loneliness being one, I 
transferred to Lethbridge where my mother had moved and where only 
French was taught as a foreign language. Of course, the mythic significance 
of returning to mother was more than losing Latin as a key to the future. 
Campbell’s “denial of the call”? Neumann’s  “uroboric return’’?
When I finished high school in Lethbridge, I was again determined to 
major in Classics, but the University of British Columbia, which has a  fine 
program, was very expensive. I was talked into spending the preliminary 
year doing non-major subjects at the U. of Lethbridge. Of course, I retained 
most of my friends from high school and took full advantage of the non- 
enforcement of attendance. I was so blithe as to skip the final essay for an 
anthropology course called "The North American Indian." That summer, I 
was working as  a deckhand on a  Department of Transport shipping lane 
barge in the Northwest Territories when I received notices in quick 
succession: 1) that I had flunked “The North American Indian," and 2) that
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UBC could not accept me. On my boat on the Great Slave Lake, I learned I 
had again "missed the boat" and that the lake was well-named.
It was the confusion of the following months on Vancouver Island and 
the violent scatterings of the illusion of self that coerced me into studying 
philosophy when I returned to classes. In philosophy, however, I found what 
seemed to be kindred spirits in Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and—perhaps the 
beginning of the strange pairing of romantic idealism and existentialism— 
Bergson and Merleau-Ponty. I wanted only a  clear explanation which would 
make the world acceptable to me, and, perhaps, me to the world. Fate (or 
teleology) were no longer factors.
So I still thought after leaving Crowsnest Pass and returning to nearby 
Lethbridge to sub and write—exactly 10 years after I had left it the first time to 
go to Edmonton and write (as strange a timespan as the 9 gestation months I 
had spent across the Atlantic). If that did not seem to have the chilly touch of 
metric karma, my next position certainly did.
§Penance. The University had been reconstructed across the Oldman 
River in the time I had been gone. The Lethbridge Community College was 
now situated where the University had been. It was this college which now 
hired me to drive to the Peigan Indian Reservation each day and teach Adult 
Upgrading. Thirteen years after flunking my course on the North American
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Indian, I was going to do time among the North American Indians, 
themselves.
The tribal reserve of the North Peigans, an offshoot of the Blackfoot
nation, is a remarkable place, if mainly for all the wrong reasons. Here I had
gone full circle, returning with nothing, and was now to do penance (it
seemed) on one of the smallest, poorest reservations in Canada. I had lost
so much and experienced so much, it somehow seemed right I should work
with a group whose habits were really unknown to me. It may have been
penance, but it was a chance to leave the usual world behind:
The nature of the hero is as  manifold as the agonizing situations of 
real life. But always he is compelled to sacrifice normal living in 
whatever form it may touch him, whether it be mother, father, child, 
homeland, sweetheart, brother, or friend. (Neumann, p. 378)
I could still console myself with Neumann: Surely here at the bottom rung,
my labours would find their turning point.
The program was sponsored by Canada Manpower, the division of
government concerned with employment, so the idea, at first, was for us to
get our students through the GED. After passing that, they were to leave the
reserve and take some sort of employment training program and, eventually,
get a job. In practice, this seldom happened. The students were paid a small
amount to attend class and it soon became clear to me that this was the
reason most of them were there. Babies would be brought to class, and
homework was usually out of the question. The students had no intention of
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leaving their families on the reserve, but the Manpower stipend was more 
than the government welfare on which most subsisted.
My part was to teach English and “something else.” I started the 
something else with Psychology but soon moved into History. My partner did 
the Math and Science programs. Over the years, I convinced the officials to 
do away with GED accreditation since it was so rarely recognized, and to 
institute actual college upgrading courses for college credit. Then I found 
myself teaching such things as the provincial curriculum for Social Studies 
010, which included early Canadian history. This history attempted to be 
unbiased but usually limited to a page or so the pre-European era in 
Canada. My students did not complain, but I sought wider materials on the 
native cultures of our nation.
No administrators followed us to the reserve so I did have the 
unpressured sense of freedom with my classes: freedom in what I taught and 
in how I taught it. Canada Manpower was basically concerned that whoever 
achieved grade twelve credit could read and write at that level and I made 
sure that was so. It was the "how" of what I taught that eventually underwent 
such a subtle metamorphosis.
I was nervous when I started. I did not know what to expect. These 
were adults, and these were Indians. I feared resentment from them, but it 
only seemed to appear when someone provided the leadership for it.
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This was the unique culture I discovered on this little scattered 
collection of rundown houses without trees, gardens, or streets, and often 
without windows: The reserve spans a major highway and has towns on 
either side. The buffalo are gone and the last people to have seen the 
buffalo are gone. The inherent native culture had virtually disappeared. The 
Indians walked about the prairie like ghosts in the wind, a people who did not 
remember their gods.
But they did have a  subculture: It was built on the solidarity of poverty, 
isolation, and resentment for those who had made them this way. The 
remnants of rituals which had been preserved had gone underground and 
were usually done in secret, but nobody seemed exactly sure of their 
purpose any more. If there was no one around to resent, they resented each 
other or themselves, and often there were suicides and drinking deaths.
This time I did not begin as a  missionary—they had had enough of 
that. I tried being low-key. They seemed content to silently labour their way 
through the course workbooks which had been recommended to me by my 
partner. They very seldom asked for help unless I explicitly circulated and 
asked them. It was strange: I seldom taught a lesson because everyone was 
at a different place in the coursework. Figuring to treat them as adults, I 
seldom strove to motivate them. I took attendance but did not belabour the 
point when it became random, after all, they were paid only for the days they 
attended.
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It seem ed a  comfortable distance—from their world and from my world. 
I was a stage two teacher frozen in time, between two worlds. I had seen the 
face of the Goddess in her guise a s  Medusa and I was petrified by the 
“intolerable image" (Micklem, 1979). All I wanted to do was hold on, a 
death-grip on duty. Still, their heavy passivity annoyed me and I wished to 
see  them vent some anger (which was surely there) at their present situation.
It was Cornelius who began the change and awakened in me 
memories of the mythic mind in a  darker light than the "Nature's children" 
image I had conjured up. I had found 3 large coffee-table type books replete 
with paintings, photographs, and charts. They covered Canadian prehistory 
and history from the Precambrian to the various treaties with which the 
Canadian government annexed huge parcels of land and allocated reserve 
settlement on the natives. The books referred to the Indians as  "Children of 
Eden," and Canada’s  Europeanization was "Deception and Conquest," so, 
with such a sympathetic portrait of the Indians and the mammoth opaque 
projector, I had every reason to think we could enter into heated, but 
reasoned, discussion about the injustice of their situation.
Wrong: Generally, I did the talking, though there was a  fair amount of 
grave agreement to some of my suggestions. After one day of outlining the 
treaties, Cornelius, by far the brightest student in my class, suddenly spoke 
up as I was ending the lesson: “It’s  just whiteman bullshit."
“What?" I asked.
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“It’s just whiteman bullshit. Whatta you know about it? You weren’t 
there. You came here and planted diseases and took our land. All you 
Europeans—why doncha just go back to Europe and leave us alone?”
Everyone giggled, some nervously, some with pleasure. I felt the heat 
rise to my face. I was flustered but attempted to counter: “I can't go back, 
Cornelius. I'm a European mongrel from about six different countries. I'd 
have to go back in pieces.”
Cornelius leered evilly, “Then go back in pieces, dead, all of you white 
trash. I just hate white.” There was more laughter.
“Then there's only one racist here, and it ain’t me. If you hate people 
because of the colour of their skin, then you, my friend, have the problem."
Cornelius stormed out and the class ended. I made no issue of it but 
the silence had increased in weight in future classes.
We played volleyball every Friday afternoon. Inevitably, Cornelius 
and his table aligned themselves against me and whoever was on my team. 
The first Friday I sprained my ankle to hoots of derisive laughter. I was so 
angered I rose and played anyway. Every Friday became a release of 
energy in no holds barred, very few rules, killer volleyball. The ferocity 
eventually led to pride and some mutual respect.
“Good game, Nixon!" Cornelius would yell and grin like a wolf.
I began to think that it was my forbearance and continued friendliness 
which kept the class stable. In other words, I knew what these poor
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misguided souls had wrong with them. If they'd listen to me, their lives would 
surely improve. This hubris, the sheer do-gooder confidence, blinded me to 
the fact of my defensive ethnocentrism. I was almost beginning to feel like a 
leader again.
At 3:30 in the morning, my phone rang. It was Cornelius calling collect 
from a phone booth next to the highway. I could clearly hear the cars hissing 
by. He talked real slow with long silences between his words. It seems his 
household had begun drinking again. He had tried to avoid partaking but 
had been drawn in. He felt awful. Not understanding, I suggested he go 
sober up.
“You don't understand,” he said derisively.
I suggested he tell his family to leave him alone. And, again, I found 
how distant I was from comprehending. The household had some family but 
it also included anyone else who had decided to take up residence there. I 
did not yet know that "drinking" did not mean a party: It meant a long, 
ritualistic dissipation which went on for days and which ended either when 
anything alcoholic (or anything in any way intoxicating) was finally consumed 
or when unconsciousness or death intervened.
He began to sob: “You don't know; you just don't know. It's too much. 
I'm just gonna walk out on the highway until it's done.”
Shooting, freezing, poisoning, the railway tracks, and the highway
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were the common means of leaving this soulless world. I woke up. I knew 
he was serious. The cars hissed ominously.
I searched deep for the right words. I gave solace. I gave advice. I 
encouraged: “Man, you'll be in college next year.”
“I'll never make it. You know that! They never let you forget you're an 
Indian.” His voice cracked: “I wish I was white.”
This shocked me into silence.
Cornelius spoke low: “You'll never understand. You can't. I've gotta 
end this...hell. There's nothing you can say, because you just don't know.” 
The phone clattered, but I still heard him breathing on the other end.
I felt something give way in me. I was absolutely ignorant and I was 
absolutely helpless. Almost astonished, I heard the weary resignation in my 
voice: “You're right, Corn. You're right. I have no idea about your life. None 
whatsoever. I've lived in a different world. I don’t understand at all.” He was 
silent, but I felt he was listening now. “You're gonna do what you're gonna 
do, and I have no idea about the reason why. There's nothing I can do 'bout 
that. But if you can just find some shelter, go through your horrors,1 then 
maybe later you can come and explain it to me. You'll be considered absent 
with excuse until I hear from you.”
It was the beginning of an interesting friendship and an aperture into 
the hidden life of the Peigan Reserve for me. From then on, I taught less
1 Alcoholic withdrawal
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defensively and I actually began to listen when people talked, trying to hear 
the resonance, the intent, behind the short sentences and limited vocabulary. 
After a few years there, I found I was being accepted by people from the 
hopeless drunks (who had spat at me my first year) to the chief and tribal 
council.
After class, I listened to distraught wives or confused young men. I 
never gave much advice but it seemed to mean so much to them to be able 
to speak of their troubles. I began to attend some of their functions— 
traditional dance competitions, sporting events—on the Reserve on my days 
off. With increased trust, older Peigans of either sex would sometimes take 
me aside and hint to me of mystical secrets, or of the ancestral power of their 
inherited sacred medicine bundles. Eventually, I was invited to take part in 
the Sweat Lodge Ceremony.
The ceremony proved to be long, smelly, suffocating, and very very 
claustrophobic. A large group of males stuffed into a hide tent around 
red-hot stones among still-smoking embers was experience enough. But the 
chanting, chanting, chanting began to convince me I would lose my mind (if I 
didn’t sweat my heart out first). There were moments when I could no longer 
tell who I was, or even that I was a separate individual. Distantly, I could hear 
my own voice sounding alien and singing along with the rest. I believe I 
even saw my hands raising little dust clouds by pounding on the ground to 
the insistent drumbeat, though who could have seen the dust in the smoke?
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When we finally burst gasping from the dissilient pod, I found myself 
among the younger men being splashed with cold water by a  circle of 
women and crazily laughing. The older men kept their dignity and walked 
soberly away.
It was a  kind of initiation. If nothing else, it finally buried the missionary 
and the rabble-rouser, too. How can you preach when all you know is that 
you know nothing? The result of such unknowledge, however, is not 
self-doubt and insecurity. In a quiet way, I felt liberated, even invigorated— 
like a young animal first exploring its environment. My awareness felt as 
undirected as when I had roamed the riverside groves or the bleak sandhills 
as a boy, and, similarly, I again felt a  sense of something immense 
happening, though I made no attempt to grapple with this. I soon let the 
sense disperse in the eternal wind.
I suppose I was passive. I suppose I could have accepted my fate if it 
had been to toil hopelessly on the Peigan Indian Reservation all the rest of 
my days. Perhaps the Indians' windblown torpor was seeping into my soul. 
Whatever it was, my stillness was not without fecundity.
It seemed the world came to me: not as a result of the abandonment of 
my pedagogical quest—this was no cause and effect progression—or even 
to make demands toward action. The hints of the anima mundi implied open 
doors (along with complete indifference about my choosing to enter one of 
them). I can only describe it as one of those crossroads of time (perhaps an
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unintended "creative breakthrough") in which synchronicity made itself 
uncomfortably evident.
Jung (1971) describes synchronicity as "meaningful coincidence" (p. 
505). Most people with any sort of peripheral awareness have experienced 
it: Incident after incident seems to indicate the intrusion of another reality, the 
deeper significance of a certain theme or a certain image. Jung, himself, 
gives the example of a  time he vaguely noted the parallels between the fish 
imagery in alchemy and in Christology. For three days running he 
encountered fish—in children's drawings, in every article he read, in 
overheard conversations, in dreams, and, inexplicably, laid out on his garden 
fence (pp. 506, 507). It was as though the unconscious were indicating, 
somewhat humourously, the mysteries which lay below its wavy surface.
In my case—and it is still happening—I found the theme of 
metamorphosis oozing into my life like a vapourous fog sliding under 
windowsills and up from the basement. At first, its presence was merely 
distracting but, when it came between me and my fridge or my TV or my 
mirror, the sense of the uncanny was unavoidable.
Of course, I had read Norman O. Brown (1959) with some attention 
previously, and his insistence on the need to metamorphose back into 
unrepressed Nature, into "polymorphous perversity," or into the immediacy of 
the Dionysian ego had been strongly impressed on me, as had the similar 
ideas of Herbert Marcuse (1964) in first-year university.
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Now, however, I opened my door one day and met Vireo who thought
she was looking for someone else. After verbal exchange, this unique
woman came through my door. Later we went through the ritual of book
exchange. Her gift was Brown's Love's Body (1966):
The id is instinct; that Dionysian “cauldron of seething excitement," a 
sea of energy out of which the ego emerges like an island. The term 
“id”—“i f —taken from Nietzsche (via Groddeck), is based on the 
intuition that the conduct through life of what we call our ego is 
essentially passive; it is not so  much we who live as  that we are lived, 
by unknown forces, (p. 44)
These thoughts left me adrift, so I turned to poetry to find solace. I 
re-read "I Am a Cowboy on the Boat of Ra" then found Lawrence's 'The Ship 
of Death" opening in an anthology. Were these watery metaphors for 
“unknown forces”? Where do these streams lead, I wondered. I did not think 
too hard for I had accepted my basic stupidity; yet, soon after in the university 
library, I happened upon a translation of a  very ancient text which addressed 
my unknowing: “I have entered in a s  a man of no understanding, and I shall 
come forth in the form of a  strong spirit, and I shall look upon my form which 
shall be that of men and women for ever and ever” (Budge, 1938, ch. 64).
It was as though the Egyptian Coffin Texts were addressing my 
misreading of Reed's "...Ra" poem, which was certainly meant to be ironical 
toward conquering heroes. The texts concern the transformation of the dead 
soul into Osiris for its final journey.
I began to wonder if for many years I had not been on a  Campbellian 
quest for "the ultimate boon," but had instead been pushing a self-image
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before me like a scarab pushing its ball of dung. Osiris (and Jesus, for that
matter) was a paradigm of sacrifice, which a Jungian may read as the
ego-sacrifice involved in the individuation process met with in the second
half of life. Having "heroically" built an ego separate from its unconscious
sources, the maturing individual must now allow it to become decentered (to
ritually die) to become centered again in the Self. The Self is the same
source as always but now it may use the ego, and other complexes, for
vehicles of consciousness and action. The soul is not remembered by the
ego but made active through it: the ego is more remembered by the soul.
In this sense, it is "we who are lived," I thought. Whether “if be id,
instinct, archetype, Self, soul, or gods, the sense of self (small "s") or ego is
something lived through. Egoism had always seemed to be something
easily identified, in me and in others, but this more primordial force (call it
what you will) seemed to remain distinctly unrecognized (unconscious) by
many, many people, or at least by our limited social discourse.
The young fight hardest to deny it. Perhaps being too dose to the
primal matrix, they fear being overwhelmed. Their great fear is "being
different," and that may be the origin of those well-walled group identities:
Whereas the average individual has no soul of his own, because the 
group and its canon of values tell him what he may or may not be 
psychically, the hero is one who can call his soul his own because he 
has fought for it and won it. Hence there can be no heroic and 
creative activity without winning the anima, and the individual life of 
the hero is in the deepest sense bound up with the psychic reality of 
the anima. (Neumann, 1954, p. 379)
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The anima, or soul, is understood a s  something to "be won" by 
Neumann. Perhaps this is in line with Lindley's concept of the stage three 
teacher as one who has attained to "absolute individuality." The concept 
parallels the Jungian stages which culminate in individuation (and Lindley is 
a Jungian).
But, I wondered, who is to do the winning, who is to direct the action if 
not the ego? In one of our talks, it was Vireo who reminded me of my own 
ideas: in the ego’s security complex—in its monotheistic monologue forever 
taking place within its walls under the rule of repetition and determinism— 
thoughts are forever buzzing back and forth in oppositional evaluations.
Such thoughts interminably support the habit of self above the stream, like "a 
hydrophobic dog” (chapter 1, p. 51), but the habitus is incapable of—even 
opposed to—direct creative action. Such action is a "breakthrough" of ego’s 
walls, but if it is done often enough—a demanding task!—ego’s centrality will 
find itself "undermined."
An insight from myth—again Egyptian—seemed to clarify the 
implications of Jung's theory of transformational individuation. As Neumann 
interprets: “The identity of Osiris, the human soul, and the prime creative 
force amounts to identity with the creativity of the godhead" (p. 238).
At this point, I was satisfied. It was what early play and later dramatic 
activity had always shown me: Whenever we do anything, we are acting. To 
know myself means only to know my role at the moment. Every action is an
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improvisation, but we know what to do by remembering, or pretending to 
remember, our character’s continuity. Transformation now seemed as easy 
as changing masks. I had not yet heard of Casey’s  (1987b) “body memory” 
(chapter 1, pp. 52-54) or I would have realized how rooted action habits are.
“But,” Vireo whispered one evening, “if a  mask has grown on you, 
such a change can be a painful experience." I made light of it, but she 
continued: “You treat masks too lightly. I fear for you. Without any masks, 
there’s..."
“The authentic Self?’
"No, it's just empty: an abyss.”
I pondered this but I did not know what "abyss" meant. Perhaps it was
like the nirvanic void, a creative centre which was "buried treasure."
Compared to this, personae seemed such artificial decorations, a  face to
meet the faces that you meet, defensive and slightly foolish:
Personality is not innate, but acquired. Like a  mask, it is a thing, a 
fetish, a fetishistic object or commodity. "I consent that Isis shall 
search into me, and that my name shall pass from my breast into hers." 
The real name of the god, with which his power was inextricably 
bound up, was supposed to be lodged, in an almost physical sense, 
somewhere in his breast, from which Isis extracted it by a sort of 
surgical operation and transferred it with all its supernatural powers to 
herself. In the famous potlatch cultures of the Indians of the northwest 
coast, what is wagered, won, and lost, is personality, incorporated not 
only in name but also in a variety of emblematic objects; in masks; 
also blankets, and bits of copper. (Brown, 1966, p. 94)
At this time, I was completing my part-time M.Ed. and doing a course in
Educational Philosophy. Vireo was nervously advancing on her B.A. and
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one of her courses was Mythology and Literature, ironically under the same 
English professor as my Mythology class nearly 20 years before. We both 
agreed to thematically approach metamorphosis but each in our own course 
in our own way.
My paper took a very pessimistic view of culture and human life on 
Earth, in general. Any rational extrapolation revealed utter catastrophe 
ahead, especially as the result of a cultural mindset identical to the ego, both 
of which paranoically seek security through "progressive" aggression against 
their insecurity. The insecurity is found in Earthly Nature (phylogenetically) 
and in instinctual nature (ontogenetically). The only hope, mad as it may be, 
is in a miracle (I said): the metamorphosis of consciousness and body into a 
state about which absolutely nothing can be known from here.
Vireo had been studying the English Romantic poets whom we had
often read together. The seemingly limitless flights of their imaginations were
intoxicating. Shelley was the highest flier, but it was in the more sensual
Keats that Vireo found the myth she wanted, and the paradigm of
metamorphosis for her paper. "Lamia" (1820) is an erotic poem which tells
the story of a snakewoman who yearns for the body of real woman again so
she may experience its delights, however transitory. She is granted
metamorphosis by Hermes, but the process reveals itself as one of the
utmost agony:
Left to herself, the serpent now began 
To change; her elfin blood in madness ran,
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Her mouth foam'd, and the grass, therewith besprent,
Wither'd a t dew so sweet and virulent;
Her eyes in torture fix ’d  and anguish drear,
Hot, glaz'd, and wide, with lid-lashes all seer,
Flash’d phosphor and sharp sparks, without one cooling tear. 
The colours all inflam 'd throughout her train,
She writh'd about, convuls’d with scarlet pain.
Lamia emerges a woman but is eventually destroyed, shrivelled like a 
dream, by the rationalist eye of the well-named philosopher, Apollonius.
“I think it’s  like that with us," she said.
“What?”
“You're going. Leaving me to be Lamia: 'convuls'd with scarlet pain*. I 
just hope you’re not Apollonius.”
“What?”
“Oh, Greg, you’re so damned obsessed with your journey, your 
metamorphosis. You're even going to Louisiana because it's so 'down 
there’, so 'delta of rebirth' and all that! I think you're just looking at your soul 
from the outside, from your ego. And you look at me the sam e way: 
Sometimes you think I’m just a  bird in your goddamned tree of life, or some 
brief episode in your story."
§Translucent Masks. If the obsession continues, I do not think it is mine; 
it more likely possesses me than I it. Here in the land of Huey Long, I have 
found a  mutuality of being with the people I have encountered (as I have 
everywhere), but I have also found different guards on the periphery: different
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fears, different desires. My mythic fate to “see through” my required roles—
whether teacher, student, lover, hermit, or fool—is purely my own and not to
be imposed on others. To make my masks of self transparent in no way
extinguishes them or their vital necessity when dealing with a world of
masks. Here in Louisiana I have become less and less aware of myself:
There are too many other presences, too many compelling voices. This story
evaporates as I write it.
In the quietude inside, I sometimes feel I now understand Kazantzakis’
Odysseus when he affirmed truth without substance: “...the soul at last had
reached its ultimate task, the Act” (1958, p. 449). To take action in this sense,
it seems to me, is to act through the self, not from it. It is to relieve the soul,
the shadow over the abyss, from the stressful anxiety of only undertaking
actions which conform to the precepts of habit and training which have
constructed the ego from the outside in. These actions are, of course, often
necessary, but the difference is in the invisible matter of identity: Does one
listen only to the interminable voices which use guilt, duty, and reward to
decide the march of one’s day? Or does one Act from the listening to do the
dance of one’s  day?
I kindle fires in fog, I plant bell buoys on waves,
I cut roads through the air and build all things from chaos; 
my five slave-weavers a t the loom of my swift mind 
weave and unweave all life on a ir’s firm-fibered cloth 
until I cover the whole abyss with a strong net. (p. 514)
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This entire vision of “acting" draws us into the theatre of Dionysos.
The commandments of Zeus are used to inspire order and obedience, but
conceal, as well, Zeus’s fraternal identification with Poseidon (god of the sea
and chaos and earthquake) and with Hades. Dionysos, too, emerges from
the abyss to inspire unpremeditated action (Otto, 1933/65). It is Dionysos
who teaches us not only how to act, but that we are acting (performing) every
moment of every day. This implies, yes, that “all the world is a  stage” but from
the Dionysian perspective, this stage is gloriously unconfined. The roles of
life should all be revelled in, so Ginette Paris (1990) imagines Dionysos:
The actor does not feel he is cheating about his identity because he 
knows, as we do, that he is playing a role, wearing a mask. If he is not 
cynical... he puts all of himself into his role and tries to be for the 
audience the character he pretends to be. Meanwhile the actor is not 
bothered about whether he is being true to his “real self.” He is truly an 
actor. As we all are.
Dionysos is not the God behind the mask. He is the mask.
In our psychological culture, the quest for the real and true Self 
conceals an anti-Dionysian fantasy and a typically monotheistic one. We 
do not easily recognize Dionysos, patron of actors, who invites us to play 
every role, tragic as well as comic, grotesque as well as solemn, with 
intensity, with spirit and brio.. . .  As God of the carnival, of the 
masquerade, he is concerned with the constant metamorphosis of 
identity and opposed to any fixed identification with a role. (p. 49)
Paris’s  statement reveals another sort of trinity in action: Our ideas of
culture, self, and divinity are archetypally interwoven. The belief in a
monotheistic centre of power has similarly led to a belief in a central (and
authentic) “Self.”i Culture (“our” culture) is understood to be a singular entity
i Though for Jung (1971), the Self, though indeed authentic, had no 
attributes in and of itself. It more resembles the abyss of creative chaos.
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with its own internal growth patterns and digestive practices. This 
“psychological culture” (Hillman, 1983b) may be understood as deriving from 
the subject/object split wrought by science and by the self-centered humanism 
of the Enlightenment. C. G. Jung was foremost a scientist.
Paris and Hillman imply that Jung, the son of a  domineering Protestant 
minister, had not himself escaped the fantasy of monotheism with his doctrine of 
individuation seemingly leading to a  deeper, truer Self. Hillman (1983b) has 
said this “S elf can be nothing other than an ego projection. How else, he asks, 
can that which is bottomless be said to have attributes at all?
This implicates Campbell and, perhaps, Neumann in their tendency to 
imply an end of the quest: the “attainment of the boon," or the “mandalan” Self.
It may implicate me in my haranguing years. Behind the mask there is nothing 
but fantasy. Was Vireo correct—am I obsessed only with the abyss?
Jung (1971) has stated that more "primitive” minds—animists, pantheists,
polytheists—experienced their traumas through the demons and deities of the
world. Now, psychological, monotheistic humanity looks only inward within an
enormously inflated self to seek the source of its malaise. Since we as a
civilization seem to seek only order (an order which must extend into the future),
our chronic malaise is disorder. Hillman (1986) understands this a s  the voice of
the exiled “Gods” within:
If the Gods have become diseases, then these forms of chronic 
disorder are the Gods in disguise; they are occulted in these 
misshapen, inhuman forms, and our seeing through to them there—in 
all forms of chronic disorder in ourselves and our city—is a  grounding
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act of culture. The education of sensitivity begins right here in trying to 
see through the manifestations of time into the eternal patterns within 
time. We may regard the discontents of civilization as if they are the 
fundamentals of culture, (p. 20)
The “seeing through” implies a seeing through our daily masks, our
identification with the collective, and with the linear flow of time to those
individuals and those groups who are less than content with our present
order of civilization. It is to seek the god behind the malcontents.
Marginalized groups would be unable to identify themselves as a group were
there not an image, a deity, as the constellating gravity of this identity. As an
example, Paris identifies a Dionysos for women:
Jung has made of Dionysos the archetype who frees us from the 
tyranny of the ego, and archetypal psychology further describes 
Dionysos as a path of freedom for inner oppressed woman. Her 
liberation cannot be the result of an intentional, calculated, heroic 
process; it comes when the inner Maenad finally is let out, free to feel 
whatever she feels, including vulnerability as well as strength, distress 
as well as potency. The special gift of Dionysos is that bursting energy 
that breaks through the internalization of Pentheus’s rules and 
Platonic devaluation of the feminine, (p. 33)
Is release possible? Can we release Dionysos like pent-up steam (as 
Nietzsche cried in increasing evaporation) or can we construct Brown’s 
Dionysian ego in the midst of the id? If we can, do we want to? How would 
you teach such a thing?
I may once have imagined you could, but only when I assumed there 
was a more real, utterly authentic self within our carefully composed faces. 
This present doubt makes me doubt as well Lindley’s  third stage of teaching 
as being “absolute individuality.” Surely this must be only another illusion.
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Yet realizing the play of masks and our infinite self-deception is only one
aspect of a style of teaching which encourages seeing through, i f ! was
teaching hoping to metamorphose Dionysian egos from Apollonian (or
Jehovan!) egos, then i would be creating madness to counter madness.
Paris (1990) puts it this way:
If any given culture receives only Apollonian sunshine, it dries up and 
dies; conversely, if it receives too much Dionysian moisture, it rots and 
becomes crazy. A hyper-technologized, hyper-rationalized society is 
as crazy, in a way, as is an anti-intellectual rock ‘n roll subculture. We 
need both Dionysos and Apollo, (p. 33)
I have asked myself many times: Then why work for transformation? 
Why believe in experientialism? Why teach in a more Dionysian mode? As I 
have indicated in this extended statement: Because I must. The hero-fantasy 
may have been eclipsed, but to deny the exhilarating sense of presence and 
creation which becomes repressed in school systems, institutions, and 
civilization in general, would be to undergo a kind of death. It would be to 
“dry up," like poor Lamia, like a hydrophobic dog.
I see the masks, and I usually try to wear an appropriate one, too. I 
hear the deceptions of speech which reveal poorly hidden motivations of 
another nature. The world we live in often seems unreal, a vast 
phantasmagoria of desire, anxiety, and cruelty: so many phobias, such 
desperate hungers. We are set against one another, defined and divided by 
language in the service of dissectionism and repression. The emotions we 
live with, however, are as real as  we experience them to be.
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Beneath the masks are the imaginal complexes, according to Hillman 
(1983a). They are fantasies, as  I mentioned above, but fantasies as the only 
possible manifestations of the abyss, which can have no characteristics of 
itself (even the word “abyss”! has delusive connotations). They may be 
imagined as amorphous constellations always being reshaped by interaction 
with each other. But, being persons, we respond best (face to face) to other 
persons so the faces of these complexes reveal themselves as the gods, and 
there are animal-persons, too (Hillman, 1980). We are always in one such 
complex or another, according to Hillman (1979c), and we perceive out of it; 
but from the outside (as it were) such a complex may itself be perceived as  a 
god:
All consciousness depends upon fantasy images. All we know about 
the world, about the mind, the body, about anything whatsoever, 
including the spirit and the nature of the divine, comes through images 
and is organized by fantasies into one pattern or another. . . .  Because 
these patterns are archetypal, we are always in one or another 
archetypal configuration, one or another fantasy, (p. 114)
This perspective achieves a type of depth perception for me when
dealing with students (and others). I would feel like a polytheistic priest to
suggest that students should be taught mythology so they can “find out who
they are.” There’s no doubt, however, that old cultural tales and images have
a  purpose in directing individual energies to rediscovering their source,
rather than being rootless vegetables part of “the march of civilization."
Learning mythology, Hillman (1986) suggests, helps provide those roots:
iGreek abussos: a-, not + bussos, bottom. (Morris, 1982)
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Civilization looks ahead, culture looks back. Civilization is historical 
record; culture a  mythic enterprise.. . .  Culture, a s  I have been 
speaking of it, looks backwards and reaches back as a  nostalgia for 
invisibilities, to make them present and to found human life upon them. 
The cultural enterprise attempts to peel, flail, excite individual 
sensitivity so that it can again—notice the "again"—be in touch with 
these invisibles and orient life by their compass. The key syllable in 
culture is the prefix "re." (pp. 19, 20)
I teach autobiography; I use imaginative writing, journal writing, and
face to face dialogue to have people experience themselves in action, to ube
in touch with these invisibles” and remember their placement in time without
succumbing to literalism (the literal repetition-complex I once felt to be “The
Plot"). Other people use such “methods” (and more) and do so with greater
sensitivity than I. Yet the motivation for such facing each other, facing the
gods, is perhaps not only for the demands of my particular daimon, but for the
metamorphosis of culture, and, a s  some would have it, of the world.
In my classes, I have certainly experienced the pleasant recognition of
one person by another who had thought they were strangers. Paris (1990)
suggests Dionysian awareness of masks accomplishes the sam e purpose:
Dionysos shatters the positivist perspective, for which there is only one 
interpretation, one truth, one definite place for everything and 
everyone.. .  . Dionysos [is] the God who introduces us to the world of 
Otherness. To be able to play many roles we must have this built-in 
sense of the other, (p. 33)
Such a recognition is deeper and more important than political 
polemics. The recognition of the Other (whether human or daimonic) is not 
mere academic sloganeering. Its ultimate result may be the recognition of 
our own “self” or mask, shapeshifted as it may be.
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As many groups have intuited, the sense of community, of 
communality, is very important to a  strengthened sense of personal identity. 
The other side of this, however, is the almost inexorable manner in which a 
community hardens from a  position of enthusiasm for uniqueness into a 
dogmatic organization whose objective doctrines demand ritual 
subjectification, and the problem of rigidification repeats itself (McLaren, 
1986).
It is alone, within the whirlpools of emotion, within the gods and
animals—the angels and the demons—of one’s  own nature that a person,
“convuls’d with scarlet pain,” may awaken to the tyranny of ego and to the
agony of existence. Hillman (1986) comments:
Confronted with the unbearable in my own nature, I show more 
trepidation—which is after all the first piece of compassion. In regard 
to others, my manners alter, my language more attuned and precise, I 
become more sophisticated and artful. . . .  I need something further 
than community and civilization for they may be too human, too visible. 
I need imaginal help from tales and images, idols and altars, and the 
creatures of nature, to help me carry what is so hard to carry 
personally and alone. Education of sensitivity begins in the back 
ward, culture in chronic disorder, (p. 21)
Such confrontation, it need hardly be said, is no mere matter of
introspection or idle fantasy. Imagination must be active, in creative work or
in play, for it to memorialize “the invisibles.”
For some, the need to overthrow the tyranny of ego, the monotheism of
monotony, involves more pervasive matters than that of opening oneself to
the gods. With civilization rapidly moving into hyper-technologization, the
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possibility of success in at last eradicating its "chronic discontents”—its
marginalized voices and its frustrated pantheons—seem s possible. N. O.
Brown long ago saw this as the vital issue of our times when saying in the
introduction to Life Against Death (1959), that
it begins to be apparent that mankind, in all its restless striving and 
progress, has no idea of what it really wants. Freud was right: our real 
desires are unconscious. It also begins to be apparent that mankind, 
unconscious of its real desires and therefore unable to obtain 
satisfaction, is hostile to life and ready to destroy itself. Freud was 
right in positing a death instinct, and the development of weapons of 
destruction makes our present dilemma plain: we either come to terms 
with our unconscious instincts and drives—with life and with death—or 
else we surely die. (p. x)
Brown understands our fear of the punishing social father a s  being the
great dead hand which weighs us gravely down into a death-in-life. It is not
old-fashioned religion, according to the early Gnostics and to psychoanalyst
Greg Mogenson, to see the spectre of the one God as the ultimate punishing
father. Many are those who, fearing that heavy hand, have identified with its
power to produce much of the incomprehensible terror and angst of our
present predicament. Mogenson (1989) proclaims that it is only through
destructuring the words around our minds that we can save ourselves from
the dead weight of time:
This century has enacted a derridean deconstruction of our 
civilization’s logo-centric, Judeo-Christian defense—the Judeo- 
Christian covenant. In the text of history we can read the subtext of 
God, the horror of the Great Code. God is the oven. God is the atom 
bomb. God is a  trauma, (p. 50)
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These apocalyptic positions which blame the patriarchal allfather for
socially subjected consciousness are very uncomfortable to some. If the
attack is personalized, it feels like it is focused on a personal father and many
of us have or had fine, loving fathers. For me—as a teacher, a s  a person—to
say I feel limited or oppressed because of the great Father God smacks of the
Oedipal crisis, but that is simply to continue mythmaking in another arena:
the application of Freud’s monomyth.
It is the dogma of pedagogy which stifles, the pretense that there is a
literal body of knowledge to be passed piecemeal to students. It is as though
each teacher is expected to dissect his or her portion of this body and pass it
on to the students. Whose body is this? What is the face of
institutionalization? Is it Zeus? Is it Yahweh or “God”?
There are voices which think so and which call for the replacement of
the patriarchal hierarchy with a matriarchal hierarchy (there can be little
doubt it would still be a hierarchy). Paris (1986) points out that any hierarchy
derives from a single point of revelation at its peak—a monotheism:
If we can let go of the devotion to an original, single matriarchy of the 
Great Mother (that ideal which supports monotheistic feminism), then 
we can regard the plurality of the Goddesses, not as her fragmentation 
or as  her developmental differentiation, but rather as each Goddess 
comprising an archetypal form of feminism. There are a s  many 
feminisms as there are Goddesses, at least, (p. 199)
As I have attempted to indicate, the idea of “teaching” and “teachers” 
implies there must be “a teaching”: a  body of knowledge kept slightly out of
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reach from which we can feed on only parts at a time. The entire body is out 
of reach for any one of us; it is just ahead, in the future, eternally deferred.
It seems to me Norman O. Brown (1959,1966,1970) is near the mark 
even at his most bizarre. Brown claims what is just before us is Thanatos:
Our will to seek control and security is a denial of growth, creativity, and the 
dangerous erotic play of life. Unknowingly, we labour for death.
The substance of Thanatos is there before us every day, either 
drowning us in ads or implied behind the raison d ’etre for seeking an 
education. Daily, hourly, it is either at the back of our minds or at the front. I 
speak of the Great God Money. Brown (1959) explains that “money reflects 
and promotes a style of thinking which is abstract, impersonal, objective, and 
quantitative, that is to say, the style of thinking of modern science—and what 
can be more rational than that?’ (p. 234) Money is perfectly rational, the 
epitome of quantification. We look askance at anyone who plays with it. But 
what is money: shining gold? the sacred? “The ultimate category of 
economics is power; but power is not an economic category... to pursue the 
tracks of power, we will have to enter the domain of the sacred, and map it: 
all power is essentially sacred power" (p. 251).
But Brown goes on to claim that what we have made sacred is “filthy 
lucre.” The wish to both retain money and use it for purposes of power leads 
Brown to psychoanalyze that wish as “anal-sadistic” (p. 270). What we hold 
before us and eat from is the same dung the scarab rolls into a ball and
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pushes patiently along, according to Brown. The totality of knowledge, its 
body, even the ideal society (without discontents) appears in this image as a 
coffin, or, at least, as an outhouse.
Our civilization, which so many have claimed is overly “heroic” in its 
myths, is in this view in desperate need of new archetypal adventurers. The 
archetypal hero is not always male and is certainly not a policeman or a 
soldier—those action figures that thrive on television. The hero to break from 
the monomania of money, the monopoly of consciousness, must be a culture- 
hero indeed. As Hillman indicated earlier, culture looks back and down 
through memory and its sources, whereas civilization denies the past to 
pursue its anal-sadistic progress. It is in this sense of culture that teaching 
may introduce the gods. Teaching becomes mythic whenever it works with 
memory, imagination, or with “persons.”
I have my doubts that the system is in imminent danger of collapse or 
that schooling in its entirety promotes only objective rationalists who seek 
money (and all that it implies) and see all other persons as stepping stones 
to that goal. But I do feel strongly that teachers who work for metis—intuitive 
knowing—are often the heroes who renew culture by guiding students to 
renew contact with their original pantheism (Hillman, 1981).
But perhaps the image of the hero has become too tainted with 
notions of glory and conquest. The teacher I speak of is more like a
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hierophant of sacred mysteries, an alchemist of transmutation, or a  magus of 
metamorphosis.
It may be Dionysos who reveals the masks we wear and to which we 
have become attached, but it is Eros who overleaps Thanatos to bring life 
(libido) back to our bodies and enliven the world. Here I understand 
Aphrodite to be the forbidden goddess who has been fearfully excluded from 
curriculum. She has been pushed to the margins, or left in the chthonic 
depths of memory. She too often must become pathologized to get the 
attention she needs. Aphrodite a s  the principle of love in human relations 
should be welcomed into any initiate’s education (Paris, 1986).
More acceptable, perhaps, at this stage of our evolution is the elusive 
god, Hermes. Hermes is anything but heroic (Lopez-Pedraza, 1989). He is 
the god of thieves, the deceiver who breaks all boundaries, and he is the god 
of writing. When we find ourselves stuck, frozen in the consciousness of the 
Thanatic money-security god, it is unboundaried Hermes who can free us.
In our paranoia we have transmogrified Aphrodite into Medusa who 
turns us to stone in the terror of facing her. It is Hermes with his gifts of 
magical flight, indirect attack—both attributes of the creative imagination— 
and invisibility—awareness without the delimiting rap of ego—who frees us 
from this terror of the snake-haired Gorgon, and perhaps allows the Gorgon, 
like Lamia, to emerge in a more attractive guise.
The Hermetic element in the intolerable image is considerable. . . .
Hermetic deviousness is given here in the form of flight that is in
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someway essential to the meeting with Medusa. It is more than an 
escape. Likewise the invisibility is so much more than a hero’s 
protective equipment. The psychological significance of this motif lies 
in the way that Hermes directs us towards Hades through his gift of the 
cap. This content is a reminder of the long tradition which realises that 
the healthy state of psyche is invisible. (Micklem, 1979, p. 11)
Instead of imagining our physical image as our soul-self, a self-imago
like Narcissus, Hermes, as guide, disappears in the depths: “It was no
upward soaring to heroic ecstasies, but was essentially in the direction of
psyche and therefore a journey that, like, psyche, speaks and defines itself in
terms of depths” (Micklem, p. 11). Hermes is not the Pegasus of imaginative
inflation, nor is he the courageous hero inflated with dreams of glory.
Hermes smiles, shimmers, and disappears. He accepts the “ecstasis of
forgetting” (Heidegger, 1927, in Krell, 1990, p. 331, 5n) to stay undefined. As
Paris (1990) expostulates:
Too often the reaction against the domination of rationalism and 
positivism has led to the defense of the simple-minded and ignorant, 
those who are excluded from the Apollo-Zeus system. But this sells 
short the Hermes intellect, for he is, along with Dionysos and 
Aphrodite, an archetype to stand up to the champions of Logos.
These champions (the sharpest minds, the strongest wills, the 
highbrow and the powerful) are more vulnerable to the cleverness and 
astuteness of Hermes than to what they usually perceive as 
threat—the uprising of the oppressed. Winning while appearing to 
lose is a strategy that a hermetic person knows how to play to 
advantage. The power of humor and ridicule in the face of harsh 
authority, the role of the court jester, the uses of flight over fight and of 
artful speech in negotiation—all these can be rediscovered in Hermes 
. . . .  Women, who are said to be wily, know these strategies, a s  do 
men who are endowed with that form of intelligence known to the 
Greeks as metis, that is, an intuitive intelligence.. . .  Hermes-Mercury 
is many-faceted, shimmering, impossible to pin down. (p. 61, 62)
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Just as  imagination cannot be contained by an outsider—be it a
teacher or one’s own ego—Hermes can never become an identity. He is
never where he is expected to be and so, as  god of writing, he is the very
antithesis of a  scribe. He is the messenger-god who brings messages from
the archetypal depths below the masks. He is the shapeshifter who can drop
into the abyss and step as lightly from it. It is Hermes who suggests that in
the process of writing we may allow the world to speak, as is suggested by
the metaphor of Muses. By using writing in classes individuals may find
themselves on the path of what Jam es Hillman (1983a) calls “soul-making”:
By soul I mean, first of all, a  perspective rather than a  substance, a 
viewpoint toward things rather than a thing itself. . . .  by “soul” I 
mean the imaginative possibility in our natures, the experiencing 
through reflective speculation, dream, image, and fantasy— that 
mode which recognizes all realities as primarily symbolic or 
metaphorical, (p. 17)
Writing which is soul-making (providing a perspective outside of the 
city of anal-sadistic compulsion) is precisely that which is undertaken in 
autobiography, in dialogue, or in any true fiction. It means the loss of 
certainty or its seeking.
When I beg?in encountering the Hermes-Mercurius archetype, I finally 
abandoned the pretense that I knew. Transformation or metamorphosis can 
only be explored as a possibility when the end result is mysterious and 
uncertain. Today I no longer accept the Jungian idea of the end result of
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individuation as being the discovery of an authentic Self. Hillman’s soul as a
shifting perspective behind the masks feels more strange, yet more
appropriate for a  hermetic approach. Teaching as a hermetic activity admits
to a future of infinite possibility, not one covered with the weight of the body of
knowledge, yet one supported by the weight of memory.
Teaching monotheistically leads, so it is said, to a strong sense of
identity. To know who you are, you have merely to listen to the socially-
injected voices in your head. Teaching polytheistically gives all voices
validity but, guided by Hermes, the result need not be cacophony but poetry
(in the sense of language speaking itself). Hermetic teaching allows the soul
to choose whatever identity (mask) it wishes and to play it into form in a
journal, an autobiography, creative dialogue, or some form of fictional
characterization or creative exploration. The imagination can never be
capped by a singular identity, as Derrida (1981) has noted of Thoth, the
Egyptian Hermes:
the figure of Thoth takes shape and takes its shape from the very thing 
it resists and substitutes for. But it thereby opposes itself, passes into 
its other, and this messenger-god is truly a god of the absolute 
passage between opposites. If he had any identity—but he is 
precisely the god of nonidentity—he would be that coincidentia 
oppositorum. . . .  In distinguishing himself from the his opposite, Thoth 
also imitates it, becomes its sign and representative, obeys it and 
conforms to it, replaces it, by violence if need be. He is thus the 
father’s other, the father, and the subversive movement of 
replacement. The god of writing is thus at once his father, his son, and 
himself. He cannot be assigned a fixed spot in the play of differences. 
Sly, slippery, and masked, an intriguer and a card, like Hermes, he is 
neither king nor jack, but rather a sort of joker, a floating signifier, a 
wild card, one who puts play into play. (p. 99)
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I have found this “non-identity” to be the most important component of
the autobiography section of my own courses in the present. Jo Anne
Pagano (1991) has rightly pointed out that one of the major dangers in
classroom autobiography is precisely that hardening of self-pretense:
Autobiographical writing, particularly in the classroom context, can 
inhibit that surprise because we are so concerned with the 
representation of ourselves. When we tell stories with ourselves 
prominently and self-consciously at the center, we tend to think of 
others only in relation to ourselves; we tend to reify others. The 
exclusive preoccupation with our own concerns and motivations 
annexes the otherness of the other, (p. 202)
I try to teach in a way which avoids this unpleasant side-effect, yet I
must beware of providing too many guidelines and ordering the students to
investigate their past as they would a stranger’s. I, too, must take chances. I,
too, must undergo the “scarlet pain” of shapeshifting. I often make mistakes
and it often does not work, but I still feel I am working out my own mythic
journey and, at the very least, encouraging my students to enter on theirs. It
is not a path a student, or any person, may simply enter on to walk out of the
city, to cross the threshold of adventure. It involves transmutation, becoming
aware that the thing called T  is just another mask (and one largely created
by others). This inner change is often not detectable or testable, but many
serious educators consider it the true task of education. As Donald Cowan,
President of the University of Dallas (1986), has written:
Learning must cause a metamorphosis of the person, not merely 
elevate him—must make him into something different from what he 
was before. The evidence for this comes in the moment of making.
131
There must issue from the learner something new, something he has
not been taught, that has about it a recognizability of authenticity, (p.
27)
So this is where I find myself today: a stranger in a strange land. But 
this land is also a mindscape and perhaps even a soul formation spiralling 
above the abyss. And the stranger is I, the writer, estranged from other 
soulmasks who may face me as gods or plague me as demons. I perceive 
the images and hear the whispers which arise in reverie from hidden depths 
within or hidden depths without. In this way, I participate with these 
soulmaking forces, not as a heroic conquistador, but more as a transparent 
mask whose features can adapt and give expression to the daimonic 
presence behind it. I become as mutable as the gods within, my motions 
and emotions transfigured and multiplied. Perhaps I continue to engage in 
egoistic self-delusion, but fantasy is the stuff of the gods.
In a way, I feel I have become unreal, yet simultaneously been caught 
in the maelstrom of more eternal presences which have swirled up from the 
abyss and out from their hiding places in the natural world. I am involved in 
the immanence I felt as a child in the sandhills and I again feel the 
ominous/wondrous sense of something about to happen. I am deeply aware 
of my transience and this gives life a certain piquancy, yet it does not lessen 
the sense of other presences moving between the concepts, and back and 
forth through the gates of the city of insecurity.
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This sense of unrealized forces behind our existence was beautifully
expressed by the late naturalist, Loren Eiseley (1987), in a  poem which
proved to be one of his final writings. Though it recognizes no gods, the
poet’s aching aw areness of the tenuousness of self leaves the reader with an
overwhelming sense of silent worlds in eternal motion. This part of the poem
concerns Eiseley’s awakening after passing out cold at the top of his stairs:
“/ Am the Stranger Here"
I have often wondered since, knowing fu ll well I died, 
how the dark and scattered cells in the sprawled body knew 
how the rent in the brain might be closed, 
how the churning blood might stop 
the wind, the intolerable wind that swept 
me down to the dark, how, out of nothingness,
could rise, could be rebuilt 
the tower o f light in the mind, how steadily crawling cells 
could recompose and knit 
memory to memory, till up from death I came, 
drawn forth by things unseen, some entity, some toiling
congregation
below me in the dark, but not myself nor my will.
No, not myself. In a ll the years remaining
I know, and am grateful to them, those secret alchemists
o f void and stardust who, when m y will had failed,
re lit the light. Why did they do it? No one has answered me, none.
The blood does not speak, nor the stricken neurons answer, 
yet they willed that light should be and it was done.
I am the stranger here, the construct. I am the lonely one.
(p. 244)
Chapter 3: Memory and Matter
“memory... is just the intersection of mind and matter."
(Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, p. xii)
§Mind and Matter. Now that I have remembered my teaching career and 
sought the mythic themes which seem to have been so interwoven with my 
life, I have to ask myself: Just what is it I have remembered here? Over the 
basically twenty years from which I have rendered a narrative, there were 
other incidents beyond count which must have had lasting effects. There 
were vital relationships which were left unexplored and important places 
which even now hold memories against time’s erosion. Most important, as 
far as  the quest for memory goes, is why did I choose the particular lines of 
summary I did? With all the endless bits of memorial data available, why did 
I choose to compose the particular fugues I did?
It may be my narrative was emplotted unconsciously to be appropriate 
for my particular self-schema (Piaget & Inhelder, 1973; Ross, 1992) or that 
my habitus (Grinnell, 1973; Kirby, 1991) chose only those storylines which 
would present me to myself in the best light. If either of these is the case, 
then the self, however defined, chooses its memories and its role is more that 
of a censor than a  judge of truth. It seems the self acts more as a public
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relations officer than a  chief executive, according to Jeremy Campbell 
(1989), regarding truth and control as  being secondary to public image.
But then what does this say of memory, that it is a  sort of grab-bag full 
of sensory or emotional impressions, some less than accurately recorded? 
Then when the self puts these memories into a narrative all that must be left 
is the “truthfulness” (Pinar, p. 25) of the narrator’s approach and that is 
subject to the self-deceptions of the habitus or self-schema. The self is 
assum ed to originate in intersubjective mimicry (Lasch, 1984) and 
identification (Freud), especially of parental figures, until it, at last, becomes 
an object to itself in Lacan’s (1977) mirror stage and begins to protect that 
image through the manipulation of memory.
This, however, tells us little. It may be understood as being subject to 
the paradigm of infinite regression. After all, where did the parents get their 
identities from, and their parents before them? How time and place oriented 
is the habitus of self and how culturally designed are the schemata of self?
At some point, within what Casey (1987b) calls primary memory, memory 
must be remembering itself. That is, if memory serves the function of a grab- 
bag for self-image, it must also serve the function of remembering who the 
self is. It must always already be active in every act of recollection. 
Remembering into the self rather than “before” it—remembering subjectively 
rather than objectively—takes one into the very structures of linguistics and
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culture which first created the space for subjectivity in the first place (Ricoeur, 
1984).
This speaks of both the nebulous nature of that which we call memory 
and of its abyssal depths. Did memory originate with language or with 
technology or with mourning? The question of origins, itself, is probably 
another instance of the paradigm of infinite regression (Daignault & Gauthier, 
1981), but as Casey (1987b, 1991) indicated in chapter 1, body-memory 
must underlie each of the above cases of mental memory: “Because it re­
enacts the past, it need not represent it; its own kinesthesias link it from within 
to the felt movements which it is reinstating; as a way of ‘dilating our being in 
the world,’ body memory includes its own past by an internal osmotic 
intertwining with if (1987b, p. 178). Such body memory must be present in 
the rest of the organic kingdom, as well, which makes memory an attribute of 
nature. Indeed, that is Casey’s project: returning memory to the world. But 
what is this “world”? Does it include what we commonly refer to as “dead 
matter”? Can it even be known outside of our cultural constructions?
That our cultural world has had an effect, an enormous effect, on 
nature few would deny. Has nature had an effect on us? We were all taught 
in school how cultural evolution has “replaced” natural evolution in our 
species. We know today that we had ancestors who may have been 
Hominidae, like us, but who had neither the brain capacity nor the larynx 
necessary for speech, and “language is so intimately linked to man and
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society that they are inseparable” (Kristeva, 1989, p. 3). Did Homo 
symbolicus (Jung, 1971) create culture in the “aether” of imaginative space 
only then to turn on nature? Or did the symbol-making hominid merely act on 
natural impulses to remember the past and adapt to the future? Or, perhaps, 
the question is without meaning since our ideas of the inner lives of our 
primate ancestors and of nature, herself, can only be cultural interpretations.
Memory, as memor (mindfulness), is described by Dunne (1988) in 
chapter 5 as arising around mourning, an understanding shared with the 
psychoanalyst Kristeva (1987) and perhaps with Lacan (1977). A more 
widespread anthropological storyline is that as Homo erectus became Homo 
habiiis—as the upright hominid used his freed hands and opposing thumb to 
become the tool-making hominid—tools created mind (Portmann, 1954/64; 
Leakey, 1982): Memory as techne (skill or art) evolved as the technical 
assistant to the hands in their endeavour to produce and reproduce stronger 
and finer tools.
In the latter case, language and memory can be understood as 
developing within a rapidly enlarging brain and functioning constructively to 
further the basic survival instincts of their animal hosts. Memory, in this case, 
is a brain function like language which has expanded simultaneously with 
humankind’s technological mastery. Technology, in this light, is not the result 
of mental activity but is instead its manifest identity. Creativity is technical 
creativity, present in nature and in matter.
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Kristeva (1989) states that the archeologists, Boklen and Leroi- 
Gourhan, share the opinion that language appeared with the graphic 
symbols on statuettes and eventually in caves during the Mousterian period 
and that “there is human language wherever there are graphic symbols” (p.
45). This would be an explicit case where “Anthropian” motor functions led 
into a new world of symbolism, from which memory emerged and evolved, 
gradually, the symbols into language.
The former case—memor— may have had a spontaneous 
appearance more to do with shamanism, with rhythm and movement, than 
with the referential symbolism of language (Eliade, 1964). Memor grew from 
the nostalgia for pure action:" Except for the point, the still point, /  There 
would be no dance, and there is only the dance” (Eliot, 1944, 1, 66, 67). Only 
with the evolution of mythic names and narratives, in this view, did memor 
appropriate linguistic sounds and use them non-representationally as 
invocation of the ancestors or gods and as sacred song to augment the 
action of ritual (Harrison, 1903/91). L6vi-Strauss (1966) has noted how the 
structure of language resembles that of music.
Here, instead of memory being a dependent “technical assistant,” it 
becomes its own creative matrix. By recoiling upon itself, it compresses the 
density of its own remembering “(which does not re-member)" (Taylor, p.
168). Dream and imagination produce images as memory turns upon itself.
“Poetic images condense infinite meanings in elliptic associations,” as
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Bachelard (1987, p. 28) says. Bachelard was fond of the image of the tree,
and he indicated the recoil of memory as being similar to the invasion of
dreams which awaken us to our roots: “A root is always a discovery. We
dream it more than we see it. It surprises us when we discover if (p. 84).
The way of the dreamer, the artist of the soul, is a reversal of the outgrowing
use of self toward environmental expansion:
The root is the mysterious tree, it is the subterranean, inverted tree.
For the root, the darkest earth—like the pond, but without the pond—is 
also a mirror, a strange opaque mirror which doubles every aerial 
reality with a subterranean image, (pp. 84,85)
It seems that self as techne, with its practically-oriented memories, can
easily be explained away as residing in the space of the human brain or
hands or the constructions of those hands. However, where can we find the
space of those strange dreams and reveries which draw us back among the
roots of the “inverted tree”? The self which enters the labyrinth of itself,
through “possession" or bold endeavour, seems to have other intentions than
increasing one’s “substance.” Can it be dismissed as instinctive brain activity
to “lose oneself” in ruminescences, or to actively draw or write to enter the
labyrinth of soul?
Bergson (1912) insisted that “memory ... is just the intersection of mind 
and matter” (p. xii). He understood the body to be an instrument of action, 
and “of action only. In no degree, in no sense, under no aspect, does it serve 
to prepare, far less to explain, a representation" (p. 299). How he applied 
these notions will be explained in the next section, but here it should be
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noted that memory, which consists of representations, is not understood as
merely an extension of perceptions which came into being gradually over
time, but a creative leap which he refers to as "spirit”: “When we pass from
pure perception to memory, we definitely abandon matter for spirit” (p. 301).
Bergson seem s to be indicating the hidden connection between
human memory and language. For him, the representation is the beginning
of language—a creative leap that could not have emerged gradually from the
signs and sounds of proto-human tool-users.
Linguistics as  a science refuses to even consider the question of
origins. Kristeva (1989) sums this up by saying:
No matter how interesting ail this information is, it reveals only the 
process by which an already constituted language is learned by 
subjects in a given society, and can inform us only about the 
psychosociological particularities of the subjects speaking or learning 
a particular language. But it can shed no light on the historical 
process of the formation of language, and even less on its “origin.” (p. 
44)
Kristeva even questions the gradualist hypothesis:
Can one consider that language underwent a period of development, 
of slow and laborious progression during the course of which it 
became the complex system of signification and communication that it 
is today, and that history finds as far back as it goes into the past? Or 
should one adm it... that from the “beginning” language was “formally 
complete” and that once there was man there was language as a 
complete system in charge of all the functions it has today, (p. 46)
Kristeva cites L6vi-Strauss in his renunciation of the search for a
sociological theory to explain symbolism, instead suggesting a search for the
symbolic origin of society. As language functions mainly through
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unconscious exchange, so social systems could have appeared as
representations of language. Kristeva quotes Levi-Strauss as writing that,
no matter what the moment and the circumstances of its appearance 
in the animal scale were, language could only have been born in a 
single stroke. Objects couldn’t just start to signify progressively. After 
a transformation ..., a passage was effected from a stage where 
nothing made sense to another where everything did. (p. 46)
In this perspective, the world suddenly revealed itself in symbols
which were felt as material presences (a perspective I will pursue in chapter
4, on mythical consciousness), but the appearance of this signification was
different from “the slow acquisition of the knowledge that ‘this signifies’” (p.
46). This latter function is the beginning of the division which led to
subjectivity: to identity, and to personal memory. It is only with some
semblance of personal identity that memory as memor can begin.
Perhaps here, again, the dichotomy is being too finely drawn. The
situation may be more both/and than either/or. Michel Foucault (1988)
considers the technology of the self to be the action of the soul which may
either increase substance or “care" for its invisible source:
The self is not clothing, tools, or possessions. It is to be found in the 
principle which uses these tools, a principle not of the body but of the 
soul. You have to worry about your soul—that is the principal activity 
of caring for yourself. The care of the self is the care of the activity and 
not the care of the soul-as-substance. (p. 25)
Yet, even if the principle of self and memory is the same in both
instances—that of natural, substantial concerns, and that of seemingly
insubstantial explorations—the difference is enough to give one pause. If the
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body seeks only to increase its substance, then why would the brain be 
programmed to remember, imagine, or dream? Is it merely the response to 
the growing awareness of “this signifies” or is it the regression back into the 
world in which signifier and signified were once united? If such 
remembering is the recoil of “care” upon the activity of the self, as Foucault 
indicates, then such explorations may be regarded as contra-nature. If this is 
conceivable, I submit that the inspiration for such mindfulness may not lie 
within the solidity of the brain. Such inspiration may not lie within matter, as 
we commonly understand it. But, lest it seem I am proposing a sort of 
spiritualism or alternate reality, the problem may lie in the traditional 
understanding of physical matter—and in its intimacy with time.
Before I use the minds of Bergson and Whitehead, and the startling 
implications of “postmodern science,” to seek a source in time for the creative 
recoil of memory upon itself, allow me to further explore the phenomenon of 
memory as techne in time and matter.
If mind and matter are distinct phenomena, then memory exists only in 
the former and there is no question to explore. If, however, mind and matter 
are of the same substance—or at least mutually implicated—then the 
question must be asked just where is the place of memory in matter, or, 
better, what is the action of memory in matter?
This is not to delve into the specifics of the mind-body problem, a 
subject thoroughly explored by neurologists, psychologists, and
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philosophers of various eras and schools who have yet to come to a decisive 
conclusion. Body memory, especially as  elucidated by Merleau-Ponty 
(1945/78) and Casey (1987b), was adumbrated in chapter 1 and it is likely 
this is akin to the perceptually-oriented memory imputed to non-human 
animals. Like animals, we, too, employ body memory to navigate through 
familiar terrain and notice it most when something physically familiar has 
changed in some way: “Body memory alludes to memory that is intrinsic to 
the body, to its own ways of remembering: how we remember in and through 
and by the body” (Casey, 1987b, p. 147).
It is difficult to see how even the most hermeneutical of 
phenomenologists could deny a  place within memory and self to the 
vexations, “humours,” and genetic programming of each of the bodies we 
are, though just what that place is remains open to cultural interpretation. As 
our bodies are genetically similar to all those of our species, it is conceivable 
that there could be species-specific memories which reflect traumatic 
experiences or habituated responses common to us all. On a further level 
entirely, since we have evolved from less complex forms of life and remain so 
connected, atavistic body-memory buried deep in our genes could exceed 
the lifespan of the changing cells of this body and derive from some 
primordial cellular struggle for life. Even single-celled amoebae appear to 
be capable of remembering and learning (Eiseley, 1960), so remembering 
and learning (for specific ends) themselves may be inherited characteristics.
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Neurologists will insist that the mind is merely an “effect” of the body.
As neurons fire through synapse loops, the body experiences consciousness
with the attendant illusion of free-will. The body, it is concluded, is merely
responding instinctively to its environment and is pre-programmed to act in
certain ways to ensure its survival and reproduction. As D. E. Wooldridge
writes under his apt title, The Machinery of the Brain (1963):
No useful purpose has yet been established for the sense of 
awareness that illumines a small fraction of the mental activities of a 
few species of higher animals. It is not clear that the behavior of any 
individual or the course of world history would have been affected in 
any way if awareness were nonexistent. (In Griffin, 1988, p. 42)
It is, of course, such mechanizing of our inner experience which led
from Pavlov to Watson, Skinner and the behavioral psychologists. Even if we
were someday forced to accept a purely physiological cause and effect
relationship between the brain and consciousness, however, it is still unlikely
that human personality could be reduced to generic behaviors. This was
known even in 1931, when Sir Arthur Keith, the British anatomist, wrote:
Within the brain, there are some eighteen thousand million of 
microscopic living units or nerve cells. These units are grouped in 
myriads of battalions, and the battalions are linked together by a 
system of communication which in complexity has no parallel in any 
telephone network devised by man. Of the millions of nerve units in 
the brain not one is isolated. All are connected and take part in 
handling the ceaseless streams of messages which flow into the brain 
from eyes, ears, fingers, feet, limbs, and body.
If nature cannot reproduce the same simple pattern in any two 
fingers, how much more impossible is it for her to reproduce the same 
pattern in any two brains, the organization of which is so inconceivably 
complex! Every child is born with a certain balance of faculties, 
aptitudes, inclinations, and instinctive leanings. In no two is the
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balance alike, and each different brain has to deal with a different tide 
of experience. I marvel, then, not that one man should disagree with 
another concerning the ultimate realities of life, but that so many, in 
spite of the diversity of their inborn natures, should reach so large a 
measure of agreement. (In Campbell, 1968, pp. 32, 33)
Though physiological uniqueness is affirmed, the necessity of
consciousness is not. Sir Arthur understands that reality flows “into the brain”
and the self—essentially passive—is apparently waiting there to receive it.
The perceived world is out there—solid, reliable, consistent—and the brain
must have generic sensory mechanisms after all which receive the impulses
of colour, sound, or what have you in identical ways. Mind, though unique, is
still implied as a by-product of the brain. The world is conceived as spatially
solid, undergoing only the slow transformations of time. Memory is a storage
unit of the brain where bygone sensory impulses reside in retirement, but
implacable matter, itself, contains none.
That the body takes part in remembering few would deny. As memory
is dependent on a healthy brain physiology, so is the constitution of identity,
as has been clearly made evident in reporting on brain damaged patients by
Luria (1968, 1972) and Sacks (1985, 1987). These physicians, however,
believe that the brain alone does constitute the human in human life. Sacks
has written that for Luria “even the most elemental functions of brain and
mind were not wholly biological in nature but conditioned by the
experiences, the interactions, the culture, of the individual—[Luria believed]
that human faculties could not be studied or understood in isolation, but
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always had to be understood in relation to living and formative influences”
(1987, p. viif). Sacks, at least, even goes so far as to accept
the lesson also taught by Socrates, Freud, Proust—that a life, a human 
life, is not a life until it is examined; that it is not a  life until it is truly 
remembered and appropriated; and that such a remembrance is not 
something passive, but active, the active and creative construction of 
one’s life, the finding and telling of the true story of one’s life. (p. xviii)
Though it is not clear where Sacks considers the “active and creative”
storytelling source to lie, it does seem clear he means it to be somehow
beyond brain physiology. Despite his training in physiology, he seems to
feel that remembering creatively undertaken becomes a self which is not
settled and final but in as much creative process as the remembering which
leads into its becoming. The self’s ongoing story is the self.
This, of course, is how memory is experienced: either freely
undertaken or its flashes freely pursued. The phenomenological study of
memory intends to be interested only in this subjective side: memory (and
self) as you and I intimately experience it with the assumption, apparently,
that neuronic impulses and chemical changes in the brain are merely
manifestations of our experience. Simultaneously, however, we continue to
experience perceptions as objectively real (even though some of us may be
somewhat colour-blind or have more finely tuned senses of smell, etc.). If
sense perceptions are “impressions” of the real, then memory is nothing
more than the passive retaining of those impressions.
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Aristotle (Sorabji, 1972) certainly saw it this way.i but he was 
opposing the thought of his master, Plato, who maintained that sense 
perceptions are but pale shadows of the realm of pure ideas or pure forms. 
With right knowledge, according to Plato (1961), one can see through the 
mere sensible world to this intelligible world. Knowledge, in essence, is 
anamnesis: an undoing of amnesia, a remembering of these pure forms or 
ideas as they eternally exist in a realm of light and bliss (Comford, 1948).
Long before Plato’s time, in the pre-Buddhistic East, this sort of denial 
of the reality of the sensory world had emerged into the sacred 
consciousnesses of at least Daoist China, Vedic India, and Bon Tibet. The 
proud science of our West has long ignored the accumulated wisdom of such 
areas because they have neither the technological progress nor the material 
prosperity to “prove” their assertions. Experience cannot be measured.
Now, however, the revolution in the sciences has confirmed many of the 
“idealistic” assumptions of these areas. Heisenberg (1971) could have 
quoted from the secret doctrines of Tibetan yoga for his uncertainty principle: 
“All things have no existence apart from the mind which holdeth them to be 
existing” (Evans-Wentz, 1935/58, p. 141). Compare Plotinus (3rd century 
A.C.E.): “In the same way [the soul] makes objects of sense which are, so to 
speak, connected with it, shine out, one might say, by its own power, and
i Aristotle does affirm that matter must be conceived as a locus of 
determinate potentialities that must become actualized only through the activity 
of forms (Sorabji, 1972).
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brings them before its eyes, since its power of [sense perception] is ready for 
them and, in a  way, in travail towards them” (1984, IV:6, p. 329). (my italics)
Was Plato a yogin? There is no evidence for such assertions but the 
origin of such visions as  the “world of ideas” may help to discover the place 
ascribed to mind, especially as it relates to matter. Plato’s idealism was not 
as original as is often thought, deriving as it does from Pythagoras'! by way of 
Parmenides (Dodds, 1973). Parmenides and other pre-Socratic rationalists 
developed their speculations within the “irrational” geography that myth and 
ritual had already mapped out (Comford, 1952/71; Dodds, 1953/73). The 
mythic mind’s  experience of profane and sacred times may prefigure the 
chronicity of becoming a s  against timeless Being in Parmenides, and the 
world of appearances and the world of ideas in Plato.
Plato, perhaps, was such a  powerful influence due to his tenacity and 
because he wrote in expressive dramatic dialogues rather dry treatises or 
oracular pronouncements. Possibly read widely and enjoyed, people 
embraced Plato’s transcendentalism. His idealism became the philosophical 
foundation of the new Christian doctrine of the later Roman Empire, and the 
senses and matter were relegated to fallen creation for at least the next 10CX) 
years.
i Pythagoras may have travelled in Asia where he absorbed ideas from 
the cultural locus mentioned above. Pythagoreans believed in the purification 
and the transmigration of the soul (Dodds, 1953/73).
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In this view, matter is dead and of no interest or worth in itself. Mind, 
on the other hand, through anamnesis in Platonism and through revelation 
and obedience in Christianity, had the power to become aware of the one, 
true reality. But with the Renaissance and the inexorable advance of science 
into the mysteries of the material world, the stage was set for the opposition 
of idealism and materialism, which is still echoed in the so-called mind-body 
problem: Is memory in matter, or is it in some sort of ethereal space?
§The M ud Tempus. What is interesting about the space of memory is
how the question of time seems to have been side-stepped, except among
the early mythmakers of the cosmic round. In profane time, individual
memories accumulate creating a sense of a “self-seeking self” and so is
accompanied by guilt, according to Eliade (1959):
Time had worn the human being, society, the cosmos—and this 
destructive time was profane time, duration strictly speaking; it had to 
be abolished in order to reintegrate the mythical moment in which the 
world had come into existence, bathed in a “pure,” “strong," and 
sacred tim e.. . .  The meaning of this periodical retrogression of the 
world into a chaotic modality was this: all the “sins” of the year, 
everything that time had soiled and worn, was annihilated in the 
physical sense of the word. By symbolically participating in the 
annihilation and re-creation man too was created anew. . . .He had 
reintegrated the fabulous time of Creation, hence a sacred and strong 
time—sacred because transfigured by the presence of the gods, 
strong because it was the time that belonged, and belonged only, to 
the most gigantic creation ever accomplished, that of the universe.
(pp. 78, 79)
In this view, just as daily time is profane so are daily memories, the 
comforting walls of the habitus. Any person “by participating ritually in the
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end of the world and in its re-creation ... became contemporary with the illud
tempus; hence he was born anew, he began life over again with his reserve
of vital forces intact, as it was at the moment of his birth” (p. 80). In Eliade’s
exposition of the annihilation of profane time for the earlier illud tempus, or
time of origins, it must be asked what the memories were of those who
walked among the gods. Could they not imagine a time before? Eliade
indicates that the memories renewed were those of the sacred stories which
signalled the beginning of all being and time:
The sacred time ... is a mythical time, that is, a primordial time, not to 
be found in the historical past, an original time, in the sense that it 
came into existence all at once, that it was not preceded by another 
time, because no time could exist before the appearance of the reality 
narrated in myth. (1959, p. 72)
Memory as techne—mind as technical accompaniment to the 
hands—may well have employed language-forms, perhaps much as non­
human animals have sound-codes and signals for information sharing, 
called zoosemiotics by Kristeva (1989, pp. 318-323). Since the genetic 
material of all (known) organisms is based on the nucleic acids DNA and 
RNA, the genetic code may be considered universal so some observers, 
according to Kristeva, have concluded “that biological as well as cultural 
phenomena can be envisaged as aspects of the information process” (p.
322). Kristeva indicates that such universalizing reductionism implies a 
transcendental meaning—an idealism—in material life:
Certain scholars remain convinced that the combined effort of 
genetics, information theory, linguistics, and semiotics can contribute
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to an understanding of “semiosis,” which ... can be considered the 
definition of life. Here we are faced with a phenomenological 
postulate that is given as empirically demonstrated: the order of 
language unites that of life and ideality. The element of signification, 
the substance of expression that makes up speech reunites in a 
parallelism (transcendental) meaning and life. (p. 323)
This imputation of a meaning-making function to the language of
information codes also implies an inherent meaning in the memory codes
constructed in the techne mode—perhaps akin to what Eliade has called
above profane time. It seems to me, however, that we do not experience
meaning in the daily memory of unfolding time (no matter how genetically
universal we may be). To experience meaning, we must participate in an
infolding against profane time, against memory as information, and
experience the beginning of time with “the appearance of the reality narrated
in myth," according to Eliade.
Memory as memor begins with myth. Narratives and ritual create
meaning—create reality—through a reenactment of "the beginning of time”
as known through archetypal memory: the creative recoil of memory upon
itself (chapters 4, 5). Archetypal memory may create meanings, but it does
not assume them (Perlman, 1988). The mythic imagination has the same
limitations as does the empirical world of the senses, but it seeks to
remember beyond the information gathering of the private self. In the archaic
world, of course, there were specialists of the sacred (Eliade, 1964) who did
the remembering for the group and led them in reenactments and narratives
of the illud tempus. The result seems to have been the same for all, however:
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Profane time and profane identity were abolished and everyone “began life 
over again with his reserve of vital forces intact." The habitus was baptized.
Memory may well be flashback images, discrete sensations, and the 
narrative interpretations I have been displaying through autobiography in 
chapter 2 and will be evoking in chapter 5. Furthermore, such narrative 
seem s to have no other possible derivation than the semiotic world—“the text 
of everyday life” (Richardson, 1989). Even the images and sensations that 
seem to leave us on the verge of a narrative-shaped memory would likely 
receive scant attention were it not for the socially-constructed subjectivity 
which takes note of such things. When memory and imagination meet—and 
they must—a  mythic memory seem s to result.
The question remains whether or not such mythic memory—the 
projection forward of repetition from the past—is part of “nature’s  plan" as 
genetic code or material evolution of some sort. I will indicate the dynamic 
role of mythic narrative in creating (or re-creating) the future, but its place in 
the unfolding of time has not been explored. To do so, I will look at two 
modern philosophers of time, Bergson and Whitehead, who seem ed to 
develop a vision of reality which gave an important place to memory and the 
creative imagination.
§ldealism, Realism, Bergson. After Plato and Plotinus, the Christian 
philosophers held out for a  kind of idealism which granted God the only
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reality. The crossover seem s to have come from Berkeley who led the way 
back into a kind of modern Neo-Platonism in which the mind has some sort of 
priority over physical reality. This position was supported from the differing 
perspectives of Kant, Schopenhauer, and Hegel.
The realists, who believe in the material reality of what the senses 
perceive, had supporters among the Greeks, but the modern anti-idealist 
position was especially laid out by G. E. Moore who states that objects have 
an existence independent of our knowing of them and exist basically as they 
appear to us. Dewey is sometimes classed among the realists in that he 
claimed only nature—that which is studied by the natural sciences—exists, 
(summarized in De George, 1962) As a philosopher of “becoming," however, 
Dewey is difficult to conceive in the realist camp.
Henri Bergson has found himself occasionally placed in the idealist 
camp, or classified as an “intuitionist” (Runes, 1961), yet he saw himself as 
providing the link between the two positions, as science itself was beginning 
to do. Instead of putting the “real" in the “ideal” or nature in the mind, in 
Matter and Memory (1912), Bergson suggested the necessity of postulating 
some sort of memory within both animate and inanimate nature—one of the 
many suggestions A. N. Whitehead was to take up. Human memory, then, is 
but the expansion of this natural impulse to lead to the separation of mind 
from matter. Later, however, in Creative Evolution (1911/83), Bergson began
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to see more of a creative power at work in the world, which includes both
matter and memory, and may have its expression in language:
Bergsonian intuition is a  concentrated attention, an increasingly 
difficult attempt to penetrate deeper into the singularity of things. Of 
course, to communicate, intuition must have recourse to language.. . .  
This it does with infinite patience and circumspection, at the same time 
accumulating images and comparisons in order to ‘embrace reality,’ 
thus suggesting in an increasingly precise way what cannot be 
communicated by means of general terms and abstract ideas 
(Prigogine & Stengers, 1984, p. 91).
Attempting to deny both idealism and realism, Bergson reasoned that
matter is an “aggregate of ‘images.’ And by ‘image’ we mean a certain
existence which is more than that which the idealist calls a representation,
but less than that which the realist calls a thing” (1912, p. vii). Each
traditional position, then, depends upon the perspective taken. If memory
remains only perceptual memory, he writes in Matter and Memory (1912),
then we may be helped to make our next decision:
But this is not all. By allowing us to grasp in a single intuition multiple 
moments of duration, it frees us from the movement of the flow of 
things, that is to say, from the rhythm of necessity. The more of these 
moments memory can contract into one, the firmer is the hold which it 
gives to us on matter: so that the memory of a living being appears 
indeed to measure, above all, its powers of action upon things, and to 
be only the intellectual reverberation of this power, (p. 303)
This sounds very much like Bergson is suggesting that pure memory
has access to what he calls different planes of consciousness, or, sometimes,
pure spirit. Pure memory, he indicates is a pure potential for action to create
the next creative field of order science can then discover.
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The historical "quarrel” between the idealists and the realists has its
origin, according to Bergson (19.11/83), in the mind’s attempt to respond to
disorder. Bergson writes that “if the great problem is to know why and how
reality submits itself to an order, it is because the absence of every kind of
order appears possible or conceivable.” He continues:
It is this absence of order that realists and idealists alike believe they 
are thinking of—the realist when he speaks of the regularity that 
“objective” laws actually impose on a virtual disorder of nature, the 
idealist when he supposes a “sensuous manifold” which is 
coordinated (and consequently itself without order) under the 
organizing influence of our understanding, (p. 220)
Bergson, on the contrary, wrote extensively about the synchronic
creativity between what had been called idealism and realism—or mind and
matter—both of which are the results of intelligence acting on instinct:
In order to follow the indications of instinct, there is no need to 
perceive objects, it is enough to distinguish properties. Intelligence, 
on the contrary, even in its humblest form, already aims at getting 
matter to act on matter, (p. 189)
The world, that is to say, does not come to exist with its objects, i.e., 
objectively, until the “intelligence” perceives it as such. Simultaneously, the 
intelligence gives itself mental form through the conceptualization of its 
actions:
Thus the same movement by which the mind is brought to form itself 
into intellect, that is to say, into distinct concepts, brings matter to break 
itself up into objects excluding one another. The more consciousness 
is inteilectualized, the more matter is spatialized. (p. 189)
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And, it should be added for my purposes here, the more time is 
temporalized. The intellect, deriving from memory as techne, “instinctively 
selects in a given situation whatever is like something already known” (p.
29). So, as matter is perceived as distinct objects and the mind as distinct 
perceptions and conceptions, time is perceived as distinct present moments. 
According to Bergson, this is the result of the way past perceptions—factual 
memories—are “held” then further anticipated: “Of the future, only that is 
foreseen which is like the past or can be made up again with elements like 
those of the past" (p. 28). But the real is not in the fiction of present solidity, it 
is instead being created as we move into it: “Time is invention or it is nothing 
at all” (p. 341).
Bergson never develops a complete system or cosmology or states
imperatives, but he does indicate that if we wish to find the real, to participate
in the ongoing emergence of creation, we must cease projecting a future
from a “present” which seems to exist only because we are always in the
process of remembering it:
We should no longer be asking where a moving body will be, what 
shape a system will take, through what state a change will pass at a 
given moment: the moments of time, which are only arrests of our 
attention, would no longer exist; it is the flow of time, it is the very flux 
of the real that we should be trying to follow, (p. 342)
This leads into Bergson’s famous concept of “duration,” an idea
variously interpreted. It seems to be related to what German
phenomenologists call the Lebenswelt or the previously mentioned (chap. 1)
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habitus, and perhaps to the causal efficacy at work during Whitehead’s
actual events or occasions (1978). It refers to time as the becoming of a
reality which is never become, though the intellect perceives it so. The
rational intellect is an important survival mechanism which evolution has
made manifest, Bergson says, but it seems only able to carry us along into a
future we have determined shall be as identical as possible with the past. If
there is no real present, an interesting implication is that we have created our
sense of the present with the immediate memories of the past, but the only
creative position is always the slightly extended futurity of becoming. The
“present” may be said to be created from the duration already moving into the
future—with the materials of the past. From which “present” we project the
“future,” and so o n ...
We cannot perceive beyond our senses which are limited by our
intellect’s “use” of memory to perceive. And we cannot creatively acf with
intellect alone, which works only within the flow of time:
For, as soon as we are confronted with true duration, we see that it 
means creation, and that if that which is being unmade endures, it can 
only be because it is inseparably bound to what is making itself. Thus 
will appear the necessity of a continual growth of the universe, I 
should say of a life of the real. And thus will be seen in a new light the 
life which we find on the surface of our planet, a  life directed the same 
way as that of the universe, and inverse of materiality. To intellect, in 
short, there will be added intuition, (p. 343)
It is intuition, according to Bergson, which guides us into "true
duration,” and a union with the power of creativity found there—the
immediacy of Gian vital. I would like to note how similar in structure this
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suggestion is to rituals previously described by Eliade as a return to the illud 
tempus, the time of creation. Bergson’s position seems to be that an 
intuitional memory can seek the symbols beyond the perceived circle of 
self—the habitus—in what has been called the mythopoeic imagination.!
In what fashion can we imagine time unfolding or our infolding into 
time? I look about me and I hear my air conditioner crank out pollutants, I 
look beside my Mac Classic and see Sonya, my overweight grey cat, sleep 
on Stephen Ray Gould’s Time’s arrow, Time’s Cycle, and I feel the weary 
solidity of the self relentlessly tapping away at these keys. How can duration 
be conceived as happening amidst these realistic events? Alfred North 
Whitehead is often considered to have taken Bergson’s suggestions about 
time and memory and to have completed them in a systematic fashion. I ask 
myself: What is the place of memory in Whitehead’s work? Has he a place 
for the mythopoeic imagination in his intricate cosmology?
§Becomfng as Process: A. N. Whitehead. My initial response to the 
latter question would be to simply reply in the affirmative. Since any human 
construction of a cosmology cannot ultimately be verified experimentally and 
since, by definition, any human is within its own ideas of a cosmos, a 
cosmology is a work of speculative philosophy, which Whitehead has
i Like Foucault’s “care of the self being an advanced form of the 
“technology of the self,” Bergson’s “intuition" is not a denial of intellect, but a 
completion of it.
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extensively defined. Speculative philosophy in our rationalizing world is 
related to the mythopoeic imagination. A cosmology is, itself, a  work of 
imagination which endeavours to divest itself of the cosmetics of imagery, 
drama, and allusion to specific culture-heroes or divinities (Whitehead,
1978).
This is insufficient, however, so I will proceed to dissect the terms of 
the question. Following this, I will attempt a brief outline of Whitehead’s 
cosmology, as “ultimate” then as “immediate," especially as portrayed in 
Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology (1978) realizing that this 
statement and my limitations could not possibly do Whitehead’s “magnum 
opus" its deserved justice. I shall then speculate whether or not Whitehead 
intended the mythopoeic imagination to have a background or central place 
in his cosmic scheme, or if such place can be found.
§Cosm os and Imagination. The idea of cosmos will not detain me long.
It is such a big idea that it seems to me unnecessary to attempt to grasp it 
whole. To most of us, cosmos is a synonym for universe: an 
incomprehensible totality consisting mainly of vast emptiness. Our 
incomprehension must only increase when we learn through someone such 
as Carl Sagan in his TV miniseries “Cosmos” that this universe is replete with 
mathematical anomalies and warps in space-time, such as those 
encountered when approaching the event horizons of black holes. The black
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holes, themselves, theoretically deny the totality of everything by being, as far 
as we can understand, cosmic drainpipes to nothingness. Some even 
propose that black-holes are inverse doorways to "other” universes or other 
planes of being (Toben & Wolf, 1982). One need hardly throw in 
speculations about universes beginning and ending or expanding then 
contracting to give a sense of the utter chaos around our dreams of order.
The archetypal mythologist, Jam es Hillman, attempts to bring us back 
to the original meaning of the word cosmos and to reveal that it refers 
specifically to “dreams of order” within the image of a  particular Greek deity: 
“Everything had shelter and altar. Nothing was lost; everything belonged to a 
cosmos because it belonged somewhere as image to the planetary persons 
and their myths” (Hillman, 1989a, p. 226). Hillman’s admitted mythmaking 
also reveals that cosmos refers to an aesthetic creation, as  does its logos, 
cosmology:
This emphasis on descriptive qualities gives back to cosmology its 
original aesthetic meaning. We have lost that first sense of the word. 
Cosmos now means empty, vast, spacey—a video game for 
astronomers. The Greek word meant orderly, becomingly, duly, an 
aesthetic arrangement. Cosmos once referred to the anima mundi, 
world-soul, an Aphroditic order. And our word “cosmetics,” referring to 
the facial appearance of things, brings to light this original sense.
So, besides its astronomical and metaphysical meanings, 
cosmology implies even more fundamentally an aesthetic world 
whose essence is constituted in sensory images. Attempts to reduce 
the account of the world to the fewest coherent principles, even to 
mathematical formulae, have the intention of revealing by means of 
scientific elegance this cosmic beauty, (p. 226)
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Despite the implication that cosmos is an aesthetic rendering of 
universal reality, Hillman does not attempt to explain a cosmos as a 
projection of the human faculty of imagination. Perhaps because he 
understands imagination not to be a human faculty at alh but the process of 
ordering within an archetypal image (or “planetary person”). Cosmos here is 
not objective reality, but our ordering of it. Whitehead, as will be shown, 
seems to understand it to be objective reality-in-process, with some 
possibility for our ordering of it. It is precisely the denial of an ordering which 
can be known in advance of the creative act of ordering (i.e., becoming) 
which Bergson implied through duration. This comparison will be renewed 
at the chapter’s end.
The Indo-European root of cosmos is usually considered to be /res-, 
which means “to put in order,” thus the “order” of things. The scientific act of 
ordering is usually the intellectual act of defining things in ever smaller and 
more intricate categories: kes- also means “to cut," from whence we derive 
castigate, castrate, and caste (Claiborne, 1989). Thus, cosmology here 
implies a vast “de-fining” of all the objects and properties in the universe.
i “Grand—imagination not a faculty! The claim that it is a  faculty has 
been precisely what has deceived us most about imagination. We have 
considered it one function among others; whereas it may be essentially different 
from thinking, willing, believing, etc. Rather than an independent operation or 
place, it is more likely an operation that works within the others as a  place which 
is found only through the others—(is it their ground?)." (Hillman, 1979b, p. 133)
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There is another possible etymology which gives precedence to the 
human mythopoeic collaboration in reality. Kosmos may derive instead from 
the suffixed o-grade form of the Indo-European prefix kens- = (kons-mo). 
Kens- refers to “speaking solemnly” (Calvert, 1982), thus cosmos makes 
order through solemn speech. It may worth noting that the root of the Greek 
mythos may be muthos, or word (Levin, 1960). It is possible that cosmology 
and mythology already have a familial relationship: a solemn speaking of the 
sacred word—muthos as Logos? Muthos, in turn, may derive from mu-, 
perhaps the first expressive sound (Harrison, 1903/91), which in turn could 
well have evolved into murmur and memor.
Imagination in Western philosophy has oscillated in position from 
being foundational to all thought to being derided as the distraction of 
fantasy. Plato turned to myth for his deepest formulations; Kant distinguished 
between reproductive and productive (or transcendental) imagination. 
Reproductive imagination works only through association and is itself 
possible, according to Kant, because it is founded in the transcendental 
imagination, which is an active, spontaneous power (Avens, 1980). Like the 
pre-Socratics, Kant seemed to understand rational thought as an aspect of 
imagination imagining itself. Kant, however, seem s to have sought shelter in 
pure reason in later writings and finally understood imagination as did David 
Hume in this terse dismissal: “Nothing is more dangerous to reason than the 
flights of imagination” (Hume, I. IV. vii.).
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Of course, Coleridge, Wordsworth and the Romantics understood 
reason to be the threat to flights of imagination. It was objective rationalism, 
Wordsworth intimated, which made us feel that for “Nature,” and
for everything, we are out of tune;
It moves us not. —Great God! I'd rather be 
A Pagan suckled in a creed outworn;
So m ight!, standing on this pleasant lea,
Have glimpses that would make me less forlorn;
Have sight of Proteus rising from the sea;
Or hear old Triton blow his wreathed horn. (1807b)
The later Nietzschean overflow of mythopoeic emotionalism hardened the
reaction against such anti-rationality by logical positivists, among others, and
was still strong in the time when Whitehead was writing.
Whitehead knew that language was built on image and metaphor and
would never be as precise as the mathematics from which he had emerged
into speculative philosophy (Wallack, 1980). He recognized that, like
mythopoeic thought, imagination was the basis of all speculation. Here
(1978) he insists, however, that the difference in his metaphysics is in the
criticism of the concepts thus envisaged:
The true method of discovery is like the flight of an aeroplane. It starts 
from the ground of particular observation; it makes a flight in the thin 
air of imaginative generalization; and it again lands for renewed 
observation rendered acute by rational interpretation. The reason for 
the success of this method of imaginative rationalization is that, when 
the method of difference fails, factors which are constantly present 
may yet be observed under the influence of imaginative thought.
Such thought supplies the differences which the direct observation 
lacks. It can even play with inconsistency; and can thus throw light on 
the consistent, and persistent, elements in experience by comparison 
with what in imagination is inconsistent with them. (Whitehead, p. 5)
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Whitehead seems weil aware that his rational metaphysics will be
hard to prove logically with inexact language, built as it is on relative
inference. He accepts that metaphysical explanation can only “approximate”
truth yet to be testable it must make meaning within a self-referential system:
No metaphysical system can hope entirely to satisfy these pragmatic 
tests. At the best such a system will remain only an approximation to 
the general truths which are sought. In particular, there are no 
precisely stated axiomatic certainties from which to start. There is not 
even the language in which to frame them .. . . But no language can be 
anything but elliptical, requiring a leap of the imagination to 
understand its meaning in its relevance to immediate experience, (p. 
13)
Imagination, then, by Whitehead’s own admission, surrounds even a 
cosmology as seemingly profound as his own. But to what extent can it be 
understood as "mythopoeic"?
First of all, some may question whether or not Whitehead starts without 
any “axiomatic certainties” as he claims. “God" must be among the most 
used terms in Process and Reality. God in his primordial nature is present at 
the “beginning” and in his consequent nature is there at the “end.” 
Whitehead’s “process" seems linear, ongoing, but in this sense is cyclical. 
Whitehead calls this a presupposition (p. 44) and it is interesting to note 
that—again through etymology—the very term “God” may have derived from 
an infinitive verb form meaning “to invoke.”1 Like Homer or Hesiod in his 
cosmogony (and cosmology) asking for inspiration—“Sing, O Muse...”,—
iGod, gheu(e)- = to call, invoke (Claiborne)
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Whitehead may himself be invoking cosmic inspiration for what is widely
recognized a s  an inspired system.
Whitehead’s cosmology is not specifically a mythology, however,
especially a s  it is not claimed as  a  revelation or used as  code for ritual.i
Henri Frankfort, the great archeologist of the most ancient civilizations,
differentiated between mythopoeic and theoretical thought:
Myth, then, is to be taken seriously, because it reveals a  significant, if 
unverifiable, truth—we might say metaphysical truth. But myth has not 
the universality and the lucidity of theoretical statement. It is concrete, 
though it claims to be inassailable in its validity. It claims recognition 
by the faithful; it does not pretend to justification before the critical. 
(Frankfort, 1946/61, p. 16)
Though Whitehead elaborated his cosmology into finely tuned 
conceptual abstractions, he also recognized that no system can be logically 
complete and that future generations would probably pick his system apart 
(Whitehead, chap. I, sec. II, II, IV.) Certainly his speculative concerns are very 
similar to those of early man, who “entangled in the immediacy of his 
perceptions, recognized the existence of certain problems which transcend 
the phenomena. He recognized the problem of origin and the problem of 
telos, of the aim and purpose of being” (Frankfort, p. 17).
i “Myth is a  form of poetry which transcends poetry in that it proclaims a 
truth; a form of reasoning which transcends reasoning in that it wants to bring 
about the truth it proclaims; a form of action, of ritual behaviour, which does not 
find its fulfillment in the act but must proclaim and elaborate a poetic form of 
myth.” (Frankfort, 1946/61, p. 16)
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Poetry derives from “poesis,” a  making or a creation (Morris). In this 
understanding, especially underscored by Whitehead’s emphasis on primal 
creativity, his cosmology, a logos of “solemn saying” is also mythopoesis, a 
"making with words.” Many of those words refer specifically to the sacred, 
and often to the eternal. It seem s to this writer that cosmologizing is 
mythmaking, but it is possible that such a view depends on the etymological 
dictionary employed.
More important, perhaps, to the question at hand, is whether or not 
Whitehead reserved a  place for such elements or “faculties” as  inspiration, 
aesthetic memory, or the mythopoeic imagination within his system. Where 
is the present moment—the inspired instant—in his process? To examine 
this, an outline of his cosmological system must be attempted.
§W hitehead’s  Ultim ates Influenced by Einstein's theory of relativity,
Whitehead developed his theory based on space-time, rather than
understanding space and time as separate dimensions of the same
unfolding reality. We perceive extension in space-time and understand
reality to be present and solid:
We must first consider the perceptive mode in which there is clear, 
distinct consciousness of the 'extensive’ relations of the world. These 
relations include the ‘extensiveness’ of space and the ‘extensiveness’ 
of time. Undoubtedly, this clarity, at least in regard to space, is 
obtained only in ordinary perception through the senses. This mode 
of perception is here termed 'presentational immediacy.’ In this 
‘mode’ the contemporary world is consciously prehended as a 
continuum of extensive relations. (Whitehead, p. 61)
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The senses, however, are later developments upon a deeper, less
conscious mode of awareness called prehension. This accepted,
experience need not be restricted to entities with sensory organs.
On this basis, it not absurd to attribute a vague kind of emotional- 
purposive perceptivity to those lower organisms that are devoid of
sensory organs To say that all individual events prehend the things
in their environments is to say that they take influences from them into 
themselves and have some sort of emotional-appetitive response to 
them” (Griffin, 1988, p. 153).
In this statement, David Ray Griffin, prominent modern Whitehead interpreter
and applier, does not pursue the matter the matter beyond “lower organisms"
to its smaller and more momentary limit: the actual entity, for the space
oriented, or the actual event, for the time oriented, or, simply, the occasion,
defined by Whitehead as “a momentary experiential event which occupies
(or constitutes) a region that is spatial as well as temporal” (In Griffin, p. 151).
So instead of semi-permanent “things” changing through a continuous
flow of time, we have experiencing occasions which appear, prehend their
environments, perhaps adapt to some “extent,” and disappear as
experiencing occasions to become completed objective occasions. These
occasions include events at the atomic level and those of macrocosmic
stature. The occasion is the act of becoming, like Bergson’s duration, the
process of which is going on “all the time.” These are the existential realities,
according to Whitehead—occasions becoming, achieving satisfaction, and
perishing. Their prehension guides them to satisfaction and alters them
through the environmental influence of other occasions. In their "perishing”
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they become fixed as objective occasions which will now influence the
becoming of subjects of new actual events. As Griffin (1988) explains:
an object is an event that had been, in itself, a subject. Accordingly, it 
has the kind of stuff a subject can receive, i.e., feelings, whether 
conscious or unconscious—feelings of derivation, feelings of desire, 
feelings of attraction and repulsion. . . .  By conceiving of each event as 
having been a subject of feeling prior to being a felt object, we can 
understand how an object can influence a subject, (p. 155)
This is the world according to Whitehead. We must look deeper into
Whitehead’s speculations to discover the alpha point of his cosmology.
In the beginning—metaphorically speaking since “non-temporal” does
not constitute linearity—was pure creativity and God in his primordial nature.
Unlike Bergson and others, Whitehead does not identify God pantheistically
with “The force that through the green fuse drives the flower (Thomas,
1936)—the primal force of creativity—but as a non-temporal actual entity on
his own. Creighton Peden (1981) concludes that Whitehead’s creativity “is
without character or individuality of its own. It is the active, creative force of
the universe, being conditioned by the objective immortality of the actual
world and by God” (p. 35). Bergson would likely accept condition one.
Studying Whitehead is often a matter of learning a new terminology,
but, as in all mythically-bounded language systems, each term has meaning
only in reference to other terms and the meta-meaning of the entire
language. Some terms never emerge, it seems, as actual entities—just as in
Whitehead’s system actual entities are really processes. Here at the illud
tempus of Whitehead’s cosmogony, it seems important to understand the
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difference between the conceptions of “creativity” and “God,” since 
specifically human creativity will be the subject of the next section.
Creativity as a first principle allows Whitehead to avoid the 
mechanistic view of straightforward cause and effect determination and to 
account for the “dendritic” nature of evolution. Further, his conjectures about 
eternal objects, aims, and even God's primordial nature, which—combined 
with the also primordial creativity—allow him to explain the unpredictable 
outcome of each “concrescence” of occasions which results in “novelty” in 
the universe:
‘Creativity’ is the universal of universals characterizing ultimate matter 
of fact. It is that ultimate principle by which the many, which are the 
universe disjunctively, become the one actual occasion, which is the 
universe conjunctively.
'Creativity' is the principle of novelty. An actual occasion is a 
novel entity diverse from any entity in the ‘many’ which it unifies. Thus 
‘creativity’ introduces novelty into the content of the many, which are 
the universe disjunctively. The ‘creative advance’ is the application of 
this ultimate principle of creativity to each novel situation which it 
originates.. .  .
The ultimate metaphysical principle is the advance from 
disjunction to conjunction, creating a novel entity other than the entity 
. . . .  The novel entity is at once the togetherness of the ‘many’ which it 
finds, and also it is one among the disjunctive ‘many’ which it leaves; it 
is a novel entity, disjunctively among the many entities which it 
synthesizes. The many become one and are increased by one. 
(Whitehead, 1978, p. 26)
Creativity is both the ultimate reality and the active principle in the 
concrescence of the many to produce a novel actual occasion, as in 
Whitehead’s  expressive phrase: “The many become one and are increased 
by one.” The novel actual occasion then embodies its novel creativity as one
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of the many to be used in the concrescence of the next actual occasion, an 
increase of one. In this way, creativity may be understood as inhering as self­
creativity in each event. As Peden interprets:
Because of creativity, every actual entity, temporal or non-temporal, is 
to some degree self-creative. Every actual entity, being to some 
degree self-creative, is a novel being. On the basis of novelty ... an 
actual entity is a new form in the universe. The doctrine of creativity 
points to the fact that constantly new forms are being created and are 
perishing in the universe, (p. 35)
If reality were understood as purely creative, however, then literally
anything could happen. Reality would be a chaos of novelty in which even
dendritic patterns could turn back upon themselves in disarray. To explain
the seeming form of the onflow of reality, Whitehead invokes an ultimate
actuality to guide his ultimate reality. Griffin (1989b) theologizes:
God, who is the source of all physical, aesthetic, and ethical principles, 
is the ultimate actuality. . . .  The ultimate reality and the ultimate 
actuality are equally primordial. God does not create creativity, but 
neither does creativity generate God. Each equally presupposes the 
other. Creativity that is uninfluenced by God’s persuasion toward 
ordered beauty therefore never occurs, (p. 31)
God is present “at the beginning” as a hidden persuader, so to speak.
This is what Whitehead calls God’s primordial nature. In this idea, God is
understood as an actual entity like all other actual entities (which are also
occasions), except that God “is non-temporal. This means that God does not
perish and become objectively immortal as temporal actual entities." (Peden,
p. 34)
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This suggests all sorts of difficulties in Whitehead’s previous definition
of actual entities as becoming from a previous many, but this is not the place
to consider them. Suffice to say that God, in his primordial nature, influences
the process of occasions by sustaining within him “eternal objects” which
contain the potential subjective aims for the becoming of temporal actual
entities. Eternal objects are conceptions which have no reference to any
definite entity in the temporal world, but
An eternal object is always a potentiality for actual entities; but in itself, 
as conceptually felt, it is neutral as to the fact of its physical ingression 
in any particular actual entity of the temporal world. ‘Potentiality’ is the 
correlative of 'givenness. ’ The meaning of ‘givenness’ is that what is 
‘given’ might not have been ‘given’; and what is not ‘given’ might have 
been'given.’ (Whitehead, p. 44)
As indicated, it is the eternal objects which provide the subjective aim 
in the concrescence of the many into an actual occasion of experience.
There will be more on this event later, but for now it should be noted that in 
Whitehead’s view the eternal objects are present as potentials “in the 
beginning” sustained by God’s  primordial nature, and they are also present 
“at the end” as  future possibilities toward which the creativity of each actual 
event aims. These everpresent potentialities for experience, which approach 
randomness in their sense of being “given” or “not given,” are the reason for 
beginning and end being understood as metaphors (disguising circularity?).
God is also understood as having a “consequent nature.” This is the 
physical prehension by God of the actual events/entities of the evolving 
universe. Whitehead indicates this is how temporal entities achieve
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“objective immortality” after attaining satisfaction of their subjective aims and
perishing as an actual experience. These objective entities are no longer
capable of change or experience, but they never cease to exist, apparently,
in the mind of God. In this way, all objective entities have a  potential
influence upon the present experience of an actual event. (Whitehead, 1978)
Finally, God has a “superjective nature.” It is in this manner that God
influences the creativity of each actual event toward noble or harmonious
ends, but does not determine those ends. An important question arising here
is the creation of dissonance or evil. In the self-creation of each actual entity,
is it possible to create destruction, that is, to coalesce into an experiencing
event without the superjective influence of God? Whitehead’s theologian
interpreter, Griffin, indicated above that such things do not occur. And, as I
have shown, Whitehead understands all possible aims—the eternal
objects—to be sustained by God in his primordial nature. Griffin (1989)
interprets Whitehead as implying that higher order self-creations—human
beings—are capable of evil aims:
From the point of view of a theology of universal creativity, the 
existence of chaos and evil is no surprise. They are to be expected, 
given a multiplicity of centers of creative power. The surprise is the 
existence of order and goodness. They beg for explanation in terms of 
an all-inclusive creative influence, (p. 43)
Chaotic or evil creations can only be explained by having aims not 
within God. But what else was there “in the beginning”? Only a non­
differentiated creativity, according to Whitehead. Anything non-differentiated
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is usually conceived as  being in the primordial state known to many
mythologies as chaos. Perhaps creativity, especially human creativity which
has such expanded memory capacity, partakes simultaneously of chaotic
and divine essences. Divinely “underinfluenced" creativity may not be
creative but destructive, according to Whitehead. Yet it must be understood
as creative if it is a  novel concrescence of the many into a one to increase the
many by one. Every novel concrescence is the result of both “past”
occasions and an aim toward eternal objects, even those novel occasions
conjured by human minds. It is at least conceivable that Whitehead left room
for eternal objects not sustained by his harmonious, ordered, and morally
correct God. If so, such eternal objects need not be understood as
evil/chaotic/satanic. Where would one place the potential of an eternal
object which inspires a  mischievous, but innocuous aim for an actual event?
God, even his three natures, should not be understood as being
omnipotent. His superjective nature potentially affects the creativity of events
only through the multiplicity of eternal objects:
This doctrine applies also to the primordial nature of God, which is his 
complete envisagement of eternal objects; he is not thereby directly 
related to the given course of history. The given course of history 
presupposes his primordial nature, but his primordial nature does not 
presuppose it. (Whitehead, p. 44}
God and his natures are possibly unnecessary abstractions for 
seeking archetypal memory or mythopoeic imagination. However, 
Whitehead’s cosmology is built within such abstractions and it seem s
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necessary to touch upon them. Hartshorne (1981) has commented how 
Whitehead’s three-natured God and the seemingly infinite potentials for 
concrescence found in the eternal objects seem to be a multiplying of 
abstractions which have no need of, or logical relationship to, each other.
For my purposes, it seems worth observing that Whitehead’s 
metaphysics implies a process of becoming within a divine order which 
ultimately is without beginning or end. This may even apply to microcosmic 
elaborations, since the three natures of God are closely mirrored in the 
subjectivity of becoming and perishing during each actual occasion. One 
major difference is that each occasion looks to past occasions for some of its 
aims in concrescence, but God, at least in his primordial nature, has no past.
The question of Whitehead’s strict ethical dualism within the non­
temporal God-influenced cosmic process cannot be resolved here. The 
related question of the freedom and purpose of the human imagination within 
such a cosmology must be addressed by examining the unfolding occasion, 
itself, for evidence of a moment of spontaneous (progressive or regressive) 
vision.
§Process: The Elusive Present. The quest for a purely spontaneous 
present in Whitehead’s system may well be in vain. Every actual event 
occurs through a concrescence of past or objective actual events. The 
creativity, the novelty, the aim of each occurring actual event is always
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unique to itself but it is brought about by the creative potential still contained 
within those past actual events.
The influence of the multitude of past actual events, i.e., objective 
occasions, upon the many becoming a novel one is called by Whitehead 
efficient causation. The influence of the eternal objects, the aim of the 
concrescence, is called final causation (Whitehead). We usually imagine the 
latter as lying in the future or as teleological causation. This may be 
metaphorically valid, but Whitehead also emphasizes the creative potential 
which inheres within each objective occasion but is no longer a potential for 
experience for that occasion. The creative potential within each objective 
occasion is a potential only for the unfolding of a present occasion of 
experience. It is in the combining, i.e. the concrescence, of past potentials 
that the creative potential of the present event is realized. The aim, itself, can 
only exist as potential within the influence o f an eternal object (which may be 
understood teleologically) (category of explanation vii). The realization of 
such an aim, however, can only come through the utilization of objective 
occasions of the past: The many become one and are increased by one.
Though God is present at all stages in the process of becoming and 
though the eternal objects are potentials for experience which may be 
understood in the past in terms of their inherence in all objective occasions 
and their paradigms for relating objective occasions into nexus and though 
these same eternal objects seem to be potentials without form or substance
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on their own which lie in the future a s  aims, it is our experience of temporal 
process in the imagined present which gives us clues to all other cosmic 
events. We experience the passage of time from past into future with all the 
attendant changes in space-time and have a difficult time, as Whitehead has 
indicated through his central thesis, trying to locate this present.
As narrowly as we can define the moment, upon examination we find 
that moment to be in reality a process in which past and future are always 
implicated. Even our sensory perceptions only allow experience of the 
“presented locus” (p. 168) of actual events which are themselves in process. 
The prehensions supporting these sensory perceptions are what bring them 
into “presentational immediacy” (p. 61-65), but the prehensions are of the 
causal efficacy behind the sense response. The prehensions are “a direct 
perception of those antecedent actual occasions which are causally 
efficacious both for the percipient and for the relevant events in the presented 
locus” (p. 169).
An event at the atomic level may be an actual entity (or actual 
occasion or actual event) and so, apparently, may God. Most things that we 
perceive, it seems, are objective actual entities in some combination. 
Something such as a  rock is not an actual entity; it has no experience and is 
not in process. Its constituent parts (molecules, atoms, or whatever), 
however, may be actual entities in the nexus of rockness and they do have 
experience. Their process is temporally unhurried (relatively speaking) and
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their memories and aims are limited to the most basic prehensions and
appetitive responses.
Our animal body has extended prehension through the sense organs
and our mind has enlarged memory capacity and, it would seem, a wider
range of potential responses to efficient and final causality. Despite this, we
are not actual entities, either, but compounds of various subjective
experiences. Wallack (1980) puts it this way:
Similarly for other cases of sense-perception: a  viewer is subject of a 
sight; a sniffer is subject of a smell; a taster is subject of a  flavor; a 
sentient body is subject of a  texture or an ache; and as  such all are 
actual entities. The experiences of sense-perceptions, seeing, 
hearing, touching, tasting, and smelling, are naturally very important 
actual entities for people.. . .  In fact, Whitehead allows that an animal 
body is constructed so as to provide percipient experience of this sort 
for the animal, (p. 19)
Memory, itself, is “a  human percipient experience, although in different 
mode, just as  are the sense perceptions” (Wallack, p. 19). Whitehead, as 
noted, has also referred to this as  the prehension of efficient causality. The 
point of this for my purpose is that even in the mode of so-called 
“presentational immediacy” it is nof the immediate present which we are 
perceiving, according to Whitehead, but the perceptions are separate 
subjective entities which our minds perceive (i.e., prehend) in their causal 
efficacy, their effect, and unify into the experience we call consciousness. To 
perceive anything, we must perceive through the immediate past.
Another way of putting it is to simply recall that all actual entities are 
diverse until creatively brought together into a concrescence of experience.
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It is only when the aim of the experience is subjectively satisfied that a novel 
entity ceases to experience and becomes objectified as a past occasion 
which can now be remembered (prehended, memorially perceived) to 
influence the next becoming event. Complicated as this may sound, it seems 
clear Whitehead means that nothing can be perceived until it is a perceivable 
object. And nothing is an object until it has ceased to exist as an 
experiencing subject in process and has become an objective entity. All we 
sensorially perceive are objects which have already entered the past.i 
It must be remembered that, for Whitehead, all matter is creative.
These objective entities are not inert but continue to actively influence 
experiencing subjects. “The past does not remain past; anything past is 
presently effecting a present subject, and anything present is in process” 
(Wallack, p. 142).
Prehension also provides for us an intuition of possibilities which 
inhere in the past creative possibilities of causal efficacy and in the pure 
potential of the eternal objects. Being eternal, such potentials lie neither in 
the past nor in the future but as pure potential they can only be envisioned as 
being “before” or “around” the process of becoming. They are already 
“within” the process by being contained in each objective entity and its 
relationships but then they are no longer imperceptibly pure; as pure 
potential they are intuitively apprehended only as final causes towards which
i Bergson’s duration again: intellect extends memory into the anticipated 
future, from which “position" perception is achieved back through memory.
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we in the elusive present can aim our becoming. To prehend a pure potency
in and of itself without the causal efficacy of objective occasions is
inconceivable. Remembering is imagining. But perhaps it is such non-
conceptual prehension of pure potency which brings some mystics to
withdraw from the world or find their only response in silence.
It would seem that as causal efficacy meets final causation there must
be an instant when the aim is chosen, a “flashpoint” of decision to move the
process of becoming toward a particular type of concrescence and
subsequent satisfaction. It would seem there must be moment of balance
when negative causation is excluded, positive causation included, and
teleological (final) causation accepted as purpose. This could be the
moment when imaginative spontaneity actually becomes an ultimate
necessity of process and the only actual and real experience of the present
we can possibly have.
Griffin (1988) implies that there is such a moment when the decision is
made or when the aim is chosen:
The momentary subject then makes a self-determining response to 
these causal influences; this is the moment of final causation, as the 
event aims at achieving a synthesis for itself and for influencing the 
future, (p. 24)
It sounds like the moment has been found, until Griffin goes on to explain that
final causation is but a response to efficient causation in Whitehead’s system:
This final causation is in no way unrelated to efficient causation; it is a 
purposive response to the efficient causes on the event. When this 
moment of subjective final causation is over, the event becomes an
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object which exerts efficient causation on future events. Exactly what 
efficient causation it exerts is a function both of the efficient causes 
upon it and of its own final causation. Hence, the efficient causes of 
the world do not run along as if there were no mentality with its final 
causation. An event does not simply transmit to others what it 
received; it may do this, but it also may deflect and transform the 
energy it receives to some degree or another, before passing it on. 
(1988, p. 24)
This indicates that the “final causation” inspired by the eternal objects 
does not just imply teleological or primordial potential, but also implies that 
such archetypal potential inheres in each actual occasion. It does so through 
the causal efficacy of the objective occasions which had their own ingression 
of final causation during their concrescence. Though objective occasions 
are no longer in process, the ingressed final causation—or eternal potential 
—continues to be active through them. Past, present, and future are 
simultaneously implicated in process. Teleological inspiration may be 
activated through remembering. Perhaps some of Whitehead’s  “Categories 
of Explanation” may summarize what I have been trying to elucidate:
Categories of Explanation:
(i) That the actual world is a  process, and that the process is the 
becoming of actual entities. Thus actual entities are creatures; they 
are also termed ‘actual occasions.’
(ii) That in the becoming of an actual entity, the potential unity of 
many entities in disjunctive diversity—actual and non-actual— 
acquires the real unity of the one actual entity; so that the actual entity 
is the real concrescence of many potentials.
(iii) That in the becoming of an actual entity, novel prehensions, 
nexus, subjective forms, propositions, multiplicities, and contrasts, also 
become; but there are no novel eternal objects.
(vii) That an eternal object can be described only in terms of its 
potentiality for ‘ingression’ into the becoming of actual entities; and
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that its analysis only discloses other eternal objects. It is a pure 
potential.
(x) That the first analysis of an actual entity, into its most 
concrete elements, discloses it to be a concrescence of prehensions, 
which have originated in its process of becoming.
(xix) That the fundamental types of entities are actual entities, 
and eternal objects; and that the other types of entities only express 
how all entities of the two fundamental types are in community with 
each other, in the actual world.
(xxiv) The functioning of one actual entity in the self-creation of 
another actual entity is the ‘objectification’ of the former for the latter 
actual entity. The functioning of an eternal object in the self-creation of 
an actual entity is the ‘ingression’ of the eternal object in the actual 
entity.
(xxv) The final phase in the process of concrescence, 
constituting an actual entity, is one complex, fully determinate feeling. 
This final phase is termed the ‘satisfaction.’ (Whitehead, pp. 23-25)
From this, I feel I can safely conclude that there is no "given” present
moment for the human subject or for any experiencing entity whatsoever in
Whitehead’s cosmology, unless it is the non-sensory instant (Bergson’s
intuitional duration) of apprehension of an aim toward an eternal object. As
one actual entity is objectified in influencing another, the ingression of an
eternal object is taking place. All actual entities in the process of becoming
are made of a  great array of other actual entities and their concrescence and
influence by final causes is happening at different rates in different regions.
The satisfaction which occurs upon the attainment of “one complex fully
determinate feeling” (Griffin, 1988, p. 154) is a temporal movement from outer
to inner. As compound entities, we have feeling and consciousness, but
according to Whitehead the image of consciousness as an ongoing stream of
actual durations may be appropriate after all.
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§Space-Time of the  Mythopoeic Imagination. Does an ongoing
stream of consciousness negate any chance for the mythopoeic
imagination? If the mythopoeic imagination can only exist in a spontaneous
present then it must. But a  spontaneous present could have no substance,
no consciousness as  we know it, if all perceivable entities have already
become temporally objective. A spontaneous present could only be absolute
awareness of potentials for concrescence, the pure potentials of the eternal
objects. That is to say, substantially conscious of nothing, or of
everything—same thing—so its conscious content could only be nil.
This is what Whitehead implies about the primordially natured God,
creativity, and the eternal objects: that nothing can be said about them in
themselves. He does use the adjectives “non-temporal” and “eternal,”
however, and, as Wittgenstein pointed out, eternity is found neither at the
beginning nor at the end of time:
Proposition 6.4311: “If we take eternity to mean not infinite temporal 
duration but timelessness, then eternal life belongs to those who live 
in the present." (In Campbell, 1968, p. 676)
In this way, the present must contain all extra-temporal potentiality and 
all timelessness, including the silent eternal objects. Similarly, silence is the 
only “response” to such being-in-itself. Silence, however, is not mythpoesis. 
Could it be that our sensory and self perceptions take place an “instant” into 
the past, just as matter appears to ultimately consist of energy “particles” 
travelling slower than the speed of light (Toben & Wolf, 1982)? If so, then the
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objective referents of memory and speech as techne can refer only to 
themselves in a (vicious?) circle of repetition.
Most language is built on a response to other language whose 
referents may be actual entities. The realistic, actual language Whitehead 
employs is just such a self-referential theoretic code. Even though he 
constructs a new terminology, his words all refer to actual entities within his 
system. Every term refers to actual entities in their objective form: as efficient 
causation, as past occasions, as objectively immortal in the mind of God.
Poetry, however, is sometimes perceived as turning away from the 
possibilities of causal efficacy and attempting to allow language to speak. 
Bachelard (1987) sees the poet as attaining a non-objective awareness, 
similar to that of the mystic, but the poet, instead of remaining silent, becomes 
herself the "objective” occasion for the speaking of such silence: “Poetry 
then is truly the first manifestation of silence. It lets the attentive silence, 
beneath the images, remain alive” (p. 25).
This sounds extreme, perhaps, but I am trying to map the source of 
mythopoeic inspiration; many writers, visionaries, and mythmakers seem to 
feel this inspiration is an important part of their art. Many also admit to a 
feeling of dismay at the impossibility of attaining the full depth of vision hinted 
at by the first rapture of inspiration. The actual occasion may achieve 
satisfaction but the eternal object, or the archetype, or the Muse cannot
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occasions. It is similar to the inevitable fall of Eliade’s illud tempus—the 
sacred time of creation— into the profane time of history (or the shrinking of 
personal awareness within the habitus).
This does not seem strange when it is considered that, from our point 
of view, eternal objects must use as  tools for the expression of their 
dynamism only individual human actual occasions which can act only from 
the causal efficacy of past (objective) occasions. Objective occasions are 
nearly infinite; at least they have achieved immortality in the mind of God. An 
electron may have a  memory for the efficient causation of objective 
occasions that had achieved satisfaction and become objective only micro­
seconds ago. A human being, as a compound actual occasion capable of 
both physical and mental prehension, may conceivably delve memorially 
well beyond his own lifetime. Because of the extent of awareness of the 
becoming actual occasion of experience (i.e., the present as process) we 
humans also possess a relatively vast capacity for memory. This leads to the 
seeming contradiction that mythopoeic inspiration, though derived from an 
unattainable present, expresses itself only through the depths of imaginative 
memory.
Such memory increases human freedom which, apparently, worries 
Whitehead in his ethical dualism. It certainly worries Griffin (1988), the 
theologian who declares his “Whiteheadianism”:
The importance of efficient causes, i.e., of influence from the past,
does not diminish as  one moves toward the higher individuals;
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indeed, in a sense higher beings are influenced by more past events 
than are lower ones. But the totality of efficient causes from the past 
becomes less and less explanatory of experience and behavior, and 
the individual’s own present self-determination in terms of desired 
ends becomes more explanatory, (p. 24)
It seems this enlarged capacity for reception and “present self-
determination in terms of desired ends" makes the human creature more
valuable in Whitehead’s scheme of things. This value must be because of
the human ability to imagine unique possibilities. Since possibilities are
unimaginable without eternal objects, the human being must be able to
imagine possibilities by prehending/remembering the primordial influence of
creativity, in itself, without the mollifying influence of God in his primordial
nature (or by prehending, as “aim," toward the teleological influence of
creativity—since eternal objects are “eternal,” they must be in the eternal
present which we can only imagine as alpha or omega). To an ethical
dualist, such “present self-determination” can be understood as dangerous:
A world with more valuable creatures is therefore necessarily a more 
. dangerous world, both because higher creatures can more radically 
deviate from the divine persuasion for them and because this 
deviation can create more havoc than the deviations of lesser 
creatures. (Griffin, 1989, p. 43)
To a mythologist, however, this is the place/time of human creation:
By employing memorial antecedents as far, as deep, as wide as the human 
mind can conceive, we are bringing to the present unfolding actuality 
qualities not found within any language system in itself. The mythopoeic
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imagination may make words, poems, and narratives without necessary 
reference to concrete objective actual referents.
As pointed out at the beginning of this survey, a  cosmology is, itself, an 
aesthetic rendering of universal reality. Whitehead even indicates that 
process begins with imagination “like the flight of an aeroplane," and that any 
metaphysical system requires “a leap of the imagination to understand its 
meaning” (Whitehead, p. 4). Though thoughts and perception—our usual 
selves—can never exist in the elusive present, imagination, inspiration, and 
archetypal memory, by Whitehead's own suggestions, just may.
Whitehead’s system of reality as process can be seen a s  ideal for 
exemplifying both the habituated consciousness (techne) and the 
mythopoeic imagination (memot) in action. Habituated consciousness 
works and wants to work only from efficient causation, and does not expect to 
need to look too far away in time or space to find appropriate causation to 
extend into the next actual occasion of experience. Habituated 
consciousness picks its aims from among past objective occasions and does 
not expect the sudden inspiration from an eternal object in itself, either in a 
non-conceptual instant or in the depths of the past.
The mythopoeic imagination, however, may be understood as  being 
drawn to the murmur of a past so ancient it is hidden in the inorganic. Such 
an imagination dreams of experiencing the unsayable then struggling to use 
ancient referents to find a way to express such experience. The mythopoeic
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imagination seeks to make myths from myths and to take full poetic license to 
express them in a  manner which the rational mind will find confusing, 
chaotic, or even dangerous.
Mythopoesis is not so easily classified as Griffin would prefer, it seems 
to this writer. Mythmaking is expression through the arts which work through 
the materials of distant memory (Campbell, 1968). The aim of the creative 
present is an inspired concrescence. The inspiration of the arts are the 
Muses, which are, after all, the daughters of Mnemosyne—the goddess 
Memory. It may be said that the mythopoeic imagination expresses that 
which the habituated consciousness cannot perceive and only dimly 
prehend. The mythopoeic imagination is not entirely conscious at all but 
perhaps partakes of the mysterious essences of primordial awareness (i.e., 
the eternal objects) which deliver the potential and the need for mythmaking 
and artistic expression.
Perhaps it begins to be clear why I feel Whitehead’s cosmology, 
though denying consciousness of the instant, still ideally provides a schema 
to describe the working of the mythopoeic imagination. Firstly, though 
working within the theoretic paradigm, once Whitehead gets beyond the 
ideas of process and relativity, he engages in a  grand mythmaking 
venture—from God’s three natures to his eternal objects (which are, it seems, 
present everywhere as potential and nowhere as themselves). These 
eternal objects suggest Jungian archetypes or what Hillman would personify
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as deities: the source and end of imagination and the gravity of memory but
forever hidden in themselves (Hillman, 1975b).
The more a consciousness is able to prehend aims (eternal objects,
not “final causes”—nothing eternal can be final), the more that
consciousness is able to avoid determination from the more restrictive
essential causes. However, there are limitations on such free prehensions,
according to Whitehead, unless there is way of being which eludes our
present understanding in this “cosmos”:
But there is no such fact as absolute freedom; every actual entity 
possesses only such freedom as  is inherent in the primary phase 
‘given’ by its standpoint of relativity to its actual universe. Freedom, 
givenness, potentiality, are notions which presuppose each other and 
limit each other. (Whitehead, p. 133)
Still there is more or less freedom. The mythopoeic imagination is 
freer and is given far greater depth of memory and perhaps even a greater 
sense of inspirational presence than is the habituated consciousness.
Some, like Griffin, will continue to argue that imaginative freedom is 
dangerous without God’s clearly defining for us the rights and the wrongs, 
but Whitehead, himself, seem s more concerned with expressing his reality 
than demanding imperatives of behavior. According to Prigogine and 
Stengers (1984): “Whitehead understood perhaps more sharply than 
anyone else that the creative evolution of nature could never be conceived if 
the elements composing it were defined as permanent, individual entities 
that maintained their identity throughout all changes and interactions” (p. 95).
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At the sam e time, however, Whitehead had to explain the philosophy 
of relation and of innovative becoming so he could avoid the idealist trap. 
Each identity receives its identity from other identities: “In the process of its 
genesis, each existent unifies the multiplicity of the world, since it adds to this 
multiplicity an extra set of relations” (Prigogine & Stengers, p. 95).
The mythopoeic imagination surrounds Whitehead’s entire project, it 
seem s to me, and is to be found wherever eternal objects or their effects can 
be placed. Furthermore, the mythopoeic imagination is found in the power of 
human memory, its ability to go beyond the immediate objective occasions to 
such ancient objective occasions that we are dealing with foundational myths 
of consciousness. It may be such mythopoeic imagination which can realize 
its potential to express the finally inexpressible eternity of the present.
§Postm odern  Science. So much has been written about “postmodern 
science,” “visionary physics,” space-time anomalies, or what have you, that 
there seem s little point in continuing the exercise in detail here. The 
philosophies I have touched on, from the Tibetans to Whitehead, have in 
common the denial of an objective reality which exists with or without us 
basically as we presently perceive it. To so imagine a world whose objects 
have the colour, texture, proportion, or position in themselves seem s no 
longer tenable in the light of even high school physics. The visionary 
physicist, Fritjof Capra, assures us of something, at least, “out there”:
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There is a reality, but there are no things, no trees, no birds. These 
patterns are what we create. As we focus on a particular pattern and 
then cut it off from the rest, it becomes an object. Different people will 
do it differently, and different species will do it differently. What we see 
depends on how we look . . . (Capra & Steindl-Rast, 1991, p. 165)
Bergson and Whitehead were not idealists in the traditional sense of
the term, yet their philosophies were expounded because of their anticipation
of the reversal of fortune realism, logical positivism, and mechanistic science
were to have. Perhaps Bergson was closer to the postmodern view of an
ultimately unknowable universe because he understood different times and
places to evolve different senses of duration (Bergson 1911/83). Whitehead,
on the other hand, attempted to explicate a “cosmology" (1978), which
implied an identical order in all times and places. Whitehead’s process does
emphasize creativity as the force behind that process so his system is
somewhat open-ended, yet it is finally limited—not by the eternal objects—
but by the providence of God.
Whitehead was, of course, a mathematician par excellence, and so
was perhaps drawn to totalistic orderings. He likely wrote Process and
Reality before he had ever heard of Kurt Godel or his proof that any axiomatic
system or its negation was unprovable within itself (Runes, 1961), yet he
implied the process of reality through time was not smooth and even but
subject to sudden alterations. As he stated in applying this to education.
The pupil’s progress is often conceived as a uniform steady advance 
undifferentiated by change of type or alteration in pace. . . .  I hold that 
this conception of education is based upon a false psychology of the
190
process of mental development which has gravely hindered the
effectiveness of our methods. (Whitehead, 1970, pp. 7,8)
Bergson was not a  scientist but was very much interested in the 
science of his times and noted even in those pre-Einsteiniam days how local 
conditions provided the relative conditions for the support or obliteration of 
the unpredictable mutations in nature (1911/83). This localization of 
phenomena and the irreversible creative evolution of time has echoes today 
in chaos theory (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984)2 with its implication of differing 
vortices of order and sudden dispersal. Beyond this is Sheldrake’s 
“formative causation” (1988) in which not just the way things react is different 
in different times and places in the universe, but the way things are—the 
fundamental physical laws—is different a s  well. This is because of each 
“morphogenetic” field’s “habits” as determined by its “morphic resonance” 
—which sounds very much like memory. Such propositions seem to open 
the way for a “creative evolution," a s  Bergson predicted: Creatively 
discovering alternate morphic resonances is to discover alternate realities.
Our time and space travels, however, seem to be drastically limited 
within the laws of our present reality. There may be parallel universes or 
different causational fields if we accept that “vibrations of thought patterns in
iThough Bergson and Einstein later engaged in public debates about 
the nature of “scientific” or “durational” time (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984).
2W. E. Doll, Jr. (1988) has applied chaos theory in several interesting 
ways to curriculum theory.
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specific harmonies structure all 'matter' and tight as we experience it” (Toben 
& Wolf, 1982, p. 61). There may be the exotics of string theory, or all 
possiblities from precognition to levitation, and some think dream, 
imagination, and fantasy are the key to other worlds. Black holes may be 
“breathing" creation and destruction into an anti-matter, faster-than-light 
universe, just as  it does into our matter, slower-than-light one. As long as we 
are “we," however, Homo symbolicus on the third planet from Sol, all of these 
must remain conjecture.
Bergson and Whitehead changed reality by conceiving of time as a 
uni-directional flow into unknowns. Like an improvisations! jazz combo, 
these unknowns become knowns as we harmonize with that which has gone 
before. Again memory is seen as the creatrix. Prigogine and Stengers 
(1984) have strongly come out on the side of time as an arrow, one-way and 
non-repeatable, though this may be questioned on at least two levels: One is 
the question of the ultimate fate of the universe, open or closed. The closed 
universe hypothesis suggests that everything will eventually cease 
expanding and by its own gravity will go into an extended implosion in which 
time will be reversed. Another is the idea of there being a timeless 
“nothingness” or eternity within all moments of time: “There is no such thing 
as time’s  direction at the quantum level. All events exist concurrently.. . .  
Bridges in the quantum foam can connect any event with any other event” 
(Toben & Wolf, 1982, p. 75). And, of course, there is chance.
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Speculation and possibility run rampant and this is precisely why so
many of us have embraced the new physics, the new biology, etc. From
Einstein, Heisenberg, and Bohr to Hawking, Prigogine, and Bohm (et at.) the
perspectives on time of Bergson and Whitehead seem to have been at least
manifested as  “real potential.” The deterministic prison of hard rationality
may actually have proven to be a hermetic container, for as the released 6Ian
vital breaks through its seam s to reveal possiblities at least as  potent as our
“wildest dreams," it must be admitted that doubt at the irrationality of our
fantasies of better worlds would always have limited our actions in this one.
In the hermetic container of science and reason, techne may have been
transmuted into memor— which implies the potential of imagining closer to
potency, itself (as in eternal objects, archetypes, or—dare I say it?—gods).
Prigogine and Stengers (1984) give Bergson and Whitehead much
credit for anticipating changes in science: “Whitehead’s case as well as
Bergson’s  convince us that only an opening, a widening of science can end
the dichotomy between science and philosophy. This widening of science is
possible only if we revise our conception of time" (p. 96). And further:
For [Whitehead], being is inseparable from becoming. Physics and 
metaphysics are indeed coming together today in a conception of the 
world in which process, becoming, is taken as a primary constituent of 
physical existence and where, unlike Leibniz’s monads, existing 
entities can interact and therefore also be born and die” (p. 303).
Bergson and Whitehead imagined and intricately worked out these
possibilities before the sciences ran out of themselves to realize such an
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amazing “altarity" (Taylor, 1987). Postmodern science indicates that the 
depth of memory, or, if you wish, the reach of imagination, may indicate the 
way toward a reality we have always intuited. It consists of “the empty place 
in the heart” (Dunne, 1988), but also of the materiality of language—a nature 
that speaks and is spoken to. But for this, we shall have to go to an alternate 
reality hardly recognized by science and philosophy, but a reality which 
permeates them both: a mythopoeic reality.
Chapter 4: Mythology
"... it was not man who made myths but myths, or the archetypal substance
they reveal, which made man."
(Owen Barfield, The Rediscovery of Meaning, p. 75)
§Death of the Soul. Time has been perceived by Bergson and 
Whitehead to have the property of spatial extension. The “revolutions” in 
many fields of modern (or “postmodern”) science seem to agree that time is 
the effect of the expansion of space. That is to say, we are always already 
becoming, but never become; we are always already in process, but never 
processed and complete. With this seeming escape from circularity—from 
Nietzsche’s "amor fati" of the eternal return (1982) or Eliade’s cosmic cycles 
(1963)—we have opened the way for many of our present myths involving 
the irreversibility of time, including those of evolution, progress, and history. 
Moreover, the movement toward an unknown opens the space for the 
possibility of narrative: “a story line of pasts that determine presents and 
presents that constrain futures” (Gould, 1987).
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Time’s arrow has been seen as a one-way trip to a predetermined 
end, such as in Biblical eschatology or the space-contractioni hypothesis, or 
it has simply been regarded as irreversible (Prigogine & Stengers, 1987). 
Stephen Jay Gould (1987) points out, however, that “arrows and cycles, after 
all, are only categories of our invention, devised for clarity of insight. They do 
not blend, but dwell together in tension and fruitful interaction.” The 
repetition of analogous shapes and patterns in nature , 2  among other things, 
convinces him that the human need for some sort ordered unfolding—time’s 
cycle—is as real as time’s arrow: “The same tension and multiplicity have 
pervaded our Western view of time. Something deep in our tradition 
requires, for intelligibility itself, both the arrow of historical uniqueness and 
the cycle of timeless immanence—and nature says yes to both” (p. 200).
A narrative or story needs the ongoing flux of the new or it becomes a 
mere litany: “And every moment of this universe is new. That is, we now 
realize that we live not in a static Newtonian space; we live within an ongoing 
cosmic story” (Swimme, 1988, p. 50). But a storyteller must remember that 
which has passed to be able to weave a storyline. Such remembering was, 
perhaps, one of the major roles of the tribal storytellers. Within their 
memories the past was contained and the time of beginnings could be
1 1f there is enough matter in the universe, its gravity will limit its 
expansion and it will be “closed," and eventually contract upon itself.
2E.g: The unrelated evolution of wings on birds, bats, and pterodactyls.
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re-experienced in ritual, as Eliade indicates in the last section of The Myth of 
the Eternal Return (1954) called, appropriately, “the terror of history”:
“Interest in the ‘irreversible’ and the ‘new’ in history is a recent discovery in 
the life of humanity. On the contrary, archaic humanity ... defended itself, to 
the utmost of its powers, against all the novelty and irreversibility which 
history entails” (p. 48).
Stephen Jay Gould (1987) seems to think that it is a fear of 
uncontrollable events which causes us the anxiety of open-ended possibility: 
“Most cultures have recoiled from a notion that history embodies no 
permanent stability and that men (by their actions of war), or natural events 
(by their consequences of fire and famine) might be reflecting the essence of 
time—and not an irregularity subject to repeal or placation by prayer and 
ritual" (p. 13). This is, of course, quite likely. Humanity would prefer to feel it 
is part of a cosmic process which cares about it. On another level, however, 
the whole notion of identity becomes central.
In a previous chapter, I indicated (by way of Eliade) the guilt preliterate 
people seemed to feel as they experienced a personalized identity-in-time, a 
guilt which had to be expunged through rituals of cosmic renewal. The guilt 
and anxiety, then, must always have been made bearable as the myths and 
tales of the gods of the illud tempus were told and retold between the actual 
acting out of the time of beginnings. They “remembered” their ancestors, 
their particular culture-heroes, and their gods with whom they once walked at
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the time of creation. They knew their souls—connected like a  silver cord to a
beginning which was never far behind them.
We, however, have come to realize that the past is infinite, or at least
so deep that it is beyond our comprehension as thinking hominids. Infinite,
as well, seem the vast realms of space opening out around us (a “long way”
from the security of tribal territory). If there was the guilt of isolated self-ness
and the anxiety of open-ended identity for our primitive cousins, then for us
moderns how much more guilt and anxiety we must bear! As Pascal (1623-
62) wrote at the beginning of this scientific era:
When I consider the short duration of my life, swallowed up in the 
eternity before and after, the little space which I fill, and even can see, 
engulfed in the infinite immensity of spaces of which I am ignorant and 
which know me not, I am frightened, and I am astonished at being 
here rather than there; for there is no reason why here rather than 
there, why now rather than then. Who has put me here? by whose 
order and direction have this place and this time been allotted to me? 
The eternal silence of those infinite spaces frightens me. (Cited in 
Barrett, 1986, p. 8)
This discovery of “deep time” (Gould, 1987) and the vastnesses of 
space are what have led us to shore up our identities within the myths of 
science and philosophy as separate from all nature, according to William 
Barrett in The Death of the Soul: From Descartes to the Computer (1986). 
Mostly he sees the soul “dying" as we identify with our technologies, but in a 
separate section called “the disappearing self," he expresses his disturbance 
over the work of phenomenology, existentialism, and post-structuralism. 
Instead of a  “shored-up” self, he fears here a “desubstantialization of being,”
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especially as revealed in the “nihilistic” work of Heidegger and Derrida:
“Thus there is a  gaping hole at the center of our human being" (p. 140).
This conclusion has been reached by other persons from other times 
and places who have considered the “hole” differently. Perhaps at this point, 
however, it is safest only to say that a “desubstantialized se lf may be the 
only self possible in the face of the conclusions of Bergson, Whitehead, and 
postmodern science. It may be nearer the point of this mythic inquiry to 
wonder how the self—or being—came to be imagined as “substantial” in the 
first place. Since the self seems most to be a construction of memory and 
language, it is there we must look next.
§Linguistics. Narrative has been cited previously a s  being the very stuff of 
memory and it is memory which gives the self a shape. This being so, the 
natural conclusion for those of us in curriculum theory is that we should 
attempt to find ways to get students to discover the narratives which have 
shaped them and to use narratives to move them toward becoming that 
which they’d prefer to be. We can only hope “that which they’d prefer to be” 
is not hateful, dangerous, or in some way socially reprehensible.
But what is a narrative? Is it a story with a beginning, middle, and 
end? Are myths narratives? Many consider a narrative (and a myth as well) 
to be a complete story. This brings up two problems which I will attempt to 
consider: the political and mythical ramifications of closed narrative.
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Narrative theory has paradoxically become a  source of “authority”
among literary critics, according to Bruce Robbins (1992), “in part because it
undermines authority”:
Within literary studies, narrative is everywhere spoken against, and 
precisely because it is taken to embody authority.. . .  In fact, the 
distrust of narrative seem s to be a point of principle for critics as 
diverse as  Roland Barthes and E. M. Forster. If narrative means 
militant indeterminacy or relativism to some, to others it is something 
excessively determined, a hyperstructured vehicle of dogmatic belief 
that desperately needs to be relativized, it is associated with the 
illegitimate authority of the foregone and of the pregiven telos, with 
social or psychological resolution, with an orderly conventionality 
imposed on the meaningless successiveness of historical reality, with 
the tyranny of single, authoritative meaning. In short, narrative figures 
at once as an agency that produces skepticism and as  an object 
requires skepticism. (Robbins, 1992, p. 42)
Robbins goes on to explain (referring to the work of Hayden White)
that closure means “moral principle." When a mere sequence of events is
brought to a conclusion under the authority of some moral value, the
narrative achieves closure: the closure being a culturally-determined image
of life “that is and can only be imaginary” (p. 43).
Opposed to this, he suggests the “discourse,” the narrative mode of
presentation which is a bearer of indeterminacy in that it cannot be subject to
a single authoritative meaning. Such narrative discourse always implies a
movement between an assumed speaker and assum ed listener (Robbins,
1992).
Mythic narrative seem s to have had this discursive quality, at least as  
long as  it was oral. The storyteller—always claiming divine authority—would
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sing, recite, or tell his or her narrative combining familiar elements in unique
ways according to his or her audience, often without pause and on the spur
of the moment. There are even cases of group recitations (Eliade, 1978). Of
course, these spontaneous effusions had endings of a  sort, but nothing like
the moral principles set forth as myth devolved into fable, parable, and
folktale (Thompson, 1955).
Moreover, as  for the preliterate peoples of Eliade's orgiastic
ceremonies of the eternal return, time was not viewed in a historical context
whatsoever. Moral narratives could not develop until the development of
time's arrow within a centralized authority with a sense of history, which may
have come with the long-term establishment of the first hieratic city-states
(Campbell, 1990). If time was re-established after immersion in the illud
tempus, often with the choosing of new names or new social positions, how
could long mythic narratives have had time to gain the material to grow?
Kristeva (1989) even notes that
In the language of the Abipones of Paraguay, new words were 
introduced each year, for they abolished by proclamation all words 
resembling the names of the dead, and replaced them with others. 
Such proceedings obviously preclude the possibility of a narrative or a  
history: the language is no longer a depository of the past; it changes 
with the real passage of time. (p. 52)
Roland Barthes sees mythology as  a “part both of semiology inasmuch 
as it is a formal science, and of ideology inasmuch as it is an historical 
science: it studies ideas-in-form” (1957/72, p. 112). Barthes understands 
mythology to limit consciousness, the opposite of mythology as the
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expression of the sacred of Mircea Eliade (1959) or the "creative myths" of
Joseph Campbell (1968). Barthes and other semiologists understand myths
to be the grand recits or meta-narratives of Lyotard (1984) which suggest an
outline, direction, and limitation for the consciousness of a people. Myth in
the closured narrative sense outlined above certainly fits the bill. In this
sense, both the ancient myths which prescribed limitations and supported
hierarchies and modern myths which do the sam e—patriotism, economic
growth, humanism, etc.—are closured narratives with moral imperatives for
conclusions. Instead of seeing “man as a mythmaker,” such ideologies may
be said to make “man as myth." To discover such "hidden” myths, some think
a new science is needed:
Considering man as language and putting language in the place of 
man constitutes the demystifying gesture par excellence. It introduces 
science into the complex and imprecise zone of human activities 
where ideologies and religions are (usually) established. Linguistics 
turns out to be the lever of this demystification; it posits language as an 
object of science, and teaches us the laws of its functioning. (Kristeva, 
1989, p. 4)
In this sense, engaging in dialogue in our classes, questioning 
assumptions, and writing our memories of the formation of our belief- 
systems, may be the necessary “demystifying gesture par excellence." If 
myths are taken to be meta-narratives (Lyotard, 1984), or closured narratives 
(Robbins, 1992), or ideologies (Barthes, 1957/72), then, indeed, myths (and 
language as part of their medium) could become “an object of science,” as 
Kristeva (1989) suggests.
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But there is a more imaginative, less-closured sense of myth within 
and beyond the narratives of our remembering: “Myths do not ground, they 
open" (Hillman, 1979, p. 89). The memory in language becomes mythic 
when it loses the continuity of strict narrative, or, as some would say, when 
deconstructed far enough. Kristeva’s own statement: “The question ‘What is 
language?' could and should be replaced with another: ‘How was it possible 
to conceive of language?”’ (1989, p. 5) already points the way to the mythic 
mind, for we cannot conceive of language until we can conceive of 
subjectivity—or until “speech began to speak the spoken” (p. 4).
Levy-Bruhl was an armchair anthropologist who had no doubt about 
the ultimate superiority of science (Griffin, 1988), yet he was the one who 
coined the watershed term participation mystique1 (1926/85), to indicate the 
manner in which the “savage mind” had a  dispersed and contradictory 
identity, at least in our terms. The “savage” could be both himself and 
someone else simultaneously, or a totem animal or object. His identity could 
even be that of an unseen “presence” or the group as a  whole.
It is difficult for us to imagine such a state of affairs—from our state of 
being—so we can only theorize from the outside about their state of being. 
Yet, from the outside, it is worth quoting Kristeva at length, for she uses 
linguistics to explain how primitive man “perceives the network of language 
as solid matter (p. 53)”:
i Mystical participation: communal awareness: identity through difference
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What first strikes “modern” man—experienced in today’s theory and 
linguistic science, and for whom language is exterior to the real, a fine 
film whose only substance is conventional, fictitious, and 
"symbolic”—is that in societies that are “primitive,” or as they say, 
“without history” or “prehistoric," language is a substance and a 
material force. While primitive man speaks, symbolizes, and 
communicates, that is to say, establishes a distance between himself 
(as subject) and the outside (the real) in order to signify it in a system 
of differences (language), he does not know this act to be an act of 
idealization or of abstraction, but knows it instead as participation in 
the surrounding universe. While the practice of language really 
presupposes for primitive man a distance with respect to things, 
language is not conceived of as a mental elsewhere, or as an abstract 
thought process. It participates as a cosmic element of the body and 
nature, and is joined with the motor force of the body and nature. Its 
link with corporal and natural reality is not abstract or conventional, but 
real and material. Primitive man does not clearly conceive of any 
dichotomy between matter and spirit, the real and language, or 
consequently between “referent” and “linguistic sign,” much less 
between “signifier” and “signified": for him, they all partake in the same 
way of one differentiated world. (Kristeva, 1989, p. 50)1
Language was another substance in a substantial world and any
reference to personhood was substantial, as well. The substantiality of the
world, itself, has by now been brought into question by process philosophy
and postmodern science. Philosophers like Barrett (1986), mentioned
above, have yet to relinquish their hold on the substantiality of the self.
Kristeva uses the Lacanian concept of “the real.” Alan Sheridan, in a
translator’s note to Lacan's Ecrits: A Selection (1977), explains this important
concept this way:
The “real” emerges as a  third term, linked to the symbolic and the 
imaginary; it stands for what is neither symbolic nor imaginary, and
1 “Referent”: the supposed object, “signifier": the phonic image, 
“signified”: the concept, “sign”: signifier and signified. (Saussure, in Kristeva)
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remains foreclosed from the analytic experience, which is an 
experience of speech. What is prior to the assumption of the symbolic, 
the real in its “raw" state (in the case of the subject, for instance, the 
organism and its biological needs), may only be supposed, it is an 
algebraic x. This Lacanian concept of the “real” is not to be confused 
with reality, which is perfectly knowable: the subject of desire knows 
no more than that, since for it reality is entirely phantasmatic.. ..
Hence the formula: “the real is the impossible,” ... the ineliminable 
residue of all articulation, the foreclosed element, which may be 
approached, but never grasped: the umbilical cord of the symbolic.
(pp. /x-x)
This “real" cannot be remembered in our reality, which, if not entirely
linguistic, is representational. In fact, myths as fictions of narrative closure
may be understood as the very barrier which makes “the real impossible.” As
subjectivity came to be transcribed in language and time simultaneously
became perceived historically, memory developed as self-schema (Ross,
1992) which, I submit, takes basically a narrative formj in which form most of
us spend our lives attempting to attain a desired climax, i.e., closure.
Schema theory is based on the self’s objective view of itself which it
has learned through experience over time. Considering the self, as we know
it, to be the result of the space created in language for subjectivity, the
schema theory of memory points to this self’s protective fallibility, as noted by
Jeremy Campbell (1989):
The self tends to preserve existing knowledge structures in memory by 
resisting evidence that might render them suspect, because any
1 Despite the computer analogy preferred by Ross and most cognitive 
psychologists: “Those who approach the study of memory from the standpoint 
of information processing differentiate among three basic stages: encoding, 
storage, and retrieval" (Ross, 1992, p. 23).
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disruption in the way knowledge is organized in the mind could make 
it less useful. Big Brother, the revisionist historian, preserves the 
illusion of his own infallibility by turning a blind eye to awkward facts. .
. . Between what we do and what we say we are, stands the schema, 
which is more consistent than the behavior it mediates. (255)
Self-schemata, though transformable, are what we know as “lived-
reality." How did this dream of unique and consistent identity emerge from
the actual world of language (leaving aside the “real," for the moment)?
Kristeva (1989) makes a case for subjectivity being written into
language. She postulates a graphic system being at least simultaneous
with—and possibly earlier than—vocal language. She notes that “speech ...
does not isolate the act of signifying—its verb—in a mental elsewhere” (p.
62). She traces writing throughout history in Language and the Unknown
and concludes that very different senses of self are concomitant with different
forms of writing.
In India, writing seem s to have come late so that “language tended to 
become removed from the reality from which it was hardly distinguished by 
other civilizations, and that linguistic operation became ‘mentalized’ as a 
signifying operation, with a subject as a place of meaning. Man and his 
language were thus placed like a mirror that reflected an outside” (p. 82).
This led, according to Kristeva, to the highly idealistic philosophy of India with 
its world renunciation and idea of the transcendental self (or soul). This 
transcendence led to the understanding that the self—atman—is in reality 
brahman, the “AH” (O’Flaherty, 1980).
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Perhaps second only to India in the complexity of its mythological 
narratives, Greece is famed for its development of Western humanism and 
logic. Kristeva suggests these developments also came as a result of the 
attention paid to language as a formal system. The Greeks “conceived of 
language as autonomous, and, by the same token, of themselves as 
autonomous subjects.. . .  Greeks thought of themselves as subjects existing 
outside this language, as adults in possession of a real distinct from that of 
words, in whose reality only children believed” (p. 106). The result was 
individualism and the idealistic Platonism which so strongly influenced later 
Christianity, as noted in the last chapter.
My point here, however, is that the narrative self—the sense of a 
unique subjectivity with its unique history—seems to have appeared first: as 
language lost its “solidity” and became an abstraction as  writing was 
“subjected” to study and, second: as  abstract language abstracted the 
subject (who was studying it) which could then imagine (through writing!) that 
it transcended language.
This is, “apparently," reality: inseparable from storied narrative (or 
schematic memory processing) and forever lost to the “real.” Forever?
Despite denying the reality (or retrievability) of the real, this real has never 
ceased to create the need to attempt to conceptualize it, to actively deny “it,” 
or in some way to indicate it. The transcendentalism and/or idealism just 
mentioned may have a trace of connection to this real as  the “umbilical cord
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of the symbolic,” and not just be a displacement of language. Vedantists
refer to the all, Buddhists refer to the void, and more recent writers have
attempted a number of contortions to get language to evoke or indicate
beyond itself: from Derrida’s “trace” (1978) to Taylor’s “altarity” (1987) to
Krell’s “on the verge” (1990). Kristeva, herself, has mentioned the “gaping
wound" of memory (1987), Carrin Dunne the “empty place in the heart” of
memory (1988), and, of course, there’s Barrett’s “gaping hole” (1986).
Such terms may not refer to the nothingness of a “raw” animal, pre-
representational participation mystique, but only to the absolute impossibility
of representing or even imagining it directly, that is, of narrating the real. If it
cannot be narrated, it cannot be remembered. Paradoxically, it seems that
between the real and the self stands memory (which is the self).
Heidegger has obliquely suggested that the only way of becoming
aware of this pre-imagistic real is through a forgetting to remember the self:
The ecstasis of forgetting something has the character of 
disengagement vis-a-vis one’s ownmost having-been, indeed in such 
a way that this disengagement-in-the-face-of closes off what it faces. 
Because forgetting closes off having-been—such is the peculiar 
nature of that ecstasis—it closes itself off to itself. Oblivion is 
characterized by the fact that it forgets not only the forgotten but also 
the forgetting itself. The vulgar prephenomenological view of things is 
that forgetting is nothing at all. Oblivion is an elementary mode of the 
temporality in which at first and for the most part we are our own 
having-been. (1927 lecture. In Krell, 1990, p. 331)
Heidegger’s language must turn somewhat upon itself to avoid a
narrative entrapment. Ecstasis means more than rapture: ex-, out + histanai,
place, or -stasis, standstill (as in time), so it implies being out of one’s
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sen ses—as revealed to the self. Becoming as a process which includes
one’s own “having-been,” may be as close to the “eternity of the present’ as
we can envision from here. This oblivious present—Lacan’s real—need no
more be assumed to be without action or awareness than be assumed to be
with it. “Awareness,” unlike “consciousness,” can be imagined without an
object—a non-objectivized state comparable, perhaps, to participation
mystique. Such a “state” cannot contain the qualities with which memory
works, such as representation and identity, yet Nietzsche (1982) has
suggested the possibility of a return to this s ta te—which could only be known
as a return through some memory-like action. Krell (1990) points out some
of the paradoxes involved in the Nietzschean experience or ecstasis of the
eternal return—the very antithesis of the "irreversibility” of time:
Nietzsche’s experience of eternal return, of the vicious circle, 
announces a rupture with the unilinear sense that dominates the erect 
and oblivious body. By conjoining commencement and end, direction 
and goal, the circle confounds the history of thought, for which the 
body is a property of the self. The body, as the site and the product of 
contradictory pulsions, reversible pulsions in the sense that they 
prevail, bide their time, pass, and return, gains a new centrality for 
thought. The thought of thoughts, eternal return, is thus a bodying 
thought, une pensee corporante. (pp. 278, 279)
If thinking contains within it the antithesis of its seeming progressive
volition, that is, if what is said in language always implies a what-is-not-
said—as in Lacan’s  (1977) concept of the unconscious seam or in Derrida’s
(1978) neologism la differance—then the only way to recover that antithesis
is through self-forgetting. Self-forgetting—the ecstasis of oblivion—implies a
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(deferred?) point-of-action which does the forgetting, so, as I say, the
“bodying thought” need not imply an inanimate nihilism. It probably does
imply, however, a sort of spontaneous courage-to-be (Hillman, 1988) in the
face of the great anxiety of self-abandonment—an averted glance, as it were,
from the linguistic schemata of self toward what Heidegger (1987) called “the
strange and terrible":
The origin of language is in essence mysterious. And this means that 
language can only have arisen from the overpowering, the strange 
and terrible, through man’s departure into being. In this departure 
language was being, embodied in the word: poetry. Language is the 
primordial poetry in which a people speaks being, (p. 171)
This is in line with Kristeva’s conception of a linguistic sense of "one
differentiated world” (1989, p. 50, above) when language was “solid,” or, as
Heidegger says, “language was being.” Here, for the first time perhaps, we
have an indication of form taken by that non-abstract language: poetry. It
was Paul de Man (1971) who declared that “poetic language names the
void” (p. 18). This “poetic language” need not be construed as the self-
conscious self-expression which so often passes for poetry today, or as the
product of
... English poets who grew up on Greek 
( Id  have them sing in chorus, cheek to cheek).
(Roethke, “I Knew a Woman,” 1958)
Heidegger, and de Man, seem to imply more the speaking of language itself, 
that is, of being itself. In such an instance as this—and most artists declare 
it—the body becomes only the means or the medium “through which a
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people speaks being.” Heidegger calls this poetry. In the next section I shall
call it myth, and Jam es Hillman refers to it most often as image. Such
speaking, or expressing, or creating, or acting quite properly has no proper
name at all. This creative reality appears to stand opposed—or “beyond,” or
“within,” but never quite here or now—to the reality constructed by the mind
to serve the body’s survival and reproductive needs. It is a mythic reality—
perhaps one step from the “real”—something Daoism envisions as  existing in
a  continuum of its own with or without us:
There, in the atmosphere of absolute freedom, the images associate, 
intermingle, and interfuse with one another according to their own law 
of symbolic evolvement, drawing among themselves and by 
themselves mythopoeic pictures of Reality. From the standpoint of a 
Lao Tzu or a Chuang Tzu, these mythopoeic pictures, being 
essentially archetypal, reflect more faithfully or more fundamentally the 
true structure of reality than what is afforded by sensation, perception 
and reason. (Izutsu, 1981, p. 31)
With the mention of “mythopoeic pictures," we are closing in on the 
“subject” of myth. Myth is seen here as a creative essence involving, as 
Heidegger indicates, “a people” and so is not merely a cultural story which 
has been ideologically evolved into narrative closure. This is myth as 
narrative discourse in “one differentiated world”—a participation mystique in 
which all are sayers and, perhaps, more importantly, all are listeners.
The concept of memory is clearly being opened to two senses: one, 
the narratives of self-schema in which information is processed to support the 
illusion of a substantiated, substantial self, and, two, mythic memory—
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Mnemosyne—which desubstantiates, desubstantializes, and destabilizes the
self for the sake of a mythopoeic language achieving substance:
Mnemosyne, daughter of Sky and Earth, bride of Zeus, in nine nights 
becomes the Mother of the Muses. Play and music, dance and poetry 
are of the womb of Mnemosyne, Dame memory. It is plain that the 
word means something else than merely the psychologically 
demonstrable ability to retain a mental representation of something 
that is past. Memory thinks back to what is thought. Yet as the name 
of the Mother of the Muses, “Memory” does not mean an arbitrary 
thinking of just anything that might be thought. It harbors and conceals 
that to which at any given time thought must be given, in everything 
that essentially unfolds and appeals to us as having being and having- 
been: Memory, the Mother of the Muses: thinking back to what is to be 
thought—this is the source and ground of poesy. (Heidegger, 1977, p. 
352)
§Origins of Myth. This sectional epigraph is meant ironically: The origins 
of myth cannot be discovered any more than the origins of language or of 
religion. Yet the past two centuries have seen a great deal of fascinating 
mythmaking under the ethnocentric rubric of the scientific study of myth, as  
though to define or narrate the origins of myth can escape from Eliade’s 
(1976) view that “Myth is ... always an account of a ‘creation’ of one sort or 
another, as it tells of how something came into being” (p. 23). So that our 
“scientific inquiry" into myth’s origins is, as always, a  mythmaking venture, as 
is my inquiry into the mythic world behind memory.
Myth has been understood in many ways to many different people. It 
is religion in the sense of sacred stories for many peoples of the world today. 
Thanks to the earlier work of C. G. Jung and the massive success of the more
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recent work of Joseph Campbell, myth has risen somewhat in the public 
mind from its former status a s  a  “false tale” to “symbolic truth.” Now ancient 
or preliterate mythologies are read with delight far from their contexts in the 
hope of finding the common patterns which will reveal important truths to an 
educated public grown weary with the monotony of Judaeo-Christianity.
Curriculum Theory has turned to myth in many ways over the past 
years, encompassing both above definitions. Patriarchy has been found to 
be "just a  myth" even as the myths of “The Goddess” are being accepted in 
some circles as direct revelation. Is it even possible to indicate an essence 
to our rhetoric about mythology, much less a meaning or definition? This 
section attempts both to look at our explanations for myth and our feelings 
about its place and the “nature” within it. The last section of this chapter 
aspires to evoke myth in the deepening light of what is known a s  “archetypal 
psychology." If we can comprehend mythic memory more clearly, perhaps 
we may be able to find a place for it and its effects in our theories and 
fantasies of educational curriculum.
Mythology is a  story, simply that. It is a  narrative of events which have 
been experienced and, as  such, it is also at the core of non-narrative writings 
and speech, including explanation and description. To explain something is 
to make reference to causes and effects: in other words, to tell the story of 
genealogies and the unfolding of events through conflict and cooperation.
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To describe something is to open the world of adverb and adjective, of simile 
and metaphor, the subtle colourations of story.
I have been describing a dichotomy of memory, as techne and as 
memor to indicate that the territory ascribed to memory once encompassed 
much more than it now does (chapter 1, Krell). Furthermore, thinking as the 
product of experience whose purpose is to name and manipulate empirical 
reality has been set against mythopoeic thinking which creates experience 
by naming and responding to “invisibles”: “This drive to nail with a word a 
reality of a categorically different existential status from the status of any 
components of practically usable experience, this unceasing effort to find a 
name for what is not contingent, gives the constitutive quality to human 
mythopoeic activities" (Kolakowski, 1972/89, p. 132).
Thirdly, a line has been drawn between reason and intuition, between 
logos and mythos. In common parlance, logos is acknowledged as real but, 
in the following passage, Heidegger (1977), for one, grants equal status—at 
least—to its other: “Historians and philologists, by virtue of a prejudice 
modern rationalism adopted from Platonism, imagine that mythos was 
destroyed by logos. But nothing religious is ever destroyed by logic; it is 
destroyed only by the god’s withdrawal” (p. 352).
Lastly, and perhaps most interestingly, a question has been raised 
over the shape of time or perhaps one should say over the very reality of 
time. Time as linear and irreversible is often identified with practical thinking,
214
looking to the future, whereas time as cyclical or somehow ordered is more 
often based on metaphysical or mythical thought in which language must 
transgress its own limitations (Kristeva, 1989). It is fascinating that Bergson 
and Whitehead, philosophers of duration and process (irreversibility), 
conceived of, respectively, “the spirit” and "God in three manifestations” as 
somehow representing the timeless. This is the keynote of all mythic or 
metaphysical thinkers, according to Kolakowski, though he does not address 
the important question of whether such thinkers express a need or respond 
to an intuition:
It does seem in fact that the same common motivation appears in all of 
them: the desire to arrest physical time by imposing upon it a mythical 
form of time; that is, one which allows us to see in the mutability of 
things not only change, but also accumulation, or allows us to believe 
that what is past is retained—as far as values are concerned—in what 
endures; that facts are not merely facts, but are building blocks of a 
universe of values which it is possible to salvage despite the 
irreversible flow of events, (pp. 4, 5)
Both kinds of memory, both kinds of cognition, must have existed in 
the bodies whose minds shared in a  participation mystique (or, contrarily, the 
cultural Mind whose separate bodies—members—performed distinct actions 
in the life-drama of mythic re-membering or commemoration?). The very 
drawing of differences, however, is an effect of re-cognition, a defining kind of 
attention, so it seems likely there was no awareness of separate modes of 
awareness. The primitive, as has been said, lives in an active, substantial, 
mythic universe, likely a universe in which technological memory was merely
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understood within—as a little brother or sister—the larger memor of the 
cosmic creation to which s/he was always returning.
Whether or not it was the development of alphabetic script, as 
Kristeva (1989) has indicated, or simply the worldly power engendered 
through the calculation of the logos, a divorce did take place from the world 
of myth, and it seems to have appeared almost suddenly in logical Greece.
As early as the sixth-fifth century B.C.E., Xenophanes was “profaning” the 
gods of Homer (Eliade, 1978), something that would have been literally 
unthinkable in a much earlier time—not because of religious obligation or 
enforcement, but because, if language was as solid and real as Kristeva 
indicates above, then so precisely were the gods. One would be strangely 
perverse to profane powers which were present.
Contrary to the suggestions of Kristeva (1989), there is strong 
anthropological/archeological evidence for Homo symbolicus farther back in 
time than the Mousterian period of the cave paintings in France (ca. 35,000 
B.C.E.). The grand hallucinogenic quality of these cave paintings illustrate 
the representational or symbol-making faculty of humanity in full operation. It 
may true that, as Kristeva (1989) has said above: “Considering man as 
language and putting language in the place of man constitutes the 
demystifying gesture par excellence" (p. 4), but there is no way to
i Alphabet: alpha, beta, etc—in order, in a straight line.
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demonstrate that the representations of this period included vocalizations, 
though there are patterned notches in rock and bone, suggesting words.
Thomas Mann’s  (1934) famous statement about the futility of 
searching for the origins of humanity, or language, or culture still applies. Yet 
perhaps it is worth quoting to demonstrate the sense of abyss surrounding all 
our seeking, the dark and deep abyss of the human psyche itself:
Very deep is the well of the past. Should we not call it 
bottomless?
Bottomless indeed, if—and perhaps only if—the past we mean 
is the past merely of the life of mankind, that riddling essence of which 
our own normally unsatisfied and quite abnormally wretched 
existence form a part; whose mystery, of course, includes our own and 
is the alpha and omega of all our questions, lending burning 
immediacy to all we say, and significance to all our striving. For the 
deeper we sound, the further down into the lower world of the past we 
probe and press, the more do we find that the earliest foundations of 
humanity, its history and culture reveal themselves unfathomable, (p.
3)
The unfathomableness of the psyche is itself a “mystifying” 
phenomena, as is the earlier suggestion of Levi-Strauss that language— 
objects signifying—“could only have been born in a single stroke" (Kristeva, 
1989, p. 46). Man as the measure of all things may be demystified by 
considering him a  product of language, but it is a  powerfully mystifying, even 
eerie, suggestion that humanity awoke one morning to find itself within an 
utterly new world of representation. Did our distant semi-human ancestors 
suddenly find themselves with the need and ability to sit around their fires at 
night and spin narratives about the day’s  hunting and gathering adventures? 
Perhaps it was the momentous occasion of first mastering that strange and
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dangerous dancer, fire, that first caused the hair on the backs of our 
ancestors to stand on end with the awakened sense of the uncanny. Or 
perhaps some extraterrestrial phenomenon—such as the unexplained black 
monolith from the film 2001: A Space Odyssey (Kubrick, 1968)—appeared to 
nudge humanity into beginning its representational journey into high 
technology.
The genus Homo now appears to go back at least four million years
during which time its members diffused across the planet from Africa,
learning to use (but hardly improving upon) crude stone tools (Campbell,
1990). The first indications of symbolic thought appear, however, with Homo
sapiens neanderthalensis. Joseph Campbell (1976) hints at another
possible explanation for the origin at about 60,000 B.C.E. of Homo
symbolicus, the producer—and product—of “signifying objects”:
We now begin to find burials, and at one important site, at Shanidar in 
northern Iraq, there has been recently discovered a cave containing a 
number of burials, in one of which the body had been laid to rest on a 
bier of evergreen boughs overspread with flowers, the pollens of 
which could still be traced, and all of which have turned out to be 
plants with hallucinogenic properties, (p. 46)
Furthermore, beneath the bones of this particular male were found the 
bones of two females and a child (Campbell, 1990). Burial alone suggests 
some sort of belief in an afterlife, and the extra burials even hint at a type of 
suttee sacrifice. It seems at least worth considering the possibility that 
participational symbolic consciousness “awoke" through the mystical effects 
from the ingestion of hallucinogenic plants. The grave may have been that of
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a shaman whose visions, “archaic techniques of ecstasy” and “mantic
journeys” have been suggested as prototypes of all religious activity and
possibly all representational activity whatsoever (Eliade, 1964).
Burial also suggests ritual farewells and the possibility of the mourning
which attends such things. Time and again, from individuals widely
separated in space and time, mourning as been cited as the origin of
remembering as  memor— the mindfulness which creates (Kristeva, 1987;
Dunne, 1988). Krell (1990) says that “mourning and memory are scions of
the sam e semantic vine" (p. 284), but then goes on to wonder, Derrida-like,
whether there can any mourning but “mourning in default” (p. 284):
The very linguistic multivalence of the word m&moire... whether 
masculine or feminine, singular or plural, preserves the cryptic quality 
of mourning. . .  . Mourning does not (allow) rest. It pushes ahead. The 
desire to think and speak in memory of a  departed friend is the intense 
desire for and affirmation of the future. It engages the bereaved in an 
alliance, not for purposes of progress or power, but toward an 
uncertain future to which one nevertheless must say “yes.” (p. 288)
Krell writes enigmatically but suggests that imagining may be a
response to remembering and Campbell (1976, 1990) indulges in free
speculation, but each in their own way may be opening out the possibility
that mythopoeic mindfulness need not have appeared with the vocalizations
or written markings we generally refer to as language. After the logical
Xenophanes, it was widely assumed that myth could only exist a s  language
and, specifically, as  narrative, though the narratives could be depicted as
icons or in art or performed in ritual or drama. When the scientific study of
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myth was begun, Max Muller declared myth to be the result of what he called 
a “disease of language.” He referred to this as homonymy and indicated it 
with the example of names losing referents and being mistaken for deities, as 
in the formula nomina = numina (Eliade, 1976).
Language cannot refer to anything outside of itself, it is now generally 
conceded (Kristeva, 1989), but, on the other hand, its very structure and 
rhythms may have evolved from actions done in response to the sudden awe 
of memor. Ritual dance is a widely supported candidate as the primary 
response1 —whether it is conceived as group elaborations worked out over 
time or the possessed gyrations of an individual shamanic trance (or, 
perhaps, rituals mimicking sacred shamanic trance movements). This idea 
still has wide support, especially among anthropologists, who understand 
ritual to antedate myth as narrative. Among the more famous ritualists are Sir 
James George Frazer (1890/1959) and the classicist Jane Ellen Harrison 
(1903/1991). Others following this principal but who judge iconography 
(often of rituals) whose meaning has been forgotten to be the source of most 
mythic narratives include the Swiss classicist, Walter Burkert (1985), and the 
poet Robert Graves (1960/80). All of the ritualists, according to Eliade 
(1976), “take for granted that the fundamental element of religion and of 
human culture is the act done by man, not the story of divine activity” (p. 19).
1 “So the darkness shall be the light, and the stillness the dancing.” 
-T .  S. Eliot, "East Coker” III, 128. Four Quartets (1944).
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The main import of presenting such a point of view is to indicate that 
myth and narrative need not be identified. When I suggest that there may be 
myths concealed in memory, I do not mean we are creating our stories within 
the structure of, say, Gilgamesh’s existential quest or the battle of Marduk 
and Tiamat, but that the “empty place” within memory may refer to a sort of 
Dionysian immersion in rituals of participation mystique in which the self and 
its specific memory were lost, but not, perhaps, in what Heidegger called the 
“ecstasis of oblivion” (above). I am suggesting that Kristeva’s “solid” world of 
language within which the self was conceived may well have already been 
within a pre-conceptual world of mythic realism. “Mythical realism" 
postulates the aesthetics of imaginative perception to be actually found 
“outside,” in nature, not in the mind or “unconscious” (Boer & Kugler, 1977).
“Pre-conceptual” has, of course, become a near verboten in this 
postmodern era where the authority of language has been given its due. The 
pre-conceptual is inconceivable, of course, like Lacan’s real. Kirby's 
prenarrative structures, structuralism itself, and even Whitehead’s eternal 
objects and Jung’s archetypes have attempted to indicate the formative 
tendencies which affect language but seem to reside in some deeper natural 
substratum or, perhaps, firmament.
Archetypes may be imagined as inspirational telos, or remembered as 
pure potential. When the archetypes manifest in language, they are
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experienced as real: "The primitive mentality,” writes Jung (Ker6nyi & Jung,
1949), “does not invent myths, it experiences them” (p. 101).
The similarity appears more than just passing among Plato’s world of
ideas, Whitehead’s eternal objects, and Jung’s  archetypes. None of the
above can be revealed. In fact, normal reality conceals their greater reality.
All are beyond the reach of memories, as such, but anamnesis takes us
toward Plato’s ideas or forms. As hidden movers, each—as has been
mentioned with regard to Whitehead’s eternal objects—is a present absence
(Derrida, 1978). It may be in this latter sense that such “hiddens” provide the
only trace of meaning or referent within a  language network based only on
the differentiation of signification. Assuming no transcendental signifieds,
Foucault has indicated that language can only speak towards this absence:
The presence and absence of the gods, their withdrawal and 
immanence, defined the central and empty space for European culture 
where there appeared, bound in a single interrogation, the finitude of 
man and the return of time. The nineteenth century is commonly 
thought to have discovered the historical dimension; it was able to pen 
history on the basis of the circle, the spatial form that negates time, the 
form in which the gods manifest their arrival and flight and men 
manifest their return to their ground of finitude. More than simply an 
event that affected our emotions, the death of God profoundly 
influenced our language; the silence that replaced its source remains 
impenetrable. . .  . Language thus assumes a sovereign position; it 
rises as coming from elsewhere, from a place of which no one can 
speak, but it is a  work only if, in ascending to its proper discourse, it 
speaks in the direction of this absence. (In Taylor, 1987, p. xvii.)
The “death” of the all-consuming God which gave an understanding of
meaning to all speech and writing has re-opened the avenues to what was
once called pagan sources of meaning. Whether Jungian archetypes are
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simply dismissed as biological instincts made conscious or if they are 
merited as the structures that open the way into myth and ritual, thus 
language, they still sound very similar to the gods experienced by various 
pagan peoples.
Eliade (1976) describes myths with seeming approval as possibly
preceding language as archetypal expressions. He explains that “myths are
for Jung the expressions of a primordial psychic process that may even
precede the advent of the human race. Together with symbols, myths are the
most archaic structures of the psychic life.” Campbell (1976), who has
derived much of the background of his heroic ontology from Jung, agrees
with the primacy of the archetypes, but points out the term derives from the
Elementargedanken, “elementary ideas” of Adolf Bastian (1826-1905). He
also points out that such structures are not original to the West:
The Hindus, like Adolf Bastian, have noticed and named the 
distinction between Volker- and Elementargedanken, ethnic and 
elementary ideas. Their terms for the same are desi and marga. Desi 
means “that which is local, provincial,” and refers to those forms of 
myth and ritual that we recognize as culturally shaped, and whose 
areas of origin can be mapped. Marga, on the other hand, means 
“path or track, trail of animal, to be followed,” and this is precisely what 
is implied by C. G. Jung’s term, “the archetypes of the unconscious.” 
(1976, p. 59)
Such a formative concept—which is claimed not to be—is obviously of 
vast importance. In the next section, Jam es Hillman simply personifies such 
vague structuring agents as “Gods” (1975a, 1975b, 1981). Those who have 
worked with aesthetic interpretation or dealt with human expression at all
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have found such structures emerging from behind the grand diversity of
human creativity almost inevitably (Frye, 1957; May, 1975; Eliot, A., 1976;
Doll, M. A., 1988; Neumann, 1989). Yet to recognize such patterning is not
the same as the scientific recognition of an actual mythical or metaphysical
agent of such patterns, as Kolakowski (1972/89) emphatically states:
The presence of this intention does not guarantee the existence of the 
referents. It is only evidence of a  need, alive in culture, that that to 
which the intention refers should be present. But this presence cannot 
in principle be the object of proof, because the proof-making ability is 
itself a power of the analytical mind, technologically oriented, which 
does not extend beyond its tasks. The idea of proof, introduced into 
metaphysics, arises from a confusion of two different sources of 
energy active in man’s conscious relation to the world: the 
technological and the mythical, (p. 2)
Writing about such imagined structures as archetypes, he also points out,
must be more literary—more mythopoeic—than literal:
Jung and Eliade have attempted to demonstrate that individual myths 
are locally and historically determined particularizations of that myth 
which makes up the common archetypal pool of mythical 
consciousness, although it manifests itself only in culturally 
designated specifics. These attempts themselves appear to form part 
of mythopoeic endeavors, and it is difficult to imagine how one could 
endow them with the status of a hypothesis. They are perhaps worthy 
of our attention as ecumenical efforts, that is, as elements of an 
endeavor which remains within mythical consciousness; but, it seems, 
they are unlikely to succeed as an effort which attempts to make 
mythical consciousness the object of scientific reflection only. (p. 8)
The structural anthropology developed by Claude Levi-Strauss (1966)
has seldom been questioned as to its hard-worked scientific base. Yet, he,
too, indicates a pre-linguistic something. His later work recognizes that the
structure of myth—“raw” myth—is closer to music than to language (Eliade,
224
1987). His earlier work had noted that the mind seem s to work with concepts 
or with images, but rarely with both simultaneously. Here he is interpreted as 
noting, as did Kristeva (1989), the substantiality of mythic thought: “The basic 
characteristic of mythical thought consists in its concreteness: it works with 
signs which have the peculiar character of lying between images and 
concepts. That is, signs resemble images in that they are concrete, as 
concepts are not; however, their power of reference also likens them to 
concepts" (Eliade, 1976, p. 22).
This “betweenness" of myth draws away from myth as story only. It 
implies having an intention of its own. Between some sort of primordial 
chaos, or Lacan’s  real, and our differentiated conceptual consciousness, 
myth seem s to have interceded—suddenly—with spontaneous responses 
(actions) or representations (images or substantial names). Alexander Eliot 
(1976) sums it up—poetically—in this way: “Although it cannot be defined, 
myth may be pictured in a way. It is the glistening interface between 
consciousness and creative chaos” (p. 282).
As we move to the less scientifically-constrained Far East of Daoism.i 
we find the image being described as  the limit of the knowable, but that in no 
way prevents a  mythopoeic attempt to evoke the “real” of the “No-Image”:
The No-Image is here represented by the metaphysical Nothing, the
Imageless as Lao Tzu himself calls it. The Imageless is formless.
Absolutely no form is visible. But from the very midst of this darkness
iCorrected pronunciation of “Taoism."
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of formlessness, as if by dint of the natural law of self-articulation, there 
come out visible forms, at first vague and indistinct, but turning soon 
clear and distinct. As soon as these forms become distinctly 
discernible, they are reflected in the mind and produce there 
mythopoeic images which, from then on, follow their own course in 
mythopoesis. That which is indicated by the formula: “From No-Image 
to Image” is thus in Taoism a symbolic or mythic reproduction of a 
metaphysical vision of Being, in which one witnesses the primordial 
Nothing as it goes on producing interminably out of itself images of its 
own, which, spreading out in all directions, finally establish 
themselves as the phenomenal world. (Izutsu, 1981, p. 7)
Though language is forbidden to go beyond itself (Kristeva has even
indicated that idealism—and other forms of transcendentalism, such as
subjectivity—is a “disease of language,” or, at least, a  creation of it), I am
introducing the mythopoeic possibility that myth, in itself, may consist of
actions and words which derive from a peculiarly liminal area of awareness
which Izutsu describes by the term “image," an area with experienced
imaginal forms and presences. About archetypes, nothing concrete can be
finally known. About Daoism’s “Nothing," nothing can be concretely known.
The mythic image, however, seem s amenable to experience, perhaps even
the substantial experience of a people, who could then express its reality in
narrative discourse—without the moral imperatives of narrative closure.
This world of images is not unknown to us. Far from it. We experience
it nightly in the shifting landscapes of our dreams with their preternatural
lighting which seems, somehow, to illuminate from within. Memory
flashbacks seem often not to have the slightest vestige of story, but, instead,
to present themselves as inexplicable imagery—unconnected even to the
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events unfolding within the narratives of our daily lives. Images without the 
hermeneutic of narrative can bring us to the brink: They threaten to disperse 
consciousness with the images of our identities appearing only as other 
flickering presentations on the verge of dis-appearing as chaotically as they 
had appeared. The world of images must indeed be the "strange and 
terrible” phenomena of the beyond of language, as Heidegger (1987, p. 171) 
has described. Without naming, without narrating, such unbridled imagery 
must often have seemed what we would call a hallucinogenic nightmare. It 
suggests what Alexander Eliot called above “creative chaos,” and—in this 
god-infested dreamtime—only perhaps the shared desperation of the 
discourse of mythopoeic tales could provide the ordering and the 
imagination to contain the images.
This seems to be the primary reason why James Hillman declares 
mythology to be creative and not enclosured. He suggests that “mythical 
fictions stimulate imagination. They generate cosmological imaginings and 
further the soul’s speculative freedom,” and he quotes Whitehead from 
Process and Reality (p. 115) in this regard: ‘"Imagination finds its easiest 
freedom among the higher categories of eternal objects’” (1989, p. 221).
So, to return to the theme of this section, the origin of myth, we find the 
ordering of images may not have appeared until myth found its logos. The 
logos of “mytho log / is the part of the word which meant “tale” or “story,” in 
Homer and the early Greek poets. “Myth,” itself, derives from muthos, “word"
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(Levin, 1960, pp. 103, 104). From this perspective, a myth is neither a fable,
folktale, ritual afterthought, description of divinity, nor even a narrative in
itself, though it has since been considered all these things and more. An
overview from the 1960s indicates this riot of opinion:
The first problem, then: there is no agreement as to what the myth and 
ritual pattern actually is. Not only is this true of students of literature 
who must, after all, take their materials from the anthropologists, 
archaeologists, pre-historians, psycho-analysts, historians of religion, 
folklorists, and classicists, but it is equally true of the very experts in 
those fields. I know from personal observation that Frankfort turned 
livid at the sound of Frazer’s name, Rose savages Graves, Graves 
gores Jung, Guthrie deplores Comford, and bound volumes of The 
Journal of American Folklore are thrown at Raglan and Hyman for 
criticizing Thompson. As a matter of fact, no myth and ritual pattern as 
such exists or ever existed in any real sense; it is a modern, scholarly 
reconstruction of diverse materials drawn from divergent sources. 
Moreover, and this is even more exasperating, there is no agreement 
as to the meaning of myth itself. To Whalley, a myth “...is a direct 
metaphysical statement beyond science.. . .  Myth has as its purpose, 
its source and end, revelation”, to Watts, it is the philosophia perennis; 
to Wheelright, “it is...a set of depth-meanings of perduring significance 
within a widely shared perspective", to Graves, it is “...the reduction to 
narrative shorthand of ritual mime performed on public festivals” or, 
contrariwise, the antique story of the White Goddess, or, even more 
contrariwise, politico-religious history; and as a final example, myths 
are "...mistaken explanations of phenomena...founded on ignorance 
and misapprehension they are always false, for were they true, they 
would cease to be myths," and this, ironically enough, was Frazer’s 
opinion. (Weisinger, 1960, pp. 135, 136)
It seems to me we have heard enough of the definitions of myth from 
the outside, from our academic perspective. The narratives of mythology 
give the impression of the ordering of experience through storying. To further 
gain insight into the image within myth itself, however, I feel we need the 
imagistic perspective of what is called “archetypal psychology.”
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§Remembering the Soul. The leading archetypalist, Jam es Hillman,
applies the term “myth" with different emphases in different places. As story,
he employs the myths of Ancient Greece, since he understands our cultural
roots (and thus our psyche) to derive especially from that region which
supplies the paradigms and guidance in the work of abnormal psychology:
Following Jung along this path is the main work of archetypal therapy. 
Much of what I have been attempting at Eranos since 1966 has been 
along these lines. We have looked at the myths and the implications 
for abnormal psychology—of Eros and Psyche, of Dionysos, of such 
figures as the puer aeternus, Saturn the senex, the child and Hades in 
the Underworld. In these different examples we saw that the 
pathological is inherent to the mythical. . . . Our deepest intention has 
been to move psychopathology, the basis of the field, from a 
positivistic nineteenth-century system of mind and its disorders to a 
non-agnostic, mythopoeic, psychology of the archetypes. (Hillman, 
1983a, p. 11)
Hillman’s psychology of the archetypes is openly mythic and does not 
even attempt the scientific hypotheses of Eliade or Jung. He makes the 
move away from a rational ordering of concepts or a rational ordering of 
memory to explain psyche or myth, which, as Kolakowski indicated, are not 
subject to explanation. Instead, he declares that all our rationalizing works 
within the substantial reality of language, as Kristeva (1989) said above 
about primitive humanity. The archetypes act upon a people’s mythopoeic 
responsiveness to create mythos through them. The sounds produced name 
a “solid” reality, and this reality continues to create words through 
differentiation, not forgetting their mythic origin. If, at least in its origin, myth
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was the word of words, the concept of the concept, or the meaning of the
sound—as mu is to muthos—then it must have been a datum of direct
experience, a revelation. This does not imply, however, a revelation of pure
godhead or pure form. According to Hillman (1979a), as  with Kristeva, the
“form" and the “word” are identical:
It is as if the archetypal material chooses its own descriptive terms as 
one aspect of its self-expression. This would mean that ‘naming’ is not 
a nominalistic activity, but realistic indeed, because the name takes us 
into its reality. We might even submit that there is an archetypal 
selective factor involved in the invention of terms. Let us call this an 
archetypal semantics or phonetics on which archetypal hermeneutics 
is based. After all, to lead archetypal significance out of the language 
of psychology suggests that the significance is already ‘there’ in the 
words, their roots or their sounds, (p. 25)
It appears he is saying that “archetypal substance” gave forth
language in one form or another, yet Hillman would agree with Heidegger
(1987) that “It is in words and language that things come into being and are”
(p. 13). Hillman (1989a) declares the pre-existence of archetypes, but such
archetypes have no form in themselves. Even a via negativa, he implies,
does not promote a relationship with the formless: “We may assert an
absence of form, but can we imagine this absence, this formlessness? The
world egg and eros (the generative joiner) are inherent in Chaos and Night,
and even the Titans have names" (p. 222).
In this way, it seems, the early responses to awakening in a
dreamworld of chaotic images were language-like representations: the
musical forms suggested by L6vi-Strauss, or the representations of artwork
or dance. As as been suggested elsewhere (Derrida, 1978), such
representations were not re-presentations at all, but actual presentations
because their articulation was the thing, in itself, for the first time. To
remember deeper than our own representations (including ourselves) is to
find ourselves in the “creative chaos" of dreams: “I do not consider dreaming
as a piece of the psyche like a textbook chapter listed along with memory,
perception, emotion, and the like. Dreaming is the psyche itself doing its soul-
work” (Hillman, 1979a, p. 201). Psyche or soul, according to Hillman, is that
very archetypal substance, which, like Whitehead’s eternal objects, is eternal
and “surrounding” life. The soul—a central term “revitalized” in archetypal
psychology—never leaves its bottomless depth in “death,” yet, in its striving
into life, “Soul seeks to understand itself beyond itself” (1989a, 216). We, as
representations in the world, cannot “fathom" the soul-work of dream, but we
may experience it as dream or as mystical participation:
We do not understand enough of this soul-work because we are not 
altogether in its place; we are not “dead,” not all psyche, once we have 
left the underworld and returned to our various other soul parts as 
listed in the textbook. (Hillman, 1979a, p. 201)
So language may constitute reality in Heidegger’s  sense and conceal
the real, in Lacan’s sense, but it is the dreamlike—horrifying or
exalting—quality of myths which seem to exist as  “glistening interface”
between the underworld of soul (the real?) and our daylight reality. In this
light, myths are not the creations of words but, in a twisted sense, the words
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are the form of myth. Whether the “word" made reference to a  memory of an
experience or was, in fact, a spontaneous conjuration followed by memory,
the original mythic experience must have included a representation of an
apperception: an image. Without the centrality of image, archetypal
psychology with its emphasis on seeing-through is simply another mode of
denial, as  Hillman says: “My via negativa, though different in content
because of its call of soul-making, the vivification of imagination, and the
restoration of the Gods, still retained as  method the critical, skeptical analysis
such as  we find in bare existentialism, linguistic philosophy, operationalism,
and deconstruction theory” (1989a, p. 216).
The image, however, is considered the central datum of experience in
the unbordered field of mythic psychology:
An archetypal image is psychologically "universal" because its effect 
amplifies and de-personalizes ... such an image is universal because 
it resonates with collective trans-empirical importance. . .  . And the 
universals problem for psychology is not whether they exist, where, 
and how they participate in particulars, but rather whether a personal 
individual event can be recognized as bearing essential and collective 
importance. (Hillman, 1983a, p. 11)
The image as carrier of dream as  well a s  of myth is a multi-sensory 
impression revealed primarily through emotion. But though the image is 
understood to have archetypal content, even it is not solid or final, some sort 
of ultimate particle. Instead of an image being trivialized through some 
dream interpretation or extended a s  one item on the plotline of a narrative, 
the image is instead merely the surface appearance of an emotion. The
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more closely the image is examined, the more images are revealed—like
fractals within fractals. This is what Hillman (1979a) means when he says
that the mythic image only opens and that the image is all we can know of
what is beneath it:
All that we have claimed for the dream cannot be established by 
experience or be grounded in myth. Myth doesn’t ground, it opens.
We remain in the perspective of depth, with nothing more reliable 
under our feet than this depth itself. We take depth psychology literally 
at its word, because depth is a  metaphor that has no base. . . .  Image 
is psyche and cannot revert except to its own imagining, (p. 200)
The image is understood to be anterior to the concept (including the
conception of “image”). The very word, conception, refers not to a birth from
within but is from the Latin verb, concipere: to take to oneself (Morris, 1982),
as  though the concept were a sort of personalized “after-image" of unplaced,
impersonal experience of the image, in itself. Archetypal psychology, then,
though never defining myth per se, would likely consider myth to be an
expression of the experience of the supra-personal image. Myth is the name
of that experience, taken within, a s  it were—subjected (not projected).
Mythology is the narrative of such names:
When we think mythologically about pathologizing, we could say, as 
some have, that the "world of the Gods” is anthropomorphic, an 
imitative projection of ours, including our pathologies. But one could 
start as well from the other side, the mundus imaginalis of the 
archetypes (or Gods), and say that our “secular world” is at the same 
time mythical, an imitative projection of theirs, including their 
pathologies. What the Gods show in an imaginal realm of myth is 
reflected in our imagination as fantasy. Our fantasies reflect theirs, our 
behavior only mimetic to theirs. We can imagine nothing or perform 
nothing that is not already given by the archetypal imagination of the
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Gods. .. . Since their infirmitas is essential to their complete 
configuration, it follows that our individual completion requires our 
pathologizings. (Hillman, 1980, pp. 3, 4)
This implies that our “wholeness” cannot be whole, drawn together as 
it has been from a plurality of archetypes. Our narrative selves are made 
from much earlier narratives of the gods, each expressive of the inarticulate 
grandeur and madness (from our “all too human” perspective?) of a 
particular archetypal configuration. Each configuration contains a desirable 
face and an undesirable shadow, and we each participate in many such 
configurations, according to Hillman. No configuration is unique unto itself 
but only seems so because of its differentiation from others—and all 
participate in each other: so like language.
We know of such archetypes—such “Gods"—from their imaginative 
expression in mythic tales. Today, of course, myth means little more, in 
general parlance, than illusion. Archetypal psychology would likely accept 
such a definition. It is difficult to shed light on the archetypal definition of 
myth when the very term, “definition", is rooted in the Latin de: off + finis: end, 
boundary (Morris). To define is to set boundaries, which myth as word has 
already begun and which myth seeks to carry us through. If the project of 
archetypal psychology is to “see through" the mythology to the image, then 
this boundary must be one that is permeable. Myth, it may be extrapolated, is 
illusion, as is the substance of all language.
234
The mythic is everpresent and all-pervasive because language, itself, 
is a construction of images. One has only to delve into the origins of words to 
discover something perceived, or something done behind the source of the 
sound made to indicate the image (or the idea of the image). Today we 
accept words literally, within the singular self. This may be as the result of 
Kristeva’s alphabet subjectivity or because we have been subsumed in the 
Western/Northern fantasy (Hillman, 1983b) of only a singular knowable 
—God—which we now imagine to be isolated “inside” of us, our chief cultural 
ailment, according to Hillman (1983b). The “outside" world is treated 
logically and as objectively real, but impersonal.
It may be impossible for us to decipher a “prelogical mentality” (Levy- 
Bruhl, 1926/85, p. 78, p. 295) when we are creations of logos. A return to 
animal participation mystique in nature without speech would be the end of 
humanity, but within the web of language, especially academic language, 
primordial images become obscured and we believe our speech to be more 
concrete than its referents. We become prisoners of our own device. Is this 
because we believe literally in the image T?
Even the continental philosophies of language—such as the 
linguistics section above—seem to have expunged the Dionysian excess of 
emotion from all our conceptualizing, from all our imaging. Whether 
language is seen as an abstract representation of real referents or a system 
of differences referring only to itself, it seems to have forgotten the emotional
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necessity of bringing together fragments of feeling to create a “moment,” what
Whitehead called the concrescence of the occasion. Hillman refers directly
to Whitehead in a startling passage calling for the mythically real moment:
I wish Whitehead were still around to take down structuralism and the 
deconstruction that follows it, because they continue this indifference 
to the actual occasions of the phenomenal world—this image here that 
is immediately presented and not some other—reducing what is as 
forts et origo to abstract structural relations or troping it 
transformatively into something else. Anything can be anything. 
Polysemous has come to mean polyethylene, polyurethane, utter 
plasticity—Proteus become a monster, the changeability of form 
become a mockery of form. All relations: a web of endless intricate 
relations—and no spider. (1989a, p. 225)
The spider here may be the response, the overwhelming emotional 
response, to the presumably sudden and direct experience of a polytheistic 
real, a phantasma of images in which “I” was as minor a player as the 
background scream in a nightmare. This response and the memory of it may 
be the beginning of mythic aw areness—certainly more memor than techne.
Early mythographers began their investigations with the powerful 
monotheistic assumption of the self. Everything that was not a product of 
immediate perception was understood to have no objective existence, and 
the only possible a priori was the arithmetical structure of reason, itself.
Mythic explanations and divine presences were and are understood to be 
mere products of imagination projected onto the environment. Roberts 
Avens (1980), for one, suggests we have it reversed, that imagination is a 
sort of sixth sense which includes all the others: Rather than projecting 
images “out” in some sort of holographic wish-fulfillment, we language-
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beings, instead, receive them “in,” like a wind-chime receives wind, and we
express such images as the chime uses its form for music: “For quite
possibly the primitive had no ‘insides’ to begin with. Perhaps ... instead of
being a camera obscura (something like a box with one single, very small
aperture), he was an Aeolian harp, or wind harp" (Avens, p. 26).
We today, especially in the West/North, continue the internalization of
imagination, but Avens (1980) avers we are mistaken to think we have
repressed it: “This is not to imply that the Westerner has lost or succeeded in
eradicating the imaginative power of his soul: imagination survives
resplendently not only in art but also in the pathetic entanglements of
mundane life” (p. 11).
James Hillman (1986), too, considers “civilization and its discontents”
and the psychopathologies of daily life to be where lived myth has fled:
If the Gods have become diseases, then these forms of chronic 
disorder are the Gods in disguise; they are occulted in these 
misshapen, inhuman forms, and our seeing through to them there—in 
all forms of chronic disorder in ourselves and our city—is a grounding 
act of culture. The education of sensitivity begins right here in trying to 
see through the manifestations of time into the eternal patterns within 
time. We may regard the discontents of civilization as if they are the 
fundamentals of culture, (p. 20)
In fact, Hillman insists that recognizing the “metaphorical necessity” of 
seeing through our inwardness is archetypal psychology’s “world mission.”
He understands that, metaphorically, “inner" and “down” are the places to 
soul-search according to Jung’s well-known dictum: “The gods have become
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diseases; Zeus no longer rules Olympus but rather the solar plexus, and
produces curious specimens for the doctor’s consulting room.” (C W 13 §54):
Human awareness fails in its comprehension not because of original 
sin or personal neurosis or because of the obstinacy of the objective 
world to which it is supposedly opposed. Human awareness fails, 
according to a psychology based on soul, because the soul’s 
metaphorical nature has a suicidal necessity, an underworld affiliation, 
a ’morbism’, a destiny—different from dayworld claims—which makes 
the psyche fundamentally unable to submit to the hubris of an 
egocentric notion of subjectivity as achievement, defined as cognition, 
conation, intention, perception, and so forth.
Thus, that sense of weakness, inferiority, mortification, 
masochism, darkness, and failure is inherent to the mode of metaphor 
itself which defeats conscious understanding as a control over 
phenomena. Metaphor, as  the soul’s mode of logos, ultimately results 
in that abandonment to the given which approximates mysticism.
The metaphorical transposition—this ‘death-dealing’ move that 
at the same time awakens consciousness to a  sense of soul—is at the 
heart of archetypal psychology’s mission, its world intention. (Hillman, 
1983a, p. 22)
This notion of an "unconscious”—which is consciously revealed in 
“morbid” fantasies—is unlike Freud’s repressions and very different from 
Jung's collective archetypes. In this vision the soul reaches into the 
dayworld through us, yet it remains steeped in the beyond of death. This 
metaphoric unconscious sounds much more like that suggested by Lacan 
(1977) who speaks of our subjective mode of knowing simultaneously 
creating an un-knowing, so our saying is always divisive and our knowledge 
never totalizable: The light imparted by our speech must also create a 
shadow. It is this metaphoric and metamorphic moving into shadow that 
reveals Hillman’s (1983a) path to a  shady sort of enlightenment:
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The perspective darkens with a deeper light. But this metaphorical 
perspective also kills: it brings about the death of naive realism, 
naturalism, and literal understanding. The relation of soul to death—a 
theme running all through archetypal psychology—is thus a function of 
the psyche’s metaphorical activity. The metaphorical mode does not 
speak in declarative statements or explain in clear contrasts. It 
delivers all things to their shadows, (p. 21)
Hillman’s journey into a deeper light is a sort of via negativa. To
penetrate the security of "self-esteem” and comfortable ego-structures (the
literalized mythos of conceptual belief) is to leave us exposed to all the
hidden aspects of daily life. Death is that darkside with which we would
prefer not to deal, but which is always present in the further reaches of what
Hillman calls soul. Myth, as the word, may live us through it or myth, as  the
word, may guide us back to those primordial soul-images. It must be clearly
stated that Hillman’s “seeing through” is neither merely a glimpse of oblivion
nor the seeing through to the light of the “primordial soul-image.” Hillman
(1989a) indicates that our “soul-searching" brings "soul-making” to the world:
We practice an alchemical metaphysics: “account for the unknown in 
terms of the more unknown.” Notice here that this further unknown 
beyond is a more; at the same time that emptying is going on, so is 
filling. In the act of deconstruction there is constructive aim. (p. 220)
§Archetypal Mythology. To understand archetypal psychology’s use of 
myth, the “archetypal" label cannot be left out. Myth’s narrative fabrications 
can be slowed, dispersed, or deconstructed to see through to the primordial
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images composing them. For it is such archetypal images that reveal a  god 
or the flow of a  mythologem. 1
Myth in itself—the mythologem—is not story with a  beginning, middle, 
and end. Mary Doll (1988) indicates that myths are not closured narrative, 
stories which end with a moral lesson: “Myths, we could say, have a curious 
Beckettian quality. As stories that never come to an end, myths build upon 
basic patterns, giving an opportunity to create endings and to re-create 
beginnings" (p. 1). Mythologems become embedded in expanding 
mythologies, which use them freely in all sorts of stories which, again, 
become enlarged or adapted in the retelling. Homer’s  works are neither 
myths nor mythologies but they encompass both. It may be the narrative 
structure and the later development of expository prose which bury the 
mythologem deeper and deeper in the archeological substrata of psyche. In 
this way powerful mythic images become appropriated by forces seeking 
only social indoctrination. Mythology is perverted into ideology, and an 
image of the wheel of life or its reverse, the wheel of remembering or 
creativity which cycles the opposite way—both swastikas2—can be 
transmogrified into the wheel of death and horror: the Nazi swastika.
1A mythologem is a  recurring mythic motif, which, like an image or a 
god, is subject to further dispersal and greater depth upon close study.
2Sanskrit: svastika, a  sign of good luck (Morris, 1982)
240
Jung considered the archetype to become hidden as mythic stories
gained in complexity and in the shifting of perspective. Elaboration
increased conscious objectivity and supported social orders but also
disguised the memory of the primal mythic image:
Another well-known expression of the archetypes is myth and fairy­
tale. But here too we are dealing with forms that have received a 
specific stamp and have been handed down through long periods of 
time. The term “archetype” thus applies only indirectly to the 
“representations collectives,” since it designates only those psychic 
contents which have not yet been submitted to conscious elaboration 
and are therefore an immediate datum of psychic experience. In this 
sense, there is a considerable difference between the archetype and 
the historical formula that has evolved. Especially on the higher levels 
of esoteric teaching the archetypes appear in a form that reveals quite 
unmistakably the critical and evaluating influence of conscious 
elaboration. Their immediate manifestation, as we encounter it in 
dreams and visions, is much more individual, less understandable, 
and more naive than in myths for example. (CM/9 §1:6)
Even in myths, and by this Jung means tales, the archetype has been
altered by “conscious elaboration.” If the early myths were expressions of
transpersonal archetypal experience which mythologies collapsed into
narratives, then “fairy tales” are even more so (Miller, 1976), and so on into
the matrices of the novel, expository prose, and political propaganda.
The notion of “conscious elaboration” becomes somewhat curious
when mythos is understood as “word.” How is it that the form of the original
archetype can be disguised through the increasing complexity of the “word”
which first brought consciousness?
Here we come to the creative force of archetypal psychology:
imagination. To imagine is to do just that—elaborate an image, imaginate it
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into separate constituencies and give a face to the archetype. Imagination is
understood, not as another human faculty such as Jung’s intuition, but as the
formless prime mover, similar to Whitehead’s "creativity,” from which both
myth and language spring:
Language, like myth, originates in imagination.. . .  It is for this reason 
that naming must be regarded as the very essence of the mythical 
process of imagination.. . .  It is impossible to ascertain the age of 
language and myth since their origins lie in pre-history. Nevertheless 
it would seem very plausible ... that they are twin creatures, springing 
from the same tendency to see reality imagistically or symbolically. 
Both language and myth are part of the same basic mental activity. 
(Avens, 1980, p. 88)
In claiming Jung as a forerunner of post-modernity, Casey (1987a)
suggests that myth is drawn from "the transpersonal foundation of
imagination and language" (p. 105), as suggested by Saussure and
Chomsky: “Language is no more a matter of an individual speech-act (la
parole) than primordial images are affairs of the isolated ego” (pp. 104, 105).
Conversely, it seems that imagination when employed by the animal
survival drive—order, growth, reproduction—may also be the hidden force
behind the definitions and divisions we have made throughout the centuries,
at least according to the French historiographer, Paul Veyne (1988):
I do not at all mean to say that imagination will bring future truths to 
light and that it should reign; I mean, rather, that truths are already 
products of the imagination and that the imagination has always 
governed. It is imagination that rules, not reality, reason, or the 
ongoing work of the negative.
This imagination is not the faculty we know psychologically and 
historically by the same name. It does not, through dream or 
prophecy, expand the fishbowl in which we live. On the contrary, it
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creates boundaries. Outside the bowl is nothing, not even future 
truths, (p. x//)
We have the seeming contradiction that myths awakened 
consciousness with the expression of the apperception of primordial images 
and that myths proceeded to disguise those primordial images. How is this 
possible?
Hillman would respond, I believe, that the archetypes are revealed in
myths in which the presence of gods and goddesses (as the face of the
archetype) is central. As narratives elaborated, the deities became symbols
and soon disappeared from the world altogether, becoming constituents of
the non-realm called the “unconscious.” The mesh of the masks multiplied to
appear as  a solid barrier. The only myth surviving is that of the “real,” the
“literal,” and the objective sensory world. Behind it all is the One, i.e., God,
and stumbling around within it is the self, the representational T, which is
considered to be singular. Narcissistic narrative is this mythos which serves
only to augment “self-esteem” or support ego-structures. In The New
Polytheism (1981), David L. Miller warns:
It is not that anything is “wrong" with narrative expression. Nor do I 
wish to take back anything I have said recommending attention to it—  
The danger I see lies rather in how one views a story or how a story is 
used. Narrative form is no better than abstract ideation if it is used 
ideologically, that is, for ego-security. This is particularly important to 
note in a time when story-form enjoys a more than passing popularity 
in philosophy, theology, and literary criticism, (p. 17)
Today, as  Miller indicates, narrative form has been taken so literally as
to be transmuted into the dogma of empirically verifiable scientific discourse
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and into the anti-mythic, anti-aesthetic, self-enclosed world of academia.
Furthermore, we believe we are our stories, often to our confusion in the face
of erratic experience, as literary art often reveals. Miller continues that
if stories are believed to be a crutch that help ego hobble back into a 
modicum of control... then the stories of the Gods may be as 
disappointing as the social ideologies and the monotheistic theologies 
which replaced them. Enthusiasm for narrative-form can become just 
one more idolatry” (p. 18).
Archetypal psychology has looked to myths and mythic tales to help us 
break from our self-enclosure. According to Hillman, we have turned our 
back on the multiple forms of the anima mundi (world-soul), and, as a result 
of pathologizing the gods within, all we know of the world is from the 
obsessive study of ourselves—so like the deluded occupants in Plato’s cave 
analogy studying their own shadows. We create "literal self-delusions" 
today so we can feel proud and secure in our singular “I.” Hillman indicates 
this “paranoid drive toward unified meaning” is nothing but the senex— 
fearful old age— archetype in action. Archetypal psychology abandons such 
a drive, and Hillman suggests there is “merely the method of epistrophe and 
a consistent attitude, but no attempt at overall coherence” (1981, p. 132).
Hillman has indicated the development of this totalized and totalizing 
self may have derived from the Enlightenment inversion of the objective 
monotheism of the West, perhaps another reason why the mythic path is 
seen as a “deeper light” and not enlightenment. This polytheistic path should 
have interest for anyone wishing to avoid a totalized ideology or even a
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scientific theocracy. It may have implications as widespread in curriculum as
background for a multicultural curriculum (Edgerton, 1992) or for world-order
studies (Smith, 1990).
The method of engaging the archetypal memory, called “epistrophe"
by Hillman above, is a far cry from autobiographic recitation. Its mystique is
clearer than its method. Hillman sometimes calls it a psychologizing of the
past; it seem s nearer either literature, psychoanalysis, or even
deconstruction. He suggests not taking the “givens” of the past and reducing
them, but taking them and “twisting" them:
The particular virtue of the psychological mind is its twisting of the 
given; seeing through, hearing echo and implication, turning back or 
upside down. The psychological mind makes the given imagistic, 
fantastic. Hence its affinity with both the pathological and the poetic, 
and hence, also, its distance from the programmatics of action and the 
formulations of the sciences. .. . Where scientific abstractions seek to 
posit what is really there in the given, substitutive for it and constitutive 
of it, our abstractions seek to drop the bottom out of the given. (1989a, 
pp. 217, 218)
This is the archetypal remembering Hillman calls “epistrophe, 
reversion, return, the recall of phenomena to their imaginal background ... 
regarding phenomena in terms of their likenesses” (1979a, p. 4)J This may 
imply a dramatization of the stories of one’s past, or, perhaps, an expressive 
poetics. An acting-out with others—what was once called psychodrama— 
may be useful. But these specificities fail to express the “twistedness,” or
1 Hillman credits Henry Corbin, the Islamic scholar, for the original 
method of fa 'will which means literally, he says, “to lead something back to its 
origin and principle, to its archetype.” (p. 4)
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“madness,” of what Hillman means. Far from the Freudian couch of shameful
confession or even the Jungian/Campbellian fantasy of “awakening to the
myth I am living,” Hillman (1979a) suggests we should intrude many of the
forgotten gods in our re-storying: Pan and Aphrodite, certainly, and maybe
even the god of masks, Dionysos, who presides over the madness of
carnival. Our approach to the Underworld need not be a somber procession
after the grim reaper or psychotherapist but, instead, the ribald reversion to
carnival shadow in the wake of the archetypal trickster:
We follow the clown into the circus by entering a perspective of 
rebellion against the dayworld order; rebel without cause or violence. 
Turning topsy-turvy, we deliteralize every physical law and social 
convention in the smallest things that we take for granted. Through 
him we enter the perspective of the fantastic soul, clown as depth 
psychologist. Imagine, Freud and Jung, two old clowns. ( p. 180)
This is not the sort of activity that one expects to find in schools, even
in advanced autobiographical or lifewriting classes. Yet the “problem” of
multiple Ts" has come to be expected by some researchers into narrative
inquiry (Connelly & Clandinin, 1991). Most of these Ts" are resisted,
especially in classroom situations, and others allowed only in unique
circumstances like carnival. Hillman says there is an archetype with the face
of a god behind the collection of each “I” and each god speaks in a different
mode, some of which may seem insane or obscene. To conjure this god out
from its concealment, we may have to write in its language. This is akin to
dialoging with what Watkins (1990) calls “invisible guests,” though Hillman’s
epistrophic approach may mean identifying with each god, each “mood”:
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Reversion through likeness, resemblance, is a primary principle for the 
archetypal approach to all psychic events. Reversion is a bridge too, a  
method which connects an event to its image, a  psychic process to its 
myth, a suffering of the soul to the imaginal mystery expressed therein. 
Epistrophe, or the return through likeness, offers to psychological 
understanding a  main avenue for recovering order from the confusion 
of psychic phenomena, other than Freud’s  idea of development and 
Jung’s  of opposites. . . . Epistrophe implies return to multiple 
possibilities, correspondences with images that can not be 
encompassed within any systematic account. (1979a, p. 4)
This is imaginal memory (Perlman, 1988) but it is a more accurate
reflection of our actual experience. As a singular self-schema attempts to
deny or forget most of what we experience and even what we do (Jeremy
Campbell, 1989), allowing the other characters in us to speak deepens,
widens, and perhaps even adds other dimensions to our awareness. To
speak from the position of the abandoned child, or the wild woman, or even
the fearful senex is to give voice to what was once only unexplained emotion.
Our experience, according to this view, is always archetypal
experience. Our singular self* is the conceptualization (“to take to oneself”)
of an inconceivable singular deity. To allow myth to awaken us to the world
and the multiplicities of being, Hillman, Avens, Miller, Paris and others of the
archetypal school have made the polytheistic move, which Hillman describes
a s  unavoidable: “The question of polytheism is posed by the soul itself as
soon as its perspective experiences the world as  animated and its own
iThe subjectivity abstracted from language need not be singular.
247
nature as replete with changing diversity. That is, as soon as the soul is
freed from ego domination, the question of polytheism arises” (1983a, p. 35).
Behind and between our rationalizations and narrative enclosures are
multiple archetypes which are phenomenal images. Hillman (1977) has said
that Jung’s “noumenal archetypes” are beyond the reach of language:
Furthermore, unlike Jung, who radically distinguishes between 
noumenal archetype per se and phenomenal archetypal image, 
archetypal psychology rigorously refuses even to speculate about a 
non-presented archetype per se. Its concern is with the phenomenon: 
the archetypal image. This leads to the next step: “...any image can be 
considered archetypal. The word ‘archetypal’...rather than pointing at 
something archetypal points to something, and this is value....by 
archetypal psychology we mean a psychology of value....'Archetypal’ 
here refers to a move one makes rather than to a thing that is...” (pp. 
82-83)
The memory which lies behind all our knowing is drawn through
remembered value and image back into the gravital complexes he identifies
as “Gods and Goddesses." These, he says, are not objective beings but are
(archetypally) present in all our perceiving, so are understood as
effective—and affective— presences within us and within the world:
As I have spelled out in several later writings, psychological 
polytheism is concerned less with worship than with attitudes, with the 
way we see things and place them. Gods, for psychology, are neither 
believed in nor addressed directly. They are rather adjectival than 
substantive; the polytheistic experience finds existence qualified with 
archetypal presence and recognizes faces of the Gods in these 
qualifications. Only when these qualities are literalized, set apart as 
substances, that is, become theologized, do we have to imagine 
through the category of belief. (Hillman, 1981, p. 129)
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Yet, If “memory believes before knowing remembers,” as Faulkner is
quoted in the epigraph, then memory is itself the gravity which holds the
Gods, the archetypes, together enough to provide an inner integration for
subjectivity. We—our sole selves—are the objects of memory. The mythic
perspective of archetypal psychology, then, is a  journey of feeling and
humility. Humility because our ego-structures come apart when subjected to
the “pathologizing” effects of the gods and goddesses. The form of the deity,
however imagined, can only be constructed from the fragments of our own
experience, like a whirlwind’s appearing only through that which it draws into
itself. The resulting wisdom is that we are mere products of the “word,” that
our self-concepts are mythic structures over an abyss of memory, and that
our actions are, in truth, under the sway of many “divisibles.” As Gilbert
Durand (1976) puts it:
in traditional thought man experiences himself as multiple, diverse. 
There is no pride in traditional man; he feels himself “divided up” 
between sleeping and waking, good and evil, angels and demons. It 
has taken all the discoveries of contemporary depth psychology to 
bring the ego back to this modest pluralism, to show that behind its 
triumphant consciousness the unconscious proliferates 
disquieteningly. (p. 89)
This may lead us to the edge of such an abyss, humbling indeed for 
the self-inflated or those with forgetful "lightness of being.” Archetypal 
psychology implies that we live our myths indeed, but everyone knows myth 
means illusion. It is something the Hindus and Buddhists of the East seem to
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have had no trouble imagining: It is the denial of vanity, the awareness of
vast subconscious suffering, and the insight that what
we experience as our individuality (my emotions, my temperament, my 
mannerisms) is no more or less than a collage of mythical images.
The “I” as the experiencer is also in the myth; it is not single and 
unique, but many, a flux of vicissitudes, an archetypal illusion of self- 
identity; it is samsaric and imaginal. The first metaphor of human 
existence is that "we are not real.” (Avens, 1981, p. 72)
It is this “disquieting” journey into the “morbisms” of the shadow side
why the seeing through (or "feeling through”) to the myth or mythic image
must be understood as humbling to the central self-schema, but self-creative
to the other images who afflict us as moods, intrigue us in visual flashes,
cause “beside myself’ actions , or who populate our dreams and reveries.
It is all images to the archetypalist. Or, to put it another way, it is all
poetry, in the broad sense of image-evocation. Since the archetypal
psychologist would not be such were s/he to express him or herself only
mythopoeically, s/he instead writes prose as an aesthetic rhetoric. Hillman
has indicated his own words should not be taken literally but as a rhetoric to
open the soul to the mythopoeic image behind or through the words (1983a,
p. 19). The identity of myth with the images of creative literature is hinted at
here, and archetypal psychologists quote poets extensively to support their
mythic habit. Hillman indicates, however, that myth is the chosen rhetoric of
what he has called “soul-making":
Even if the recollection of mythology is perhaps the single most 
characteristic move shared by all “archetypalists,” the myths 
themselves are understood as  metaphors—never as  transcendental
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metaphysics whose categories are divine figures.. . .  More important, 
however, is that the study of mythology enables one to perceive and 
experience the life of the soul mythically. (1983a, p. 20)
It seems Hillman’s via negativa has proved itself to be a wa regia, as
well: the royal road to awareness. Myth for the archetypalist is not a theology
and not what most would consider a  psychology. For Hillman, such
distinctions mean little next to the possibility of attuned awareness (not
“consciousness,” which implies an object):
It hardly matters to me whether theology or psychology brings 
awareness to our baggage as long as awareness comes. Rather than 
separating the theo-psychic mixture, let it continue. It will anyhow. It’s 
an authentic compound, for the soul itself is just this sort of mixture. 
(1981, p. 128)
Myth is not found in the words of mythological stories, folktales, or
even poetry. Though muthos may mean word, archetypal psychology means
the experience of the mythic image, and this, it must be noted, is as
dependent on the perceiver as on the poet The poet need not be
consciously making references to myths, even symbolically alluding to them.
The mythic image is what is evoked by the poet and potentially by the reader.
As Jed Rasula (1979) says with reference to a line by poet Charles Olsen:
Myth, then, is not a content of the poem, but rather the envoy of its 
visionary circumference. And within the domain that circumference 
establishes, both interior and exterior cosmos permit configurations of 
their powers and persons, allowing us the vision that “mythology is not 
reference / it is inner inherence” (p. 114)
It is the aesthetic sense of the “inner inherence” of the myth or the sense of
an image which constellates our experience which Hillman indicates is the
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“royal road" to ensoulment. Whitehead’s eternal objects, final causation, also
projected their effects through an inner inherence in the objective occasions.
Waking dream s are not all living nightmares, not all pathological. By
soul-making, Hillman at first seem s to have meant a personalized soul. The
personalized soul is not being made, but is the hidden source of the making
—■it seeks to re-make itself in the world. In his more recent writings, Hillman
(1989a) seem s to understand our task to be to bring the World Soul, anima
mundi (which includes my soul), to consciousness. This re-membering of
archetypes is not that cloud-puffy world of imagination, but the life of this
world, ensouled nature presented as  an Arcadia of presences:
At the furthest reach of the cosmological imagination stand the 
animals. They extend the planetary Gods beyond mythical fictions to 
actual presences of vigorous life, there above in the dodecahedron 
and here below, creeping, swimming, and flying among us. The 
universal in the particular, eternal repetition of form, walking 
archetypes, (p. 223)
I understand Hillman not to mean a return to preconceptual, animal 
awareness, but a  uniting of human aesthetic awareness with the mythic 
presences of the “outer” world: The way in is the way out. Even language 
need not be the “ossification of experience" but instead, used and responded 
to mythopoeically, it may even create archetypal experience. Anima-animal 
interpenetration and humanity’s non-egoistic remembering of the world seem
1 Plato’s ultimate metaphysical shape (Timaeus 55c), a 12-sided figure 
with a pattern of animals on it: “A very physical sort of metaphysics here.” 
(Hillman, 1989a, p. 222)
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to be some of the deepening highlights on the endless, trackless, mapiess 
journey through myth and symbol to living archetypal presence—inner and 
outer unveiled. Or so archetypal psychology would have it.
A concentrated definition of archetypal memory might be: the mythic 
and affective associations we make towards an archetype. In this 
formulation, a myth is a  particular image of experience which we 
valuate—charge with emotion—according to its place in a primordial image 
(archetype) and give it voice. The archetype places experience. The myth 
functions prepositionally, as Hillman has noted (1979b, p. 133), to assist in 
this placing and speaking. Such writing would be emotionally textured, as 
well, rich in adverb and simile.
§Loose Ends. In this sense, we do not possess the mythic complex; it 
possesses us. This can be positive—the myth of equality, or negative 
(though my valuations may be culturally relative )—the myth of racial 
superiority: “Myths seem very persistent, despite their perpetual difficulties. 
They have caused and continue to cause, much damage. Myths have 
always led people into the abyss and still do horrible things” (Guggenbiihl- 
Craig, 1991, p. 32). In this sense, the unquestioned myths we live tend to 
keep us unconscious, victimized. Myths, themselves, are amoral.
We can, however, come to be conscious of the mythology that guides 
us. Through studying myths, soul-searching, and, most of all, through the
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mythic identifications involved in lifewriting, we can speak the voices and see 
through to the images of the mythic complex which guides our feelings, but 
we can never see the archetype, in itself. The senior Jungian in Zurich, Adolf 
Guggenbuhl-Craig says: “Archetypes are forces of the soul. They were not 
'made’ or ‘created’ by humans. Symbols, however, through which humans 
try to comprehend archetypes, have been created in part by us” (1991, p. 80).
The other creative "part" is the archetype which imbues the images 
and symbols of our life with meaning within particular mythologies. It is not 
too late, I hope, to point out that as  Kolakowski (1972/89) opposes empirical, 
technological thinking to mythic thinking, so all Jung’s, Eliade’s, and 
Hillman’s  ideas on archetypes cannot be called empirical science, but have 
more value in explaining intuition, inspiration, and emotion: “As is the case 
for everything of a psychological nature, archetypes cannot be scientifically 
observed, photographed, or measured. In short, they cannot be discussed 
objectively. Hence, the theory of archetypes is also a mythology” 
(Guggenbuhl-Craig, 1991, p. 80)
To deal with such storm-centres of the unconscious, archetypal 
psychology has proposed a mythmaking venture: Provide the archetypes 
with faces and deal with them as our ancestors have always dealt with 
powerful forces “outside" of ourselves which have enormous influence upon 
our lives: a s  deities. Talk to them, become them and let them talk. Jam es
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Hillman, himself, prefers those of Ancient Greece, though of gods, 
goddesses, demons, and angels, the world has images aplenty.
The predominant myth of our time, according to Guggenbuhl-Craig 
(1980, 1991), is the myth of progress, which encompasses other such myths 
as that of development, improvement, and growth. It creates the situation 
where behavioral psychologists greet each other with, “Good morning! How 
am I doing today?”
In the field of curriculum, the extension of this complex is the myth of 
instruction, that individuals are storage tanks of information, and that nature 
(or the gods) provides nothing. We can even test to see how much is stored! 
The media continually remind us of the woes for us all when “others” have 
not lived up to their information-storing capacity. Everyone must progress 
further up the ladder of instruction. The more you’re taught, the readier you 
are for life. This is, we are told, only being “realistic.” Like all mythologies, 
this story has a darkside. Like all mythologies, it has seemingly infinite 
systems of justification. Like all mythologies, experience seems to “prove” its 
truths. Memory as techne rules: even art classes have to be justified in terms 
of results.
There is no way out of a social mythology, Jungian and archetypal 
psychology indicate, unless we come to recall the foundational myths of its 
origin, objectively (as it were). The possession can only be broken through 
the creation of new myths: symbols and images that seem to inhere in other
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instincts, that seem to be needs of another id. New myths will be disruptive,
disturbing, or revolutionary, but the archetypalists seem to feel they can be
ultimately life-enhancing if they return our soul(s) to the world.
The curricular implications of such a soul-making necessity are
manifold and richly suggestive and will be examined in the final chapter.
Much of this chapter has been an attempt to trace conceptual memory back
into its primordial images. It has been suggested that the solid reality of such
images return to us memorially in dreams and hearken us back to Levy-
Bruhl’s participation mystique, Kristeva’s (1989) one differentiated world,
Heidegger's (1977) dasein, and Hillman’s ensouled world—where other
voices may speak through us.
We do not want a curricular “ecstasis of oblivion” (Heidgger, 1927. In
Krell, 1990), I do not think, unless in the forgetting of the self we can discover
a more selfless elan vital within which to live. Hillman has hinted at such
purpose by comparing soul-making with love when he says
we go through the world for the sake of its soul-making, thereby our 
own. This reading suggests a true object libido, beyond narcissism, in 
keeping with Otto Fenichel’s definition of love. Love can only be 
called such when “one’s own satisfaction is impossible without 
satisfying the object too.” If the world is not satisfied by our going 
through it, no matter how much beauty and pleasure our souls may 
receive from it, then we live in its vale without love. (1989b, p. 70)
Memory is the substance of culture and requires practice to live its
evocations. Such areas as autobiographical writing, conversation, or
drawing, as well as imaginal dialogues, imaginative myth participations, and
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writing from the “other’s” perspective, are all potential awareness bringers.
Lifewriting from an archetypal memory reaches for a kind madness, a kind of
madness which simultaneously subjects itself to consciousness. This is
autobiographical epistrophe, when the drunken god, or the rebellious child,
or the misunderstood angel, may be allowed an imaginal conversation:
The adventure of ideas occurs already in the tongue itself in its 
adventure of language, that risk of speech, unpredictable diction. Who 
knows what is coming next? But advent is not the future as a temporal 
projection. It is a project of language: in the adventure of words 
themselves. For words are little mythical beings, popping up in 
jottings, fictions generating fictions, trailing their genealogies as 
etymology, making music and echo in phonetics, dancing their syntax, 
perishing and coming to be, more and more of them asking to come in, 
crowding forward over the exhausted heaps of wingless cliches.
Words are angels. 1 (Hillman, 1989a, p. 230)
Most important, however, is the change in lived reality that a mythic,
polytheistic memory brings. Remembering ourselves historically, “broadens”
us, as they say. Remembering ourselves as having multiple centers of self
whose depth exceeds our grasp can only deepen us, open us to what might
otherwise be an isolated, threatening world. But remembering ourselves
amidst the phantasma of primordial imagery, and still being there, can be
nothing less than change at the level of metamorphosis. There is no reason
to assume such creative remembering of the future has ever taken place.
An ensouled world is not so full of insecure, power-hungry senex
figures who glower their way through our short span together. Life is play,
i Angelos, message-bearer, but Hillman sees the world as a message- 
bearing world or an angelic cosmology (1989a, note 26).
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the myths remind us, even if the play may be very serious, indeed. Realizing 
that the stories of “I" are not even the centre of each of our own worlds allows 
this "seeing through"—so similar to deconstruction—of the archetypalists to 
include the masks of others, as well as each of our own dearly beloved 
masks. Dionysian experience in various dramatic situations may reveal 
whole complexes of masks available for the wearing.
We (as a collections of subjects) may not be real, so we should feel 
more courageously ready to create each day as though it were our last. But 
as Gilbert Durand, one of the proto-archetypalists, reminds us: “For the 
sorcerer it is always dawn” (1976, p. 102). The power of memorial imagery 
creates each day as though it were time’s first. It is the sorcerer whose place 
is never certain, because mythmaking—writing— approximates magic.
Myth reaches down into the depth of time behind us, and it has greater 
implications for education in the depths of time ahead of us. Hillman’s body 
of rhetoric centered on “pathologizing” and the “death dealing” journey into 
soul-making have the aroma of the first step of initiatory processes, involving 
loss of identity and ritual death. There is no goal, according to Hillman, just 
as the mystery rites never speak of what is ultimately revealed. Ovid 
understood that “inhering” in all mythology is life-altering experience; that is 
perhaps why he called his famous collection of mythic tales Metamorphoses. 
In this way, Hillman (1979d) calls for a restorying, a soul- 
making of the world:
258
I have come at this from a psychological viewpoint, partly because I 
wish to remove story from its too close association with both education 
and literature—something taught and something studied. My interest 
in story is as  something lived in and lived through, a way in which the 
soul finds itself in life. (p. 45)
Simultaneoulsly, he refuses his own mythic epistrophe for what he
envisions a s  the appropriate storytelling for schools. Disappointingly, he
expresses the curricular view of the educational tradionalist who knows what
culture is, without leaving room for multicultural views or even alien gods:
Which stories need to be told? Here I am orthodox, holding for the old, 
the traditional, the ones of our own culture: Greek, Roman, Celtic, and 
Nordic myths; the Bible; legends and folk tales. And these with the 
least modern marketing (updating, cleaning up, editing, etc.), i.e., with 
the least interference by contemporary rationalism which is subject to 
the very narrowing of consciousness which the stories themselves 
would expand. Even if we be not Celtic or Nordic or Greek in ancestry, 
these collections are the fundamentals of our Western culture and they 
work in our psyches whether we like it or not. We may consider them 
distorted in their pro-Aryan or pro-male or pro-warrior slant, but unless 
we understand that these tales depict the basic motifs of the Western 
psyche, we remain unaware of the basic motives in our psychological 
dynamics, (p.45)
It is strange that Hillman, as a psychoanalyst who listens to personal 
stories, should relegate curriculum to objective story-studies. I feel lifewriting, 
at some point, could be used experimentally as epistrophe to awaken voices 
and bring light to faces we have either forgotten or never listened to before. 
These invisible guests could be encouraged to speak and act through us as 
educated mediums. The curriculum might revitalize the experience of both 
person and world. It may have to move from its buildings. Knowledge, 
according to the archetypalists, will have to make room for gnosis, a  more
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active alchemical way of knowing which may lead to experiences of death 
and rebirth during this lifespan. At least it should be so if we dare imagine 
that archetypal psychology has a form of gnosis to offer lost souls. It was 
Durand (1976) who said: “Being is a call to transmutation” (p. 101), a way of 
being too unpredictable for modern technical control and so not considered 
in present schooling. The bell rings and we rigidify. The bell could ring, as in 
Zen temples, as a signal to awaken. At least according to the myth of a 
mythology of a lost world of archetypal realism!
§Backward masking. I have perceived memory as an active principle in 
the natural world and in the subtle dynamism of matter. I have invoked the 
world of primordial images as a sort of chaos from which mythologized 
images emerged, usually in the form of daimons and deities, to dwell among 
people as culture-bringers.
Mythic images elide into mythic concepts, and language becomes the 
caravan which conceals its sacred cargo of images. The world becomes the 
word and naming creates things, “the one differentiated.” Mythology is at the 
heart of every ethos and inspired narrative discourse provides the mode for 
the keeping the world ensouled by returning it to the illud tempus.
Periodically, the cargo is opened and the mythic image re-experienced 
through hallowed ritual and dance, song and chant.
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Language becomes aware of itself and subjects “discover” that they 
are the creators of it, so the space of subjectivity is displaced within 
language. Narrative appears as stories with a beginning, middle, and end. 
The moral imperative in this closured discourse is overseen by custom and 
law, by the class of priests and kings and by the soldiery of the hieratic city- 
state. Language is perceived as one-way communication from subjectivity to 
subjectivity. Language becomes commerce. History is begun. Time is 
discovered. Individual subjectivities become aware of their personal 
histories: Memory—through narrative and imagery—tells me who I am. The 
world becomes object and I internalize its soul as my own: until even that is 
forgotten and the amnesia of self is begun.
Though time is now understood to be irreversible (Prigogine & 
Stengers), remembering, it seems, is that which allows us to venture upon 
the journey of the eternal return. There is, however, no remembering beyond 
the self which is a narrative creation. The paradox, as stated by Klossowski 
(in Krell) and Heidegger (1962), is that the “beyond of language” (Heidegger, 
1977) can only be approached through the “oblivion of self-forgetting” 
(Heidegger).
What is beyond the narrative of self? According to the archetypalists, 
concealed within language and semiology and therefore possible to “re­
vision” (Hillman, 1975b), is the primordial image—the mythic image which 
seems to have suddenly and mysteriously brought about our peculiar sort of
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human awareness, though without narration life must have been very like a 
waking dream. For Hillman (1975a), memory as epistrophe—imaginal 
resemblance or identity—is the way to recover archetypal imagery.
Existential experience beyond or before this imagistic reality can only 
be indirectly inferred as “Absolutely Other”i (Otto, 1917/73) or as the “raw” 
state of the organism in Lacan’s (1977) impossible real: “the umbilical cord of 
the symbolic.” It may be negatively suggested by the “No-Image” of Lao Tzu 
(Izutsu) or the “Nothing” of Zen (Izutsu). Or it may be nothing at all.
Having traced memory “forward” and then invoking the ecstasis of an 
“eternal return” back through myth to the “unthinkable” primordial image, I 
suggest that the return to such images is nothing less than the fertile bed of 
the imagination. It is for this reason I pose the formula that imagining is more 
a mode of remembering than remembering of imagining. As the image leads 
into the opening space of futurity in imagining, so the creative arts best 
express the mindfulness of memor.
Mindful of this, I shall now turn to literature, and especially poetry, as 
“disciplinary” referencing points to explore the phenomena of my own 
experiences of memory and to provide a hermeneutic for the potential 
evocation of meaning therein.
iHere, less the otherness of God than the “absolutely unknowable.”
Chapter 5: The Coil of Time and the Recoil of Memory
"That a thought rises only by descending, progressing only by 
regressing—inconceivable spiral whose ‘pointless' 
description proves to be repugnant. ”
(Pierre Klossowski, Nietzsche et le Cercle Vicieux. Krell, 1990, p. 278)
§“Being and Remaining...” (Beckett, Krapp’s Last Tape, 1983): Only 
everything remains to indicate the void from which we have come. Being 
forever remains curled around its empty centre, its gaping wound (Kristeva, 
1987)1. Like the black holes around which swirl spiral galaxies, this null 
point both sucks energy into non-being and expels it out into being (Toben & 
Wolf, 1982). It neither is nor is not.
Those in the curriculum field who have been working to recover the 
suppressed memories hidden within institutional jargon (e.g., Huebner,
1975; Apple, 1979; Anyon, 1988; Franklin, 1988; Giroux & McLaren, 1989; 
Kincheloe & Pinar, 1991; Pinar & Reynolds, 1992) or who have been 
developing lifewriting practices to discover or transform the memories within 
the habits of individual students and teachers (from Pinar, 1972, to Witherell 
& Noddings, 1991, and Graham, 1991. See chapter 1) have found no source, 
no fountainhead within the labyrinth of self from which all truth flows. The 
Absolutely Other (Derrida, 1992; Otto, 1927/73) before/outside wordworlds
i Kristeva sometimes means the yearning for the mother’s  body.
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eludes language and must do so. If I am but a concatenation of words, is 
there any use looking within, before words, for whatever it is I might be?
Lifewriting cannot tell what the life is that is writing, it can only use the 
self to express the trace (Derrida, 1978) of its unspeakable end, absent- 
presence, and origin. Gasch§ (1986), notes the “quasi-transcendental” 
status of Derrida’s notions of trace and differance. “The absolute past is 
retained in the trace” (Krell, p. 182). Such a trace is of a past, as Merleau- 
Ponty has said (1945/78), which has never been present. Krell (1990) adds: 
“To envisage such a past, however darkly, is to have experienced the failure 
of the traditional model for memory” (p. 7). Once narration begins, the 
lifewriter can only gather the scattered bits and inferences of the already- 
spoken everything in a vain attempt to transcend the wordworld’s closure.
We emerge into everythingness. The senses mingle incestuously. 
Nothing is distinct or differentiated. Everything is no-thing. How is it we 
come to be as distinct entities? Let me personalize: In what manner did I
become an /?  Is the motive force behind this much-maligned, much altered, 
much-abused body my soul? my genes? me?
I remember remembering when I could have gone back. That is to 
say, I can no longer remember a time when I did not remember a time before 
(just as the “ancients” always memorialized previous ancients). They and I 
cannot recall beginnings, or the non-time before time. But I remember 
articulating (in some manner) that I could recall feeling that I need not “come
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out,” that I need not follow the seduction of the smiles encouraging me to eat, 
to hug, to smile back. I remember thinking that I had felt that I could go 
back/before/within/ouf—and what a  tingling of bliss danced around such 
dissolutive potential! I could just shut off the synesthetic sensory bother and 
fall back to oceanic bliss. Oh yes: "Not in entire forgetfulness.../But trailing 
clouds o f glory do we come...” and all that. Earth may “fill her lap with 
pleasures of her own” (Wordsworth, 1807a) but nothing like the 
transpersonal joy that urged me back, senseless but serene.
Unease crept through: Some inkling that / who was on the verge of 
making such a momentous decision (Good Lord, it’s  “To be or not to be...”) 
would not be there for the next decision. Such a thought could not arise from 
the blissful nowhen of absolute memory: I was already attached to the dis­
ease of self. I remember remembering that I would embrace the "inevitable 
yoke" (Wordsworth) so / would not dissolve. It was bliss or being: Why 
choose being?
Perhaps it has to do with double glance of Hermes, the god of 
boundaries, looking both ways at once, to being and non-being (Lopez- 
Pedraza, 1989). Only one "way” chooses, however. With the act of 
choosing, being is aware of being: both ways becomes duplicitous.
The secret bliss transmogrifies into omnivorous horror. I fear I will be 
lost. The terror stalks when the senses darken and desperately I seek to 
sunder identity from its unspeakable source. One flees into the world, but it is
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a chaos of multiple selves in such action which is expressed by Beckett in his
possibly autobiographical novella, Company (1980):
What visions in the dark of light! Who exclaims thus? Who asks who 
exclaims, What visions in the shadeless dark of light and shade! Yet 
another still? Devising it all for company. (1980, pp. 59, 60)
One becomes "one” by entering the stories of others—company—and,
through naming and subtle allusion, learns who one is. There is an
existence aware of itself existing which “enconceptualates” a self from the
concepts projected by the world: “I’m in words, made of words, others’
words.. . . ” (Beckett, The Unnameable, 1983). The words congeal until we
find ourselves in Graves’ “Cool Web” (1927): “There’s a cool web of
language winds us in,/Retreat from too much joy or too much fear. . . . ”
Now I know: “I,” “me,” “mine,” refer only to my secret being: the unified
entity inferred by reference. This in-ferred singularity of differences isolates
me but fills me with the power of secrecy: I now nurture yearnings which will
strengthen my place in this realm of denial. I now know the name for the
bliss/threat of unbeing and I will never forget it: They call it “death.”
I lie alone in my oblong room at night aware that falling to sleep is like
falling into the abyss. I do not close my eyes until dreams take me without
consent or knowledge. Instead, I listen and look in fear—the fear is of me. I
recognize it and hold it to me. There are rage and desire, as well, but they
are the stuff of the shifting shadows behind the always partially open door of
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my clothes closet. They swirl in the darkness under my bed which seeks to 
draw me in. They are not of me.
I hear the voices of my parents rise in the next room, the pat of my 
sister’s  bare feet as she sneaks to the bathroom. Silence. Then I hear 
insidious whispers and muffled laughter which I cannot comprehend. I feel 
compelled to an attuned intensity.
Who is talking? More mysterious still: Who is listening? / am the self 
who loves the world so the world must love me ("If I should die before I 
wake..."). I am good. / shall try not to strain into the dark or listen to its fearful 
suggestions in the thunder, in my dreams. The shadows straining for 
freedom from the hidden corners of my room are not me—Not ME!
If I cry in my terror it will bring her to my bedside: “It’s only a dream," 
she will say but I will extend my whimpering in an attempt to keep her longer. 
She knows I am good. / wish no harm on anyone. The rustling, breathing 
dark places are evil and seek release in the act. But why do they attempt to 
draw me to them? /? lam  good.
I am told of death but it is an abstraction no more real than “God.”
Death is for others. I exist. And there are I things I want. I learn to bargain 
with the dark whisperers and they eke out their needs through the subtle 
social sanction of sexual fantasy. The “clouds of glory” (Wordsworth) 
dissipate in compromise: Duplicity. Rationalization. Narrative.
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My secret, private world grows until the day comes when I doubt the 
existence of others. Am I the only one with inner thoughts, emotions, and 
dreams? Why are their eyes always so veiled? My solipsistic enormity 
begins to imagine the world as a  vast test existing only for me. Today I am 
grateful I did not objectify others as only moving matter—the hell-trip of 
psychopathology.
Even Narcissus leaves the mirror-stage (Lacan, 1977) at some point. I 
had been telling Clyde about what I had learnt about the size of the universe. 
We looked at the arching night-sky over the Saskatchewan prairie while I 
described with growing awe the stars that were planets, and the Milky Way in 
which our sun was but one among billions, and other stars which were 
actually other galaxies, also numbering in the billions. Clyde became so 
frightened his freckles jumped and he ran home. I lay back and picked out 
one distant blue star and let it study me as I tried to comprehend.
Of course, I could not. But I fell back—fell before—as the hypnotic 
blue light enlightened me as to my utter insignificance—an insignificance so 
incomprehensible as to be astonishing. I was silent for days after that, never 
able to explain to my mum how I had come to wet my pants at my age. Nor 
can I recall today. The bliss abyss tells no tales.
The years of self-construction again are poised over an action. Now 
my boyhood self hungers for something vital missing, which must, I assume, 
be in the world. The world seem s a mystery, but with a  prize within. All the
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tales I have been told since infancy and the Greek myths I have just been
absorbing seem to unite into an urge to seek some great treasure. School
has stolen the adventure, but now I have discovered a better use for
language than “phonics” or grammar: writing whatever is imaginable,
whatever my fancy damned well pleases.
There is a complacency to self when it learns its script, when its stories
have become memorialized and relegated to ritual. Ah, the sweet
contentment of those who have named the abyss, placed it, and filed it. For
such, writing is always labour at least, and sometimes a serious threat. I
found great liberation in my adventure stories, a liberation through the
limitation of writing. At this early stage, I had to forget who I had memorized I
was, and listen darkly or in the air for all that I imagined I could be:
As though in order to begin writing one did not have to forget or 
otherwise suppress, most of what memory and reminiscence have 
meant; as  though the entire matter of memory, reminiscence, recall, 
recollection, revery, and repetition were not an endless overture 
arising out of an absolute past and capable of infinite development; as 
though one were not always writing on the verge of both 
remembrance and oblivion alike. (Krell, 1990, p. 1)
At this stage, all that “I could be” was still idealized from the memory of
the world with its opening for a hero of one face or another (as in Campbell,
1949/68). Writing opened the world and gave me a more realistic place
within it (than thinking it was me). A quest, however envisioned, becomes a
con-quest unfulfilled when the imagination roams like the wind, unattached,
ungrounded. All the holding-pens for heroes awaiting the cattle call, heroes
269
that will never be, become the overcrowded bins of braggadocio. The dream
fades, and even Ulysses must look for novelty:
Little remains; but every hour is saved 
From that eternal silence, something more,
A bringer of new tilings ... (Tennyson, 1833)
Other dreams come, no longer of conquest, but of a return. The scene
changes. The body ages. Desire becomes a relentless dominatrix.
Frustration, itself, is not enough to keep me going. My attention wavers, but
the self-collection urges me on through my meagre accomplishments. I want
more. I want the beyond. I read astronomy. I want transcendence. I want
out. Yes, drive on. Yes, I dream...
Of driving alone, without luggage, out a long peninsula,
The road lined with snow-laden second growth,
A fine dry snow ticking the windshield,
Alternate snow and sleet, no on-coming traffic,
And no lights behind, in the blurred side-mirror,
The road changing from glazed tarface to a rubble of stone, 
Ending at last in a hopeless sand-rut,
Where the car stalls,
Churning in a snowdrift 
Until the headlights darken.
(Roethke, 1964)
I have become a being fearing his demise, desiring his predominance: 
fearing his desire and (O anxiety!) desiring his fear. I am tensed in extension.
I re-collect the mystic art of veiling my soul: persona. I am one for and to the 
world.
One interacts. One becomes a subject—which is to say an object.
One rationally orders one’s self-tales for immediate delivery, available on
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call. At last, one succumbs to history, a larger totality of one. One seeks to
find one’s  place, to embed one’s  narrative in the Grand Narrative. The
private motivators of fear and desire become compressed, repressed, and,
finally, sublime-ated into the Grand Fear, the Grand Desire. One putrefies in
blandness and dare not question why one continues at all. One slinks into
unity. Beckett, as always, hears the voices of a  sundered soul:
I don’t know, perhaps it’s a dream, all a dream, that would surprise me, 
I’ll wake, in the silence, and never sleep again, it will be I, or dream, 
dream again, dream of silence, a dream silence, full of murmurs, I 
don’t know, that’s all words, never wake, all words, there’s nothing 
else, you must go on, that’s all I know, they’re going to stop, I know that 
well, I can feel it, they’re going to abandon me, it will be the silence, for 
a moment, a  good few moments, or it will be mine, the lasting one, that 
didn’t last, that still lasts, it will be I, you must go on, I can’t go on, you 
must go on, I’ll go on, you must say words, as  long as there are any, 
until they find me, until they say me, strange pain, strange sin, you 
must go on, perhaps it’s  done already, perhaps they have said me 
already, perhaps they have carried me to the threshold of my story, 
before the door that opens on my story, that would surprise me, if it 
opens, it will be I, it will be the silence, where I am, I don’t know, I’ll 
never know, in the silence you don’t know, you must go on, I can’t go 
on, I’ll go on. (The Unnameable, 1983, pp. 190, 191)
§Seif-Shapes. From the "gaping wound” of blissful non-existence, my 
story has unfolded outward bound. It seem s to describe the dream of a linear 
trajectory from the terror of losing the self ascribed to me to the uniting of that 
self with its source in the semiotic totality of culture. The symbols of this 
Lebenswelt, primarily language, camouflage the secret yearnings of
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divergent memories and less sociable selves. The Lebenswelt describes not
just a space but aspires to control time, as well.
Bergson (1911/83) understood differently: “But, as regards the
psychical life unfolding beneath the symbols which conceal it, we readily
perceive that time is just the stuff it is made of” (p. 4). Time not as the
ideology of linear progress would have it, but as the continual becoming into
unpredictable convergences. Bergson (1911/83) believed we need more
than the security of mental calculation; to tune into the “time of nature,” we
need creative intuition:
The first kind of knowledge has the advantage of enabling us to 
foresee the future and of making us in some measure masters of 
events. . . .  It symbolizes the real and transposes it into the human 
rather than expresses it. The other knowledge, if it is possible, is 
practically useless, it will not extend our empire over nature, (p. 343)
Space, the other face of time, also lacks extension into the future.
Extension disappears beyond immediate perspective, as the parallelism of
Ojrailway tracks dissolves into infinity in the distance. Where, then, can I/we
find the shape of my/our destiny? Or is it even possible, as Beckett
worries,hnhgbbbvbv to find “the threshold of my story”? Surely it matters to
what climax my/our story portends?
Can I recall my bliss? No. Can I expect such bliss to await me? No /
cannot. If there is only the “going on,” it is a journey into the same timeless
void which precedes existence. “Timeless voids” can hardly be compared as
merely “similar." What reality can there be between poles of the abyss?
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What can we imagine suspended, bridge-like, between nothingness and
nothingness? All that may exist are what Paul Veyne (1988), calls the
“palaces of the imagination”:
These palaces are not built in space, then. They are the only space 
available. They project their own space when they arise. There is no 
repressed negativity around them that seeks to enter. Nothing exists, 
then, but what the imagination, which has brought forth the palace, 
has constituted, (pp. 121, 122)
Veyne maintains that, as the Greeks lived their myths but most often
disbelieved them, we, too, can hope to find no truth “awaiting.” Life “goes on”
mythically—as if— with intention deeper than belief:
Nothing equals the assurance and perseverance with which we 
ceaselessly open these broad extensions into the void. . . . The 
opposition between truth and error is not on the scale of this 
phenomenon. . . . Even the opposition between truth and fiction 
appears as secondary and historical; the distinction between the 
imaginary and the real no less so. (p. 122)
The irony of Veyne’s last phrase seems necessary to indicate this
existential courage, even in the face of “factual” nihilism. It is in the richest of
ironies that Beckett (1965) suggests imagination’s imperturbability: “No trace
anywhere of life, you say, pah, no difficulty there, imagination not dead yet,
yes, dead, good, imagination dead imagine” (p. 7).
The world of primordial images, group fantasy, imagination—call it
what you will—cannot be subverted by turning from the world. As Jung was
quoted in the last chapter: "The gods have become diseases" (CW  13§54)
and our angels may become demons. It was in my twentieth year that I
awoke from the dream of self to the awakened dream of the world; it was that
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same year that I began the plummet into all the hells the whisperers can
conjure and the further hells a culture without wisdom can devise.
Post-transcendence, I find myself signed up on the grand tour of
“maturity.” Freud’s “reality principle” kicks in and I can now put away the
illusions of childhood for the real illusions of adulthood. But our
scientific/consumeristic metanarrative tells me nothing: I live, I talk, I process,
I die. The well-advertised proclamation is that by identification with the
omnipresent Grand Narrative that a kind of immortality is attained. No longer
need oneself worry about personal memories, about unfinished stories,
about unnameable fear. "Objectify, objectify/identify, identify..." The whispers
are now those of the Grand Stage’s  promises.
I have learned and listened and now I identify personal memory with
historical memory and am assured that we are on the grand train to
revelation. We strive together for given ends. We imagine that by being
certain of our facts we may control our destiny. Even my life story becomes
literalized as a resume, memorized for easy identification. Lifewriting
becomes recitation.
Does knowing the truth—as in a chronicle—add to our awareness in
the present? Not according to Veyne:
But on rare occasions it happens that a bend in the road permits the 
travelers to look back and see a long stretch of the road and all its 
zigzags. . .  . This retrospective vision speaks truly, but it does not make 
the road any more false, since the road could not be true. . .  . Could 
this be because I wrote this book in the country? I was envying the 
placidity of the animals, (p. 128)
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To catch an accurate backward glance reveals only the illusion of our 
sense of controlled direction. The crazy mesh of “roads” behind reveals only 
present bewilderment. Veyne seem s to prefer the “placidity of animals” to a 
human mind carrying on in delusion, forgetting that "The time has been, that, 
when the brains were out, the man would die” (Macbeth. III. 4. 77, 78).
We become listeners only to our own semiosis, caught in our own 
cycles of repetition and forget to remember to listen for nothing. We become 
concerned with righting the past and seeking the chain-link causes for the 
present just as  we predict the future and attempt to make it so. Without a 
sense of presence we become caught in the nothingness of symbolic time 
and can no longer apprehend even a  trace of timeless nothingness, like 
S tevens’ “Snow Man”:
For the listener, who listens in the snow,
And, nothing himself, beholds
Nothing that is not there and the nothing that is. (1923)
In this land of forgetting, the “official” timeline is just that: a line. From 
the womb to the tomb, we march on in our dutiful progress and it is 
considered to be in the utmost bad taste to dwell on personal deaths. In Big 
Story, death is only a  vulgar imagining. But my death lies “ahead,” dressed 
up in marble and dirt. The less I wish to think of it (by, say, working for “the 
good of society”), the more the awaiting tomb drains life of all savour, the 
more purposeless seem my palaces of the imagination, and the more I fee! 
the weariness of the social procession:
"O plunge your hands in water,
Plunge them in up to the wrist;
Stare, stare in the basin 
And wonder what you’ve missed.
“The glacier knocks in the cupboard,
The desert sighs in the bed,
And the crack in the teacup opens 
A lane to the land of the dead.
(W. H. Auden, 1940)
“The lane to the land of the dead” or “the nothing that is” is the 
inevitable result of living a linear narrative. We have no preconceptual 
memory to postconceptually project. Try as we might, we do not remember 
how to die. Certain religions, of course, indicate that dogmatic transgression 
makes a difference in the afterlife— “Heaven or Hell, baby”—or in the 
metempsychosis into the next life, but such results are very much their story.
Our pseudo-scientific metanarrative position seems to be that death is 
simply one character’s departure from the grander story. Death may be a 
place or state, but that state must be inalterable and final (in one way or 
another), so it is certainly unconscionable. Whether ethereal gratification (for 
all) or oblivion (across the board) or spiritual transmigration (automatic), the 
metanarrative message is: Life has nothing to do  with death.
We are here (but do not remember how) and our private existence 
does not matter in the slightest, except as it impacts on Big Story. My own 
story can be nothing more than “a tale told by an idiot” (Macbeth. V. 5. 26,27). 
What possible purpose, then, for autobiography in education, for research in 
teachers’ stories, for lifewriting? One’s appearance on the stage of time is so
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brief and meaningless, in itself, that it must be asked whether teaching, itself,
has any purpose other than the furtherance of the larger goals of society,
however they may be perceived.
All this alters as my vision of a  life becomes shapeshifted. Is a life a
meaningless round, a meaningless line, or a  shifting palace? What is the
shape of a  life? What is the shape of this life?
After saying each life has “its own particular delineation, its distinctive
form and direction, its own ’teleological unity’,” thus suggesting a  line, Jam es
Olney (1972) admits that, finally, “no one can foredraw the exact shape of
destiny.” Our experience in the life surrounding us, on the other hand, where
presumed self meets presumed self (and they elide into unheard harmonies
and imperceptible presences) Olney describes more as a ripple effect:
The self of each of us, that one source at which we experience life, is 
surrounded by a complex and sometimes, no doubt, bewildering 
series of concentric circles: those greater and greater abstractions 
derivable from the single concretion and the final reality of individual 
being, (p. 326)
The circular shape of life has been assumed by our species since we 
were driven to periodic rituals of cosmic renewal (Eliade, 1954, 1963). Since 
Gilgamesh sought eternal life, narratives of the hero’s journey created the 
individual quest, described by Joseph Campbell (1949/68) a s  beginning with 
“The Call” and ending with “The Return," a  circle despite the changes to the 
adventurer. Many have considered the seeker's journey as an archetype of 
everyperson’s life-joumey, and sometimes beyond life (e.g. Henderson &
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Oakes, 1963; van der Leeuw, 1950/64). In the latter case, the circle must not 
be understood as inevitable, for would-be heroes are sometimes overcome 
by the trials and the temptations of the quest—one of the greatest threats 
being forgetfulness of purpose, as on the island of the lotus-eaters or 
drinking from the waters of Lethe.
Conversely, Heidegger and Hillman have been interpreted as having 
the similar project of forgetting or seeing-through the heroic ego as a kind of 
soul-making journey to nowhere (Avens, 1982). Mary Doll (1988) also 
understands Beckett’s central characters to be an inversion of the heroic ego: 
“Beckett’s quest by male questers begins a far more difficult task for modern 
consciousness—the task of undoing the ego in an attempt to rediscover the 
soul, or psyche” (p. 20).
In either case, the wonderful faith remains that a lifetime of individual
integration, or egoistic disintegration, affects the whole (“we go through the
world for the sake of its soul-making...” Hillman, 1989b, p. 70) and radiates
Olney’s “concentric circles,” which Roethke (1964) expresses this way:
The pure serene of memory in one man—
A ripple widening from a single stone 
Winding around the waters of the world.
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§An Ectoplasm ic L istener? Much depends on the interpretation of that
“single stone” or the sense of memory here employed. The individual self
and even “mind” are seen as linguistic constructions by phenomenologists,
semiologists, and by narrative theorists:
If we believe so strongly in such an internal subject it is perhaps 
because we have imagined such an entity to exist; we were either told, 
or somehow been misled by, stories and theories that posit such an 
ethereal being. (Kerby, 1991, p. 1)
This position should not be seen as validating the Grand Narratives
over the “pure serene of memory, ” I do not think. Even here, the imaging
power of the soul may have primacy. The self the world gave me took the
burden of my desire and the shadow of my soul. I experience that self in
isolation but can also listen to its mutually formative dialogue with the
world—the circle of mutual interpretations, a s  Kirby (1991) explains:
In hermeneutics this circular dialectic (which need not be construed as 
a vicious circle) is seen as one of parts and wholes: the parts can be 
understood only in relation to the whole they comprise, and vice versa. 
In light of this insight we are perhaps justified in concluding that it is 
especially through the unifying action of narration that temporal 
expanses are given meaning, (p. 3)
If my self is indeed comprised of and in  narratives, then my lifewriting 
must powerfully affect that self and its compositional memories; and if that 
self is so affected, then so must be the whole which shares the hermeneutic 
circle with that self. Does this imply that the memorializations of the whole 
are also somehow altered?
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Lifewriting or an artistic representation can never enconceptualate a
self or the truth of life. / live a story, lam  creating my story—tragic, nihilistic,
or mutant—right here before you. But there are larger circles of stories
around me. The occasions of existence (Whitehead, 1978) expand my
memories and my potential for further action. Much of this action enmeshes
my being with those of others, like expanding ripples from thrown
stones—meeting, overlapping, yet still retaining individual patterns.
I was deceived from the beginning when I learned "I” and imagined I
was alone in my private sphere of awareness. I did not know that this was
part of my cultural heritage—the myth of the individual. I did not know my
desires and fears were so obvious to others and so shared with them, their
form given in language.
I find I am both listener and teller. The teller summarizes: Seif is
constituted in and through relations with others. Relations are culturally
determined. Culture’s form is narrative, bu ilt with language. Memory takes
form through narrative. Self takes form through memory. Self as persona is
a linguistic construct adapted to cultural demands. Culture, language, and
self are sublimations/expressions o f desire (or, more nicely, concern).
Lifewriting—written narrative—is relational as well as being self-constitutive:
Either as  participant or as an observer, a s  one who possesses limited 
or complete knowledge, the narrator cares. Even though he may 
know all and observe from the extreme edge of the text, the narrator 
remains focused on the textual world and is concerned about the 
outcome of the events occurring there. (Richardson, 1989, p. 42)
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My complacent self can hear only my own recitations and those of the
world which augment them. I do not write complacently for I write toward a
deferred position which listens for my words. This lifewriter, here on paper, is
has another memory entirely than he who watches TV or chats over coffee;
but the being who listens may not attain to the attributes of being at all,
especially the necessary levee of (active) memory. As I write, I may
approach this waiting silence and find my words forgetting me. Maslow
(1973) has observed that
the creative person, in the inspirational phase of the creative furor, 
loses his past and his future and lives only in the moment. He is all 
there, totally immersed, fascinated and absorbed in the present, in the 
current situation, in the here-now, with the matter-in-hand.. . .  This 
ability to become ‘lost in the present’ seems to be a sine qua non for 
creativeness of any kind. But also certain prerequisites of 
creativeness—in whatever realm—somehow have something to do 
with this ability to become timeless, selfless, outside of space, of 
society, of history, (p. 58)
Perhaps this “timelessness” of creativity is the result of becoming 
attuned to that listening non-presence who recedes as I approach. I could 
not write anything without an uncertain teleology, but that timelessness which 
draws existence from me-in-time could not do so without that self-in-time.
The unnameable at either end of life (or so we linearly imagine) 
cannot possibly in itself attend to harmonics of being (or so I imagine). The 
unnameable as an empty centre from which being arises and to which it 
returns (or so we circularly imagine) is always present as unnameable: “The 
hidden harmony is stronger than the visible” (Herakleitos. In Freeman, p. 28).
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To perceive the harmony, however, to be attuned to its pre/post 
primordial/teleological presence requires a trace of self to remain “outside" or 
somehow apart from the circle of the recollected, social self. This revenant is 
in a  “position” of silence, solitude, and attunement (atonement?). This is a 
“transparent” self which needs its social subjectivity only to express the 
“hidden harmony” in whatsoever way it may dream fit (including using the 
memories of the recollected self as an instrument, as it were). Does this 
ectoplasmic listener have awareness which goes far beyond its original self­
structure (though its expression, if it choose to have one, could not)? Forever 
in company, real or imagined, the listener cannot be heard, but the self must 
forgo distraction to attune to it: “The capacity to be alone thus becomes 
linked with self-discovery and self-realization; with becoming aware of one's 
deepest needs, feelings, and impulses. ” (Storr, 1988, p. 21)
This ghostly, timeless self-silence—a silence which listens—seems to 
draw from the creations, repetitions and memories of time but is not drawn (of 
itself) into the prison of time. This Absolutely Other must be of the same void 
within memory I had morbidized under the grim concept of death. 1 But 
concepts are in time, and are real. With a concept like death before us, no
lOf course, the concept of death can always be reduced simply to mutual 
concern: “To use death to justify narrative, however, is to appeal to a matter of 
broad and, as  it were, democratic interest. Here the authority of narrative, 
hence that of those who interpret narrative, rests not on skepticism—or, finally, 
on death itself—but rather on the number of human beings who acknowledge 
death as their concern" (Robbins, 1992, p. 49).
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wonder we seek to control the future! But what I had called death is Other
and not conceivable. It is altarity i here implied in Mark Taylor’s (1987)
discussion of the French philosopher, Maurice Blanchot:
Blanchot stresses the unsettling interplay of time and death. Being, 
which is never present as such, is a tendency toward I'a-venir. From 
this point of view, being is a being-toward “the nonarrival of that which 
comes toward.” By interpreting the absolute future, which approaches 
without arriving, in terms of “death and dying," Blanchot is led to an 
unexpected conclusion. If death only approaches, I (or the I) never 
die. “One never dies now,” Blanchot points out, “one always dies later, 
in the future—in a future that is never actual, that cannot come except 
when everything will be over and done. And when everything is 
accomplished, there will be no more present: the future will again be 
past.” . . .  The impossibility of death does not mean that life is eternal. 
To the contrary, the silence of Midnight is the speechless tolling of le 
glas that echoes in and through all things and every one. The 
impossibility of death is the “non-event” in which the Impossible itself 
draws near. ( pp. 242, 243. Blanchot quoted from The Space of 
Literature.)
I could say I have eased away from the sales pitch of Big Story by 
changing my relationship to death. But it is not at all clear that any sort of 
relationship can be said to exist with an Absolute Other that cannot be said, 
in itself, to exist! I have found that both silent reverie (back) and creative 
action (toward) involve large doses of anxiety because of the uncertainty of 
relating to anything.
Jorge Luis Borges (1992) attempts to write from the position of the 
silent other but finds only uncertainty and a sense of inevitable appropriation:
i“Altarity" is Taylor’s neologism whose suggestions are complex, but the 
mingling of “alterity” with the silent awe evoked by “altar” may suffice.
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I tried to to free myself from him and went from the mythologies of 
the suburbs to the games with time and infinity, but those games 
belong to Borges now and I shall have to imagine other things.
Thus my life is a flight and I lose everything and everything belongs 
to oblivion, or to him.
I do not know which of us has written this page. (p. 41)
Can one be the silent other, even to oneself? The active imagination, 
the active listener, the active memory: all imply action in the here and 
now—the eternal present—not passive adsorption in the self-affirming 
narratives offered by the culture-industry or in complacent relationships. 
Ginette Paris (1990) connects the active memory to the prenarrative image 
as the relation between the goddess Memory and her daughters, the Muses 
of the arts:
It’s an active memory which breaks into consciousness through 
archetypes, dreams and myths, fantasies, symbols and artistic work.... 
But it is not just of the past, a taped recording; it is constructive, 
evocative, poignant, and the beginning of musing as Mnemosyne was 
the mother of the Muses, (p. 121)
This “musing” is akin to reverie and has for its material all the 
microversalsi of memory. The hint here is that creative action—possible only 
with a non-self-centered memory—may take one through the portals of fear 
and desire, take one beyond the finitude of the socially-constructed subject, 
take one into the realms of microversals piercing past and future. Bachelard
1 Microversals as opposed to universals: all the discrete and discordant 
phenomena of past existence and perhaps existing unbound in the future as 
well. They suggest Whitehead’s eternal objects but also space/time- 
independent “quantum fluctuations” (Toben & Wolf, 1982).
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(1987) pierces my verbosity: “Poetic images condense infinite meanings in 
elliptic associationsi' (p. 28).
Poetic reverie seems to take the particular phenomena of existence 
(and this means phenomena remembered, if perception is understood as 
time-delayed through memory) and folds them back upon themselves in 
“elliptic associations.” Lifewriting—since we all have lives, no matter how 
limited the attention our living may receive—must be one of the first motions 
toward such reverie. Lifewriting may attain to a reverie which finds the 
archetypal past projected into the future as epistrophe: a resembling or re­
assembling or dissembling. Or, as Taylor (1987) interprets Nietzsche, as 
repetition:
In repetition, the past that is never present is reversed and appears as 
the future that is always deferred. The guise of this future is death. 
Death ... is the present absence or absent presence that forms the 
ever approaching-receding horizon of human experience. The 
“beyond” of death opens with repetition, (p. 96)
A folding-back or elliptic association is not merely a repetition,
however. It suggests the power to (ap)perceive through attuned memory.
The (ap)perceiver must be a self whose centre has been replaced (through a
kind of death) by a shifting (and shifty) transparency. In such “ecstasis,”
Heidegger infers that “for the most part we are our own having-been” (quoted
earlier, in Krell, p. 331). The “creative core” is nowhere and no-thing and so
everywhere and all.
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§Experiential Excursus. We all sat around the cabin waiting. Setsuko 
glanced at Jarot from time to time, hopefully, it seemed. She rose and looked 
out into through the sheltering conifers down toward Nanoose Bay then 
sighed and returned to her mat. Jarot sat splayed—hands on the floor, legs 
akimbo—against the log walls. He glanced up suddenly at regular intervals, 
looking about nervously, then reverted to stillness, eyes inward. Was he 
worried about the effects of our ingestion, or that there would be no effects at 
all? Jake sat with his long limbs curled around himself, poking listlessly 
through the dust on the plank floor with a twig he had found among the 
firewood. His red-rimmed eyes looked especially withdrawn framed by his 
wild hair and the thick black beard covering the rest of his face. When would 
it arrive? How would it arrive? Was it already present?
So strange to begin my excursus with a description, yet so natural to 
the introduction to a narrative. It’s  all there: I see it in my mind’s eye as I 
survey the room as though I were there in my twentieth year, though no else 
will ever see the pictures of my words. Me and three others, shifting 
positions, looking about, scratching ourselves absently. Sniffing ...
“We’re monkeys!” I exploded. “We’re all monkeys!”
The hair on the back of my head literally stood on end as the 
realization from some incomprehensible centre within me rushed up my 
spine and burst over me. It’s  not that I didn’t know it before, but now I saw it: 
We were four monkeys—groping, scratching, sniffing, and waiting.
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I have no idea why it seemed such a wonderful insight; the others 
were less than profoundly impressed. “Yeah, so what?” Jarot asked.
Setsuko, who usually encouraged all Jarot’s thoughts, looked less than 
comfortable with my pronouncement.
Only Jake studied his thin, hairy paw, twisting it experimentally, and 
agreed with amusement: “Jeez, we sure are."
We talked about it forawhile, Setsuko wanting to know if that was "all” 
we were. My astonishment filled the room but I clearly did not have the 
words to convey it. The conversation dwindled and I felt deflated. I went 
around to each person in turn attempting to get them to feel “the air rise" 
when we talked together and to feel it fall when we abruptly ceased. In each 
case, as soon as we ceased our dialogue, I felt myself fall back into a kind of 
torpor—an animal darkness? I pondered on monkeydom and language as I 
settled back in my place. Then it came from the other “direction."
I felt something opening up just above my head. As it expanded, a 
tingling joy began to seep from me toward it. Simultaneously, my thoughts 
began a rapid-fire attack to prevent me from going into this “something." I 
tried to tell the other three that something very powerful was happening, that I 
knew it was good—even wonderful—but I wasn’t sure I should let go and go 
into it. They all had some response but I recall them mainly looking 
disinterested. Jarot even seemed angry. Setsuko wanted to know what “it” 
was. Jake wanted to know what held me back.
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What held me back were all the “what ifs” constructed in language. I 
felt as if this ecstatic opening would change me forever. It might mean 
insanity. It might mean an embarrassing effusion of love for my friends. It 
might be my death. It might... Even attempting to explain slowly closed the 
circular opening in the air. Words, themselves, sealed the crack in the egg. 
No one understood me anyway.
Even now I feel like someone attempting to put the images of his most 
important night dreams into words, knowing in advance how boring and 
foolish such experiences seem in ordinary parlance. D. T. Suzuki (1964), the 
Zen interpreter, has put it this way: “Language deals with concepts and 
therefore what cannot be conceptualized is beyond the reach of language. 
When language is forced, it gets crooked, which means that it becomes 
illogical, paradoxical, and unintelligible from the point of view of ordinary 
usage of language or by the conventional way of thinking" (p. 182).
We had a pleasant day, built of our fantasies of what “a trip” ought to 
be. We built a bonfire on the beach, made neat sparks and spun fiery logs. 
And got further confused in the tangle of relationships: Setsuko thought she 
was following a heroic Jarot. Jake thought Setsuko was the most beautiful 
Japanese doll in the world. There was little evidence of what Jarot thought. I 
could think of nothing but what had touched me, opened then closed, yet, no 
matter how hard I tried, I could not imagine what my alternative had been: 
“Concrete experiences are valued more than mere conceptualization.
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Language is secondary. In Zen, consciousness in its ordinary scientific 
sense has no use; the whole being must come forward” (Suzuki, p. 179).
The very next day we invited in a far more potent guest brought by Bill 
and Jim, the two American hippies who lived in the big cabin up the hill. 
Returning from one of their regular excursions across the border into 
Washington state, they told us we were in for a special treat. Two hours later 
I thought the ground on which I was lying was really very thin and that I was 
going to break through it at any second.
Setsuko had gone to the Americans’ cabin to help make cabbage rolls 
and Jarot walked on the embankment talking about submarines to Jim. Jake 
noticed my dejection and asked how things were going. “I think I’ve lost my 
soul,” I told him. The words had just run from me. I previously had no idea of 
any such thing. With the words, I fell even lower, as  though the earth would 
open, as  though I would die.
Jake stood and looked at me. “Don’t say that. Don’t say you’ve lost 
your soul. Do something!” And it seem ed to me he looked sideways directly 
at the path leading up to the sunny hillock.
Then I was running up the path. I was running to keep ahead of 
myself, I think now. At that time, I was running so I could not be thought.
There were thoughts, voices, clamouring in at me from all sides. They 
speeded up so fast the words merged and became feelings—all the private
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little daily feelings that I knew so well, all the feelings that were the being 
called "l."
All those habitual ways of feeling, it seem s to me today, must be 
composed of thoughts too condensed to even register as  such. And all those 
frightened, desirous thoughts came to me from the outside, were memorized 
by me, and became the guardians of my subjectivity.
What happened next I know is beyond telling, but perhaps I can 
suggest a few crooked images: As I burst from the shade onto the sunlit crest 
of the hillock, the thought-feelings seem ed to whirl together all at once and 
become one, like the streamers around a maypole winding their limits and 
wrapping around their central core. I felt an inner “bursting from the shade” 
as I rode the spiral out through the “opening” above my head. It was 
orgastically sudden and powerful, but then I was out: outside of my head and 
into the world, and awake, it seemed, for the first time in my life.
My awakening was composed of no new sensory data. Today, the 
word “awareness" has much power for me because that is as close as I can 
come to describing my state during those hours. I was still my body but I was 
not inside of it—I was not enclosed in the feelings and thoughts of isolated 
subjectivity. I was in the world and of the world. Yes, it was like “a dream 
come true,” because the world had all the “glory and the freshness of a 
dream” (Wordsworth, 1807a).
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In the silencing of the inner clamour (which I had long since ceased 
hearing as anything but “white noise”), I was aware of the richness of the 
natural symphony around me. It seemed that whatever tree or bush I 
directed my awareness upon would come alive with the songs of birds and 
insects. Even stranger was that, on this summer day which had been 
perfectly calm, each tree or bush I listened to seemed to dance and quiver as 
an errant breeze laughed through it. In fact this "errant” breeze seemed to 
follow my attention wherever I took it.
But I see I am on the verge of waxing ebullient with poor poetry to 
crookedly express my hours awake, and among. It was a peculiarly 
internalized and unpoetic language which had isolated me and from which I 
had escaped and to which I would have to return.
Jake ambled up. He saw I was transformed and peppered me with 
what seemed to me foolish questions about the “afterlife” and such things. I 
was in the breeze and was indifferent to his questions, not even sure I 
understood them. But whenever I attempted to respond to my friend, Jake, I 
strangely could not get past two words before I had lost him. “What?" he 
would ask, growing irritated. “What is it you’re saying?” My words were not 
complex. In fact, they were unadorned and simple. But there seemed to be 
no longer a "wavelength” or what some might call a culturally-given set of 
mutual understandings. He could not hear me because I had leapt through 
the enclosing (w)rap of mutual understandings which give words meaning.
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Though I cannot conceptualize my experience satisfactorily, it was the
experience, as  Suzuki says above, which matters. My “whole being” had
“come forward,” not just my narrational consciousness. In that sense, the
experience was transcendent, but, a s  Suzuki cautions:
There is in every one of us, though varied in depth and strength, an 
eternal longing for “something” which transcends a world of 
inequalities. . . . “To transcend” suggests “going beyond,” “being away 
from,” that is, a separation, a  dualism. I have, however, no desire to 
hint that the “something” stands away from the world in which we find 
ourselves, (p. 179)
My experience was transcendent into the world—which has never
been as  real again—not beyond it. It was, I think, a condensed satori, in
which a pattern usually taking years was followed. Suzuki notes that
anybody, modern as  well a s  ancient, knows very well that there is a 
certain critical moment in his life when he is about to start his arduous 
career of spiritual turmoil. When he faces this moment and goes on 
struggling for some years, he finds himself in a peculiar state of 
mentality, which borders on an utter feeling of despondency. He is 
sinking lower and lower, yet he knows no way to stop it or recover 
himself from it. The feeling has various degrees of intensity according 
to different temperaments. From the point of view of satori experience 
this is a good sign showing that the mind is prepared to turn away from 
its old way, that is, from its outward way of seeing things, (p. 192)
I certainly went "to hell” before going “to heaven.” In my case,
however, "heir was also awaiting soon after “heaven." As the sleepiness of
consciousness returned I found I had no conceptual m eans to explain my
unexpected experience. It was, I suppose, the end of innocence for me. I
spent the next years in a kind of madness, seeking a way to incorporate my
“mystical participation" into my self-schema. I changed my major to
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philosophy (which only added questions) and—as though daily 
consciousness were avenging itself—I began to think my way into the 
ground. I did not party and even lost interest in Lainie, my supportative 
girlfriend, though I did sneak some time for questions with Setsuko. I could 
no longer sleep at nights as my thoughts ground on, seemingly with a life of 
their own. No one I attempted to turn to had anything for me but dismissal.
Now, looking back, I can see my hillock enlightenment in a more Zen- 
like fashion as “nothing special.” I no longer pour over Eastern philosophy 
for “answers," or even seek answers within our wordworlds. Yet, my 
experience seemed important to narrate because it is phenomenologically 
real and it explains both my faith in an extra-linguistic reality and the drawing 
power of a concept such as anima mundi. L6vy-Bruhl’s participation 
mystique, Kristeva’s  (1989) “one differentiated,” and Hillman’s soul-making 
all seem to refer to the project of re-awakening to the world as I have known 
it, both as one and as many. In a hermeneutic project on archetypal memory,
I could not betray my own experience in a world of living images by denying 
it, and thus giving all power to the concretizing of conceptualizations.
§Self Deceptions. Many of us, I fear, drown in our language-worlds. 
Teachers, students, and administrators in educational discourse 
communities are especially prey to such subjugating subjectification. Is 
complacency any wonder? Explanation, fact, and knowledge are thought to
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be true now and always. Cultural assumption is what shapes the subject
who shapes her memories. And facts become just that: recorded data, inert
ideas, memories impaled.
Myths and gossip forever change form and content in the telling, and
memories retain vitality only as  long as they do, too. Language need not
impale the imagination unless we live in databanks. Imagination, according
to Bachelard (1987), needs language to find its form and “boast” its will:
How unjust is the criticism which sees nothing in language but an 
ossification of internal experience! Just the contrary: language is 
always somewhat ahead of our thoughts, somewhat more seething 
than our love. It is the beautiful function of human rashness, the 
dynamic boast of the will.. . . The will must imagine too much in order 
to realize enough, (p. 30)
Any writer (even this one) knows the experience of struggling to keep 
up with his words. Yet, words, too, can remain only socially functional within 
a socially functional self, f cannot recall my origin or see  ahead to my 
demise. / exist like an electrical instant between dual poles of 
incomprehension. The language of this self kills reverie and imagination, 
perhaps why some artists cannot bear to have their biographies imprinted.
Language which dances away from precise literalism seeks a deeper 
harmony. It is the harmony of tension between opposites: but that tension 
must be modulated to produce harmony. The transparent self which 
imaginatively speaks is not a product of one line of self-ish memory but is 
instead present in the absence between speaker and listener (even 
imagined listener). Poetic speech is also attentive listening, and may even
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give a trace of substance to the listener. The speaker is the listener and by
being so finds the altar of transmutation, especially when transforming the
voices of one’s past. Anthropologists Langness and Frank (1981) note that
a striking feature is autobiography’s transformative power. Through 
this medium, people who exist somehow on the margins of 
mainstream America and its values have shaped self-images of their 
own design. Among these, blacks, pacifists, women, expatriates, 
homosexuals, artists, political dissidents, and others have described 
their own feelings, actions, ideas, desires, relationships, aspirations, 
and efforts to survive—in their own w ords.. . . Autobiography, at its 
very core, is a process of self-creation. When autobiographers are 
conscious of this process, they can use its power in the struggle for 
personal freedom. For the autobiographer, and for readers influenced 
by published examples of people claiming the right to define 
themselves, autobiography can be a revolutionary act. (p. 93)
Autobiography may be revolutionary, or it may be enconceptualating.
A literal chronicle of my life would serve little purpose here, other than to
concretize my identity. “I didn’t know why a replicant would collect
photographs,” asks Deckard, the Blade Runner, wondering about androids
who have come to realize their “pasts” had been implanted into them.
“Maybe they needed memories” (Scott, 1982). As we hunger for totalized
identities, we wish to grasp and imprint the past. Lifewriting which re-collects
unchanging facts can only seek to record, not transmute. Literary lifewriting
expresses all the phenomena of this life, including its fantasies and dreads,
its dreams and deceptions, its psychedelic awakenings. Am I not lifewriting
right now? Am I not lying to declare these words before you as true?
The most eloquent representation of Hermes is probably the bust with 
two faces: one is turned toward humans, the other toward the Gods, 
thus symbolizing the dual meaning of all reality, the double meaning
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of all speech. The wisdom of a myth that makes Hermes the patron 
saint of liars as well as the God of communication is apparent, 
suggesting that communication and lying are part of the same 
archetype. (Paris, 1990, p. 62)
L6pez-Pedraza and Paris indicate the hermetic quality of creative 
discourse—not in the sense of hermetic enclosure but in the sense of 
alchemical transmutation or the hermeneutic imagination (Smith, 1991). I 
write or speak in this vein to escape the enclosure of my social subjectivity to 
imagine toward a  kind of listening: The speaking which results is a  mimicry 
of the voices of the Muses, the daughters of Mnemosyne (the goddess, 
Memory), who “sometimes tell the truth, sometimes lie" (Hesiod). But this, 
too, is dichotomized as either/or. The intuitive act is more enigmatic, as 
Herakleitos understood: "The lord whose oracle is a t Delphi neither speaks 
nor conceals, but indicates” (Frag. 93. Freeman, p. 31).
But how can I write without a sense of self from which to write? How 
can / indicate unless I tell the truth of myself, my past? Once that self is seen 
from the narrative position—as part of the hermeneutic circle—existing only 
as I tell it in the present, it becomes understood that there is no pre-existent 
self to be true to. Lejeune (1989) expresses the quandary of the 
autobiographer:
I believe that when I say “I," it is I who am speaking: I believe in the 
Holy Ghost of the first person. And who doesn’t believe in it? But of 
course it also happens that I believe the contrary, or at least claim to 
believe it .. . .  In the field of the subject, there is no referent. To a lesser 
degree, and more candidly, many autobiographers have outlined 
analogous strategies. We indeed know all this; we are not so dumb, 
but, once this precaution has been taken, we go on as if we did not
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know it. Telling the truth about the self, constituting the self as com­
plete subject—it is a fantasy. In spite of the fact that autobiography is 
impossible, this in no way prevents it from existing, (pp. 131,132)
I imagine this writing to be through myself. The self I have represented
as being me emerged seduced by the senses and soon became an "entity”
fleeing in terror from the bliss of non-being. Over and against Other, this self
becomes a being inscribed in negativity. An awakening to a participation
mystique with the living dream of nature only returned me to a self hating its
own narrative barriers. I imagined my quest as  a linear journey into
meaning, but now feel it as meaningless concentric circles around an empty
centre. I, like any self, cannot remember anything before my own existence.
However: “Paradoxically, in this land of forgetting there is also a
remembering (which does not re-member),” as Taylor (1987, p. 168)
enigmatically writes.
It may be my remembered memory is a fantasy and only a  wish for the
womb and/or the tomb, as Kristeva suggests. It may be my hours of
transcendence, though actual, have brain chemistry explanations. Life need
not be meaningful. And yet, if it is accepted as such, why do I (and others like
Kristeva and Beckett) wish to write that “meaninglessness”? Does the self-
forgetfulness involved in writing toward the absent listener create meaning
for the "listeners in the snow"? Perhaps the selves in flight from “death" on
the march of progress can deconstruct their memories in symbolic
lifewriting—to reveal the despair of our lost souls.
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Carrin Dunne (1988) agrees that memory folds around a sense of
irretrievable loss. She suggests that memory first began in our early
ancestors as  they mourned departed loved ones. The charged coils of
tension in the “creative furor” she equates with the “passions of the soul”:
Without mourning there would be no self-awareness; the act of 
mourning is the replication of the whole self upon itself. . . .  The 
original folding back or mourning can be construed as an instinctive 
reaction to pain for which there are many analogies on the physical 
plane: a wincing, flinching, contracting or recoiling from hurt. The 
recoil of the organism has its counterpart in a recoil of the soul. An 
unforeseen effect of recoil is an intensification or concentration of soul, 
a beginning of convergence toward a center. In contrast with scientific 
knowing which by cutting, splitting and distinguishing achieves 
distance and detachment—a “cool” mode of knowing—the awareness 
which comes to pass through mourning has to be characterized as 
“hot,” a building up of energy through infolding, a birth of what has 
been known classically as the passions of the soul. (p. 114)
§Labyrinths. So, at last, the title of my tale comes back to me. If 
life—natural life—has a shape, it must be imagined. But, imaginatively, that 
shape is spiral: as in a power-coil or the double helix of the DNA. We act and 
create a past in expanding ripples from an empty centre. We cannot recall 
such an “empty centre,” of course, since it is not a part of memories (and self),
r
but in moments of deep nameless yearning, or Heidegger’s anxiety, we may 
recoil from our natural unfolding to an infolding— that "remembering (which 
does not re-member).”
To reveal this absolute paradox within lifewriting, a story may be 
appropriate. Some of the ancestors of this mongrel soul told the tale of the
298
three Norns who guided the destiny of humankind toward its miraculous end
by nurturing and caring for Yggdrasil, the Nordic Tree of Life. It is their love
which makes the tree spread its foliage into unknown regions. But, as a
natural metaphor, this tree has its roots down as deep as  it is tall, deep into
chthonic regions of the uncreated. Here the Dread Biter gnaws at the roots
and is as much on the verge of destroying Yggdrasil as the Norns are of
furthering its growth. Dunne continues the story:
The Norns give us a hint of the heaven of memory. There is also a hell 
counter-pointing their heaven, and figured by the Dread Biter. That 
memory can vacillate between such opposites has to do with the fact 
that at the center of human reality, indeed of all reality, is a no-thing, 
which I have called the empty place in the heart. The empty center 
may give rise to the most exalted religious reverence—as witnessed 
by the relationship to the Void (sunyata) in Buddhism or to the Debir, 
the Holy of Holies in which stood an empty throne, in Judaism—or it 
may inspire unmitigated terror and horror. We may see the Tree [of 
life] as being gradually healed and transfigured through the 
ministrations of the Norns, or as  being slowly but surely undermined 
by the Dread Biter’s continual gnawing at its roots, (p. 122)
Dunne seem s bold in her pronouncements about reality’s centre, but I
feel confident in saying that I, too, know nothing. The tree of memory is also
the tree of imagination, and imagination’s verdant foliage can only spread as
far into the abyss a s  deep as  memory has spread its roots into it. Ch’iu-ti Liu
expresses this image in “A Tree that Travels with its Roots” (1992):
Separation is pregnant with connections.
Trees are parted by the wind, 
and yet parts o f the wind—but Listen!
Your breath touches ten thousand plants, 
that measure the sky with their own stalks.
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You embrace them into a chorus of the Whole:
they belong to your songs, as your songs belong to them.
The same way shall you embrace your own roots.
In your memory of swamps trembling with algae, 
you will teach your roots to walk into a tree...
O Tree, O Tree, I see in you ten thousand trees, 
and you stretch into a landscape.
You who is at home in his travelling.
You: my first and last 
IMAGINATION.
(original emphasis)
Imagination may be suppressed in the name of “reality” and emerge 
only morbidly or pathologically, or it may be employed—with remembering— 
to guide us to the thresholds of our stories. By imaginative lifewriting— 
toward the silence which listens—or by sharing our stories and visions in an 
atmosphere of Norn-like care, we may imagine the Tree of Life to be 
flourishing, the palaces of the imagination to be expanding the life-space in 
which we commune.
Imagination, however, is not just the brave trunk and the verdant 
foliage. Such imagination disappears like whimsy—without a ripple. 
Imagination directed down—backwards, if you will—discovers the roots and 
nurtures their descent. Instead of the Dread Biter mangling the roots of 
Yggdrasil, it is conceivable that we may take some of the Norn love with us 
and nurture their re-membering. Remembering goes against the uncoiling of 
nature and so brings with it anxiety and dread (but not the “terror and horror” 
of denial). Remembering beyond our personal histories requires active
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imagination, but imagination cannot exceed itself, cannot create its own 
archetypes: “Every psychic process is an image and an ‘imagining’, 
otherwise no consciousness could exist...” (Jung, CW11§889). Even the 
primordial images of "collective” memory are limited by their mode of 
representation—the empirical world of our senses (though there may be non­
represented, intuitional feelings of the “sixth” sense) We may re-member the 
roots, or we may re-collect the debris in the rootcellar of our palace (choose 
your metaphor), but we cannot imagine or remember nothing.
Yet, this recoil suggests a (painful) return of self-consciousness from 
the outer rim of the spiralling of time. Dunne suggests that a sort of 
archetypal remembering—an imaginative reverie or epistrophe—has its 
source, here and now, in that centre which is everywhere. Archetypal 
remembering, creative action toward, or listening in the silence is not a 
choice of self-consciousness but a need of the soul to “see through” self- 
consciousness. Archetypal remembering seem s not to concretize the self but 
to drain it of its refrains and colours and its semblance of substantiality: A 
certain anxiety seem s to be unavoidable!
Forgetting the self but using its materia prima—alchemy’s “earthy 
materials” (Grinnell, 1973/89)—the imaginative autobiographer (or any 
seeking soul) allows the unnameable to glimpse itself. In this sense, 
lifewriting is the fount of all literature. Its purpose is not to recollect and 
“harden” the self, but to “forget” the self and begin a strange journey in an
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archetypal wilderland. As Mircea Eliade (1977/92) expresses this threshold: 
“A strange amnesia, full of surprises—for in the void left by forgetting, all sorts 
of unreal personages creep in and incomprehensible events take shape” (p. 
21 ).
What journey is this that partakes of both the coil of time and the recoil
of memory? It can only be that age-old “pathless path” first ventured upon by
those shamans who dreamt while awake—The Labyrinth:
Since the Labyrinth pattern describes a certain combination of two 
opposing spirals (one centripetal and one centrifugal), in general the 
symbol represents a relationship between involution and evolution. 
The myth manifests a principle of exclusion and selection. (Conty,
1992, p. 5)
The labyrinthine journey of the soul through time is here represented 
by Patrick Conty as the maze where creative memory opposes (yet finally 
augments?) synchronicity with nature. Conty continues, however, not 
satisfied with that image of the quest for awareness: “But is that not a 
prevalent theme that we can find in most myths? This sort of interpretation 
obtained from above does not answer the underlying question: what is 
there?"
What is there? In the centre of the labyrinth? Outside of it? Why, 
nothing. I am not going to suggest that the potential self who listens—forever 
deferred—somehow hints at a kind of “eternal life.” All I know is the journey 
through time, but “Only through time time is conquered," as Eliot (1944, p. 16) 
oracles in Four Quartets.
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"Conquered” may have suggestions of self as self-conquistador, but 
this “nothing” is just that: there’s nothing there to conquer! The question is as 
meaningless as when we ask "cosmologists” what is outside or what was 
before the universe. All there is is space-time; and I would add that our 
knowing even this is because of our dwelling in the aforementioned “palaces 
of the imagination," which exist in "the only space available.”
This is, course, one of the abstractions of Eliot’s Four Quartets: In our
journey through time, we may find a centre of timelessness. 1 By maintaining
a trace (or thread) of self-awareness, I enter the labyrinth to seek the nothing
from which I was first expelled. Using the unique jewels and les fleurs du
mat of my own life experience—and the microversals of time—that nothing
uses me for “its" awareness:
We shall not cease from exploration 
And the end of all our exploring 
Will be to arrive we started 
And know the place for the first time. (p. 59)
This is a return/recoil: Yes, of course! But our crazy trail back has left 
its wondrous music and shapeshifting. We followed our Muses and heard 
the cries and whispers because we cared. We cared from our empty core.
To care in this way is to “forget the self" and allow the empty place in the 
heart to speak. To listen in this way seems to me to be an act of love, and 
just as replete with uncertainty. Our labyrinthine journey may bring back to
i Compare Heidegger’s (1968) transformative path: “a  circular 
happening through which what lies in the circle becomes exposed” (p. 18).
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the void the unique, once-in-a-lifetime bargain-basement deal of a  life—this 
life: the materia prima through which the Unnameable listens: “The very act 
of listening initiates communion with other living things. My own hunch is 
that some such patient listening gave birth to human language, to music and 
poetry, to vision and to joy” (Dunne, p. 122).
So lifewriting in my life and in my classes has meant more than a mere 
recounting, as though some psychoanalytic truth were awaiting discovery.
Oh, such recounting may have its place, especially for those complacent or 
youthful selves who have never yet realized their stories. But others are 
ready to permeate the ego and expand the palace of the imagination in 
which they dream a life.
in my story, I feel that sense of self often shimmer and I await the 
fantasies, ruminescences, and dreads which will certainly inundate. I seek 
solitude at such times, but it would not be honest to say I was alone. As Mary 
Doll has expressed: “Objects, images, mirages, dreams, hallucinations, 
ghosts, voices—these mantic speakings come from the soul. In order for 
their prophetic voices to acquire meaning, however, the viewer must let go 
habituated patterns of perceiving” (p. 14). If I am alone, I am alone with the 
ancient myths, the archetypal presences, which are the shape of imagination.
This before you, I submit, is lifewriting—more fantasy than fact, no 
doubt. Yet it is such written fantasy which I am suggesting deepens and 
nourishes life by connecting us to the epistrophe of archetypal memory.
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Imagining or remembering within concentric circles suggests it makes
no difference whether it is directed forward or backward, up or down, outer or
inner. To avoid building castles in the sky instead of grounded palaces of the
imagination, however, it seems to me profoundly more important to
understand imagining as a kind of remembering than remembering as a kind
of imagining. In this way, we will not forget our primordial roots:
Considered as a dynamic image, the root assumes the most diverse 
powers. It is both a sustaining force and a terebrant force. At the 
border of two worlds, the air and the earth, the image of the root is 
animated paradoxically in two directions, depending on whether we 
dream of a root bearing to heaven the juices of the earth, or of a root 
going to work among the dead, for the d ead .. . .  (Bachelard, p. 84)
By remembering to the edge of our wordworlds, to the abyss
“Wherefrom words turn back,/Together with the mind not having attained...”
(Tattiriya Upanishad 2.9, in Campbell, 1968, p. 6) there is the possibility of
bringing some life-energy to the seam between two worlds (only one of
which can be said to exist). That trace to which the artist of a life is drawn is
what I have flamboyantly called an “ectoplasmic listener.” The term suggests
both the deferment of actual presence and the cessation of resistance to the
“pure serene of memory” which becomes without content. Dunne opens out
the implications: “If we equate the lowering of resistance to the process of
remembering, then what we remember is not only the past but all of time
(past, present, and future), not only time but also eternity” (p. 116).
Dunne suggests above that eternity itself may be remembered, much
like the bliss—later called death—which I, however, cannot. Lifewriting is
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worthwhile indeed if such remembering is possible! Can the listening trace 
transcend life? The paradoxes only multiply when attempts are made to 
encompass the "circumference which is nowhere.” Eternity is already 
forgotten.
Perhaps D. H. Lawrence, a writer from his life's obsessions, expresses 
the paradox best by describing my self-revenant as “The Ship of Death” 
(1932):
We are dying, we are dying, so all we can do 
is now to be willing to die, and to build the ship 
of death to carry the soul on the longest journey.
There is no port, there is nowhere to go
only the deepening blackness darkening still
biacker upon the soundless, ungurgling flood
darkness at one with darkness, up and down
and sideways utterly dark, so there is no direction any more.
and the little ship is there; yet she is gone.
She is not seen, for there is nothing to see her by.
She is gone! gone! and yet 
somewhere she is there.
Nowhere!
The labyrinth contains and is contained by this “nowhere.” Do I enter it 
to rediscover timelessness then return into time, or do I journey in creating 
time, only to return to timelessness? You, the listener, must tell me your 
version. It is only between us that the thread can be unwound as I disappear 
into self-forgetfulness. And it is only with you on the other end that I can ever 
hope to return to myself again: for the first time, of course.
Chapter 6: Coda
through spiral upon spiral of the shell of memory that yet connects us 
(H.D., “The Flowering of the Rod,” Casey, 1987b, p. /*)
We must lay in waiting for ourselves. Throughout our lives.
Abandoning the pretense that we know.
(William F. Pinar, Toward a Poor Curriculum, p. viii)
§Memory, Myth, and Methods. To conclude this exploration into 
memory, I feel impelled to describe how I apply this work in my limited 
experience with classes in autobiography. Vital to any approach to 
autobiography as a curricular method is the understanding of memory and 
directly related to memory, perhaps to the point of identity, is the sense of 
self. My own work has thus far been with undergraduate education students 
so has been limited by the large class size and by the lack of professional 
experience.
To invoke within my students the sense of seeking for memory with as 
few preconceptions as possible I have employed unusual approaches, both 
in writing assignments and in classroom conversation. For dialogue, I have 
been inspired by the work of Haroutunian-Gordon (1991) and my fee/for 
listening has come from the suggestions of Felman (1982) and Dunne
(1988). Learning to imagine myself as a needed listening spirit—an 
ectoplasmic listener—seems to have ecouraged students to reflect deeply 
and speak freely, and to limit my vocal suggestions.
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For methods, my debt is mainly to Richard Butt who inspired me in his
own class and whose methods have been described elsewhere (Butt, 1990;
Butt, Raymond, Yamagishi, 1988). But I have freely adapted methods
suggested by my own imagination and the work of recent psychoanalysis,
especially that of Mary Watkins (1976, 1990).
Early work in autobiography in curriculum openly acknowledged its
debt to psychoanalysis. Grumet in the mid-seventies saw “currere as an
application of ego psychology” and explained that she and Pinar were
“looking at the contributions of both consciousness and the unconscious to
the structures of the ego" (1976a, p. 113). The terminology is frankly
psychoanalytic, but such terms as “ego” and “unconscious” have become a
part of the public lexicon. Grumet (1976a) understood that the
theory and practice of psychoanalysis may also be viewed as a 
double metaphor. It is a  discipline that combines the specificity and 
symbolic ambiguity of literature with the generalities and recurring 
patterns of the social sciences. It is a  bridge between the arts and the 
sciences and offers us an approach and a vocabulary that allows us to 
speak of human development in both its general and most individual 
aspects. Its theory, from its earliest to its most recent formulations, is 
concerned with polarities, its practice rooted in dialogue, (p. 112)
Though she goes on to enunciate her own “metaphorical"
psychoanalytic approach superseding many of the basic conceptions of
Freud, Grumet continues his basic dialogic format and the concern with
mediating opposites (or polarities). Freud, however, was concerned with
cure or at least with control—sometimes his own—and Grumet, at least in this
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essay, seem s to emphasize developmental mediation, if not outright 
liberation.
The basic conflict of the human psyche was early called by Freud
(1900/65) that between the ego and the libido, the latter of which was
considered the cause of anxiety and dangerous to civilized life. Later Freud
saw the ego as a mediator between the id and the social conscience of the
superego. The id, at least in the popular imagination, became raw
instinct—Lacan’s real— and thus a threat.
One of Freud’s major theses was that neurosis is the result of
repression of instinct without sublimation into some other activity, yet he
seemed often to agree with the above libelling of the id, especially in his
understanding of the social role of education:
Let us make ourselves clear a s  to what the first task of education is: 
The child must learn to control his instincts. It is impossible to give him 
liberty to carry out all his impulses without restriction.. . .  Accordingly, 
education must inhibit, forbid and suppress and this is abundantly 
seen in all periods of history. But we have learnt from analysis that 
precisely this suppression of instincts involves the risk of neurotic 
illness.. . .  Thus education has to find its way between the Scylla of 
non-interference and the Charybdis of frustration.. . .  An optimum must 
be discovered which will enable education to achieve the most and 
damage the least.. . .  A moment’s reflection tells us that hitherto 
education has failed its task very badly and has done children great 
damage, (quoted in Feiman, 1982, p. 24. Felman’s italics)
According to the orthodox view, then, the id or the instincts must be
held in check in order to attend to our scholastic duties. Surely everyone
who has been a student or holds any institutional position has experienced
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this conflict, and the successful do seem to be those who “inhibit, forbid and 
suppress.”
I take this as the starting point of the first writing assignment for my 
students. I am not concerned with the most recent research or the 
metaphysical validity of the ego and the id, but I am concerned that, by 
Freud’s definition, the ego is the only complex which has a voice (1900/65).
It has derived its vocabulary from the outside in, or, to put it another way, from 
the superego or conscience. Often when we talk to ourselves in an 
encouraging or reprimanding way, we reunite ego with its source and speak 
to our recalcitrant or wayward inner being in the second person. Somewhat 
playfully, then, I assign a dialogue for them to write “between the ego and the 
id,” the id being given the nominative “I” as well as the ego or superego.
Even more playfully, I remind them of the old cartoons where a little demon 
with the cartoon character’s  face stands on one shoulder of the bewildered 
animated animal and incites, “Do it!” Simultaneously, the other shoulder is 
occupied by an angelic being with a similar face cautioning, “No, don’t:
Never, never!”
It’s an assignment hardly fair to the complexities of Freud, but, for me, 
its seeming frivolity hides the fact that students in a classroom tend to speak 
as students in a classroom—very conscious of who and where they are and 
speaking primarily with the ego’s approval-seeking voice. The assignment 
brings upon them the necessity for the repressed “other” in them to speak,
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even if they insist on the weakness, foolishness, appetition, or nihilism of that 
other, t encourage a  stance which is fair to the id by reminding them that the 
id is a powerful energy-source so it is not being deployed in the wish to sleep 
through class. “The id," I tell them, “represents your earliest yearnings, your 
most powerful wishes; it is not concerned with order or propriety.”
Some would see this as the Dionysian opposing the Apollonian, and 
this is certainly a  functional perspective. Dionysos is the god of masks, 
including the masks of students, and it seem s to me necessary for the 
students to loosen the bindings on their student-masks for other potentials to 
emerge. Grumet does not go so far in her recommendations, but she 
intimates that the id is more than bestial instincts by generalizing it as the 
“internal nonego," or unconscious (1976a). The id, for me, is a  usable 
concept to open the doors of memory and awareness and its name is left for 
others to debate. My class is not an attempt to unleash libido or open the 
storm cellar of the unconscious, but perhaps it may be said that I encourage 
students to remember primal wishes so they may be closer to the well of life.
The classroom itself provides enough inhibitions that nothing 
monstrous arises from the “demon on the shoulder" (so far). It is a  successful 
assignment if a student perceives that her daydreams (as well as her night 
dreams) are manifestations of repressed or postponed wishes. This is basic 
Freudianism, but my purpose is for the student to remember herself, as  a 
perspective from which to continue our lifewriting.
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Freud may wish to continue educational repression and Brown (1959, 
1966) may wish for the unrepressed, desublimated classroom, but I am in 
agreement with Grumet that the teacher in an autobiographical classroom 
need neither be oppressor nor erotic accomplice.
Though the term currere (Pinar, 1974; Pinar, Grumet, 1976) is no 
longer in use by Grumet, Pinar continues to use it for the continuous process 
of deconstruction and reconstruction an architect of self must go through 
(1992b). Grumet (1976a) used currere to define her positioning of the 
teacher as “respondent” and not as analyst, which indicates her belief that 
autobiography and journal-keeping are self-developmental processes and 
not conceptual inundations or libidinal parades. Freud, however, saw 
himself in possession of the truths of the human mind and insisted his 
patients recognize this (Freud, 1963). They were required to accept his 
conceptual inundation and to understand him in the position of “the subject 
who knows.”
Shoshana Felman (1982), a previous student of the late neo-
Freudian, Jacques Lacan, reports that Lacan felt that it is the placing of
oneself in the transcendent position of “one who knows" which brings about
the transference or projection phenomena:
“As soon as there is somewhere a subject presumed to know, there is 
transference,” writes Lacan (S-XI, 210).
Since “transference is the acting out of the reality of the 
unconscious” (S-XI, 150), teaching is not a purely cognitive, 
informative experience, it is also an emotional, erotical experience. “I 
deemed it necessary,” insists Lacan, “to support the idea of
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transference, as indistinguishable from love, with the formula of the 
subject presumed to know. I cannot fail to underline the new 
resonance with which this notion of knowledge is endowed. The 
person in whom I presume knowledge to exist, thereby acquires my 
love.” (S-XX, 64) (Lacan is quoted from S-XI, 210: Le S&minaire, livre 
XI: Les Quatre concepts fondamentaux de la psychanalyse, Paris: 
Seuil, 1973, p. 210. S-XI, 150, and S-XX, 64: Le Seminaire, livre XX. 
Encore, Paris: Seuil, 1975, p. 64. In Felman, 1982, p. 35)
Yet all our lives we have encountered teachers who were self­
presented as “subjects presumed to know.” Of those, the ones remembered 
most deeply have been as the result of a  powerful projection or interchange 
of emotion. They may have been very bad teachers indeed, and the reason 
for their memory is the bitter disgust left behind at their pretensions. This 
leads me to my second writing assignment: ‘Teachers Who Left Their Mark: 
The Good, the Bad, and the Indifferent.”
Having given voice to the other within my students in assignment one,
I now attempt to engage their memories on significant others from the 
pedagogical realm, so they may reconceive their modelling behaviors or 
their aversion to a  particular person from their past who strongly affected the 
way they think and feel as learners and as people. The teacher need not 
have been positive and need not have been encountered within the 
institutions of education. I suppose my outlook is still Freudian here in that I 
wish for my writers to re-cognize some of the persons internalized in them as 
complexes. My outlook may also be seen as Lacanian in that I hope they will 
penetrate their opaque projections and discover their teaching model is also
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an uncertain learner like themselves, or that the brand-X teacher made
himself into one by his insistence on the finality of his knowledge.
My class would also be well into keeping journals by now to which I
respond privately and individually. They would be hearing stories and
opinions from each other in classroom dialogue and getting to know one
another somewhat. Some students resist encountering the “other’1 of their
repressed self. Others resist encountering the formative “others" of the
outside world who have been introjected into complexes—guides or
shadows—within them. At the point where ideas are exchanged in class, still
others reject as unacceptably “other” the voice and opinions of fellow class
members. At this point I turn to C. G. Jung to understand this refusal of the
right of voice in others:
The present day shows with appalling clarity how little able people are 
to let the other man’s argument count, although this capacity is a 
fundamental and indispensable condition for any human community. 
Everyone who proposes to come to terms with himself must reckon 
with this basic problem. For, to the degree that he does not admit the 
validity of the other person, he denies the “other" within himself the 
right to exist—and vice versa. The capacity for inner dialogue is a 
touchstone for outer objectivity. (1971, p. 297)
My third writing assignment is “Turning-Points: Autobiographical
Traces,”1 when I ask the students to pick a duration of time from their pasts,
long or short, and describe how they underwent a change of perspective in
that period. This change may have been brought about involuntarily—
i| take the term “autobiographical trace” from a 1991 summer workshop 
with Professors J. Daignault and W. F. Pinar.
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something happened to them—or they may have quietly seen through a
deception, or made a decisive move toward a new destination, or simply
evaporated some long-standing necessity. Many students say they cannot
think of any time that things changed, but others freely survey the past
ignoring no joy and fearing no pain.
I insist that historicity is of no concern to us here. I tell them that it is
better to let the memory come to them than to simply pull it from the file and
recite it. This step is very similar to the first step advanced by Pinar in the
currere method, where he suggests employing the Freudian method of free-
association to let the memory speak: “The first step of the method of currere
is the regressive, the free associative remembrance of the past. We work to
excavate the present by focusing on the past, work to get underneath my
everyday interpretation of what I experience and enter experience more
deeply” (Pinar, ix. Pinar & Grumet, 1976).
The well of the past—memory—is very deep and leads to the most
philosophical part of educational autobiography, so I will consider that
covered by the previous chapters. It may be enough to note that only Freud
insisted on the facts, that for Jung and for Grumet, the past is shrouded in a
halo of fantasy presently projected and it is in such guise that it returns and
directly participates in the present moment. Grumet (1976a) explains:
In order to compensate for this tendency to judge one’s own behavior 
and to couch those judgments in absolutes, currere encourages an 
"as if” orientation that regards autobiography ... neither as  pure fiction 
nor as pure truth. The autobiographical story stands somewhere
315
between personal myths and personal fictions. The myth is the story 
that permeates a culture, a tradition, a family, a school. We take it up 
and live it without realizing that the story persists only because we 
have chosen to tell it. If the myth comes to us from without, our fictions 
come from within; we are conscious of their creation and of ourselves 
as their source. Every autobiography is both someone else’s story 
and our own. We reread our own stories to find the mythic-fictive 
threads that we have woven through them. By making our students 
aware that their self-representations are not factual, absolute 
renderings of what really happened, we hope that our students will 
assume a more permissive and relativistic form of minding, making it 
possible to review an event or action in one’s life history without at the 
same repudiating it or affirming it. Our focus is the present, the 
storyteller’s view of the world and of himself as revealed in his story, 
rather than the actual event, (pp. 134, 135)
With this view of autobiography as the understanding of the “mythic-
fictive threads’’ of memory, we have gone beyond Freud in his insistence on
ferreting out “the truth according to Freud” to Lacan (1977) who seems to
consider knowledge forever incomplete. We have gone into the structure of
story-making and seen the face of other possibilities: Jung’s inner
complexes, the “others" of the anima or animus, the shadow, and the
archetypes of the collective unconscious emerge as mythic beings in their
own right with the potential for delusion or dialogue.
In other words, if I lean more toward the mythic/fictive and provoke
imagination into action, I have called up the resources of the most creative of
the post-Jungian schools, archetypal psychology (chapter 4). Archetypal
psychology considers the creative imagination to be the principle of life in the
active instant. Archetypal memory evokes figures who are imagined as
beings which guide the imagination into seemingly timeless forms and
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relations. The basis for its psychoanalysis is not science, but poetry and the
arts, and mythology:
The major move of archetypal psychology is that it places itself in a 
poetic tradition and essays a psychology of the imagination, a  
psychology which originates neither in cerebral physiology, ego 
psychology, nor behavioral analysis, but in the workings of the poetic 
imagination. Archetypal psychology assum es a poetic and 
mythological basis of mind. (Kugler, 1978, p. 136)
My final major writing assignment takes license from this amorphous
school and combines some of the ideas of the first three papers into a
product which is, hopefully, both imaginative and positively decentering.
Poetic memory from assignment 3 is activated, the complexes from
assignment 2 may be awakened, and the inner dialogue of assignment 1 is
re-employed. I now assign them, however, an imaginal dialogue. Using the
work of archetypal psychologists Michael Perlman (1988) and Mary Watkins
(1976, 1990), I attempt to allow themselves to sense the many beings in their
one. This is remembering through the patterns of emotion and fantasy
already present in the individual, but now this remembering gives these
patterns identity and voice. It is what Hillman (1979a) has called epistrophe.
Perlman’s  interests lie mainly in the place of the imaginal and Watkins
is concerned with giving voice to the imaginal beings we already subtly
experience. Watkins and Perlman derive the term “imaginal" from the Islamic
scholar, Henry Corbin. As Watkins (1990) explains:
Corbin rejects the word “imaginary” when referring to these 
phenomena because in modern non-premeditated usage the 
“imaginary” is contrasted with the “real”. . . .  By using the term
317
"imaginal," Corbin hopes to undercut the real-unreal distinction, and to 
propose instead that the imaginal not be assessed  in terms of a 
narrowed conception of “reality," but a broader one which gives 
credence to the reality of the imaginal. (p. 4)
In such dialogues, the “I” position is transferred to whatever characters
the person-as-narrator feels needs to be heard. It is less a  making-up of
personae than a recognition that we are always already involved in
dialogues within, that we a re—as a value, if not in fact—dialogic beings:
“Before one becomes aware of the characters within thought and action, one
often successively identifies with them,unconsciously becoming one and
then another” (Watkins, p. 168). In intonations and private soliloquys we act
out "the abandoned child," “the jealous wife,” or “repressed Socrates.” The
method does not seek to transfer knowledge but to discover it through
dialogues, dialogues in which, as  Watkins would have it, we already engage:
Side by side and woven through our dialogues with our neighbors, 
these imaginal dialogues persist. We may find ourselves speaking 
with our reflection in the mirror, with the photograph of someone we 
miss, with a figure from a dream or a movie, with our dog. And even 
when we are outwardly silent, within the ebb and flux of our thought, 
we talk with critics, with our mothers, our god(s), our consciences; 
indeed we do so just a s  steadily as we once spoke to our dolls, our 
imaginary companions, the people of our painted pictures. We may 
find ourselves a s  audience or a s  narrator to conversations among 
imaginal others—others not physically present but actually 
experienced nonetheless. At times we may even notice ourselves 
playing more than one role in these imaginal dialogues: now child, 
now old one, abandoned one. (p. 2)
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Each persona assumed, it should be noted, seems to carry along its 
own baggage into the form of narrational memories. There are such vast 
seams of wealth to be mined from such a complex weave of memories!
I have another minor writing assignment which involves fictitious 
journal entries from 20 or 30 years down the line: one entry from the self they 
most fear they will become, and another from the ideal self. Both describe 
who they are, their place, and who surrounds them.
These, then, are the psychoanalytic traditions I consciously 
apply—going from Freud, through Jung, to the mythic archetypalists. It 
should be noted that I also consciously bear in mind the pedagogic 
guidelines originally suggested by Butt and Pinar and Grumet.
Moving briefly into the area of my general attitude as a teacher of 
autobiography, I do not think any of the three psychoanalytic areas 
mentioned above convey my openness to the task at hand. I do not 
psychoanalyze my students whatsoever, not in terms of childhood 
repression, collective archetypes, or the inner myth. I do not pretend to be 
“the subject presumed to know”—I often tell my stories, too—and in this way 
usually avoid the complications of transference or of students seeking a 
father-confessor. When I respond to students’ journal writings, I limit myself 
to encouraging further self-seeking, but I never judge and rarely give advice. 
As respondent, I am not “Father Freud,” just as Grumet has made plain:
The respondent is not attempting to modify entrenched structures of
narcissistic character disorders, nor to break down ego defenses
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formed to allay overwhelming instinctual impulses. Working with 
groups of students, the respondent has neither the time nor the 
training to participate in the transferences that characterize the 
therapeutic relationship. (1976a, p. 140)
By not being the omniscient possessor of knowledge, I do not
therefore become an “anti-pedagogue,” trying to undo the harm of the other
curricula. I perceive myself as teaching in the manner of Socrates:
Meno: Can you tell me Socrates, if virtue can be taught? Or is 
it not teachable but the result of practice, or is it neither of these, but 
men possess it by nature?
Socrates: ... You must think me happy indeed if you think I 
know whether virtue can be taught.. . .  I am so far from knowing 
whether virtue can be taught or not that I do not even have any 
knowledge of what virtue itself is.
Meno: Yes, Socrates, but how do you mean that we do not 
learn, but that what we call learning is recollection? Can you teach 
me how this is so?
Socrates: ... Meno, you are a rascal. Here you are asking me to 
give you my “teaching”, I who claim that there is no such thing as 
teaching, only recollection. ( Plato, Meno. In Felman, p. 21)
Felman’s experience is that psychoanalysis and pedagogy never
have been separate discourses. They have always had mixed elements:
“As myself both a  student of psychoanalysis and a teacher, I would here like
to suggest that the lesson to be learnt about pedagogy from psychoanalysis
is less that of ‘the application of psychoanalysis to pedagogy’ than that of the
implication of psychoanalysis in pedagogy and of pedagogy in
psychoanalysis" (p. 26). She goes on to explain that both Lacanian
pedagogy and Lacanian psychoanalysis proceed through a  very different
temporality than the conventional linear—cumulative and progressive—
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temporality of learning, as  it has traditionally been conceived by pedagogical
theory and practice:
Proceeding not through linear progression, but through 
breakthroughs, leaps, discontinuities, regressions, and deferred 
action, the analytic learning-process puts indeed in question the 
traditional pedagogical belief in intellectual perfectibility, the 
progressistic view of learning as a simple one-way road from 
ignorance to knowledge. (Felman, p. 27)
The discovery of the unconscious should have ended the fantasy of a 
progression of knowledge toward some ideal end some time ago. If we are 
each understood as possessing, or, better, being possessed by an 
unconscious, then we each “hide” most of that which we know—though “slips 
of the tongue” and dreams reveal that knowledge. In Lacan’s terms, the 
unconscious is “knowledge which can’t tolerate one’s knowing that one 
knows” (Lacan, Seminar, Feb. 19, 1974, unpublished. Felman, p. 28). This 
seems to imply a purposeful kind of forgetting. This is like Freud's 
unconscious but with a theory of signs attached, so that we always mean 
more than we say: “The discovery of the unconscious ... is that the 
implications of meaning infinitely exceed the signs manipulated by the 
individual” ( Lacan, S-ll, p. 150. In Felman, p. 28). Everything remembered 
includes something unremembered which is unintentionally implied. This is 
to say that human knowledge is untotalizable.
Ignorance in this approach is perceived as active repression “with the 
imperative to forget—the imperative to exclude from consciousness, to not 
admit to knowledge" ( Felman, p. 29). Recalling Socrates, then, with his
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insistence as of learning being recollection: "Teaching, like analysis, has to 
deal not so much with lack of knowledge as with resistances to knowledge” 
(p. 30).
Personally, I prefer the Jungian dynamic which suggests that we,
ourselves, are splinter creations over an unconscious of inconceivable depth
to the idea of an unconscious brought into creation through the Freudian
dynamic of repression. In terms of pedagogical interaction in
autobiographical sessions, however, the ultimate theory chosen makes no
difference. In class or in therapy, Jung or Lacan likely would understand
knowledge not as a substance but as  a structural dynamic which reveals
itself in the interplay of dialogue in which each speaker says more than he
knows. As Felman puts it:
Like the analyst, the teacher, in Lacan’s eyes, cannot in turn be, alone, 
a master of the knowledge which he teaches. Lacan transposes the 
radicality of analytic dialogue—as a newly understood structure of 
insight—into the pedagogical situation. This is not simply to say that 
he encourages “exchange” and calls for students’ interventions—as 
many other teachers do. Much more profoundly and radically, he 
attempts to learn from the students his own knowledge, (p. 32)
In this situation, for analysts and teachers, there can be no “subject
presumed to know.” This obliterates the imperatives of the expert not in the
practical terms of the good of society or useful to further one’s career, but in
terms of Lacan’s  idea of the theoretic mode of “self-subversive self-reflection”
(Felman, p. 39). I understand this to mean a  sort of undercutting of the
conscious ego to the use of becoming aware of oneself through action—both
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speaking and writing—with others.
Without the rationalizing, projecting, condemning, bombastic ego- 
centre struggling for control of any situation, one is put into a  situation of 
silence. I do not mean here apathetic inaction, but a silence of attuned 
listening. From this listening silence one’s own voice may be heard to 
speak—ironic and exposed—as that of an “other” attempting to tune in to the 
rhythms which surround it, as  interesting and alien as all voices.
I often—and I think many of us do—become unconscious in intense 
discussion as my words gush forth inspired or dwindle to a confused trickle to 
be suddenly inundated by the inspired estuary of some other voice. Often 
the explicit meaning of such words is lost in what seem s to me like some 
primeval conjuring of unrealized forces.
The water-imagery—gushing, trickling, murmuring—seem s 
appropriate for this listening speech (appropriate to both pedagogy and 
psychoanalysis) as it suggests the flow and intermingling which take place 
when no one is a “subject presumed to know” and everyone’s shared 
ignorance is a kind of mutual teaching. This is an ideal, of course, but one, I 
think, worth listening for.
§Concluslon? It is time to look back over the twisted terrain of this essay to 
see if we can discern any patterns within the labyrinth of paths which have 
been followed. Vital to the project of autobiography in curriculum are several
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questions which, at this point, seem to remain questions. This chapter is 
entitled “Coda" rather “Conclusion” to indicate the journey has not reached 
an end, that the questions produce more questions, which will, in turn evoke 
responses unique to each person’s  subjective environment.
It should be clear by now that I feel one’s ontological predispositions 
determine what type of information will be termed acceptable, what type of 
experience will be termed real, and what type of self will be honoured as true 
or authentic. The naturalistic fallacy which presupposes that only the 
objective world of sense data be named as universally real and true has 
imposed a certain value system on inappropriate areas. It is this fallacy 
which wishes to know the developmental worth of explorations in memory or, 
for that matter, autobiography in curriculum.
Theorists of development, however, do not study simply what is, but 
what should be. Mary Watkins (1976, 1990) feels that children do not reveal 
a natural process of development to researchers but only the extent to which 
they have been enculturated into such processes. She recognizes only that 
physiological development in general follows some pattern. “Beyond this 
rudimentary level of development, however, we find that values organize the 
preferred telos” (1990, p. 80). Watkins suggests not a truer ontological 
predisposition but a valuing of the “imaginal" aspects of experience which 
have been devalued and pathologized in our modern worldview: “The value 
and power of this imaginal reality has been severely circumscribed, and at
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times castrated, by the presuppositions of the modern scientific outlook which
our developmental psychology shares" (p. 173). In her view, there are other
aspects of memory and self to value:
If we follow the lines of development I have been suggesting we find 
ourselves rehearsing not for Piaget’s scientific audience, not for actual 
social discourse, and not for action or a harsh [Freudian] reality, but 
rather... for imaginal life itself—that other life where we are also 
housed, clothed, cared for. That other life of dialogue also creeps into 
our gestures, our turns of phrase, the very structure of our thought, just 
as surely as it presents itself in our dreams and waking dreams, in art 
and poetry, novels, and prayer, (p. 83)
The value of what we do in curriculum, then, may be found in our life 
values themselves. If we value creativity and even pluralistic awareness, the 
kind of explorative autobiographical writing which has been suggested and 
portrayed throughout this paper must be taken seriously.
Taking it seriously has been one of the motivations of this paper.
Some questions remain whose answers must be at least more firmly 
approached. In our narrations of the past, how much freedom do we have in 
the present to change that which has gone by? I am not referring here to 
misrepresentation but the power of transformation available to the “architect 
of self” (Pinar, 1992b) to construct or deconstruct the memories which 
constitute the self.
William Casey’s (1987b) much-cited study of memory’s “thick 
autonomy’’—as found, for example, in body memory, place memory, and 
commemoration—seem s to indicate a depth of memory beyond reach of the 
self-who-remembers. “In depicting memory as autonomous in this
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immersionist mode, we court the danger of losing ourselves in our own 
description, our sense of intact self-identity may dissolve” (p. 289). Casey 
seems to backtrack from this position to claim a “bi-directionality” (p. 291) for 
memory. He cites Lacan’s aphorism “what I shall have been for what I am in 
the process of becoming" to claim autonomy also for the self: “I am free to 
reconstruct and reconstrue what I have experienced: there is no set script for 
my life as I elect to remember if (p. 291).
Whitehead (1978) makes explicit reference to this bi-directionality of 
freedom in his metaphysics of unfolding occasions and denies the possibility 
of complete freedom in the present over the past and thus the future: “But 
there is no such fact as absolute freedom; every actual entity possesses only 
such freedom as is inherent in the primary phase ‘given’ by its standpoint of 
relativity to its actual universe. Freedom, givenness, potentiality, are notions 
which presuppose each other and limit each other” (133). According to 
Whitehead, we are inexorably involved with the past, although the past is 
“creative” in that its near-infinite objective occasions can be brought together 
into the process of a present concrescence—and each objective occasion 
still contains the memory of its own creative concrescence. Casey’s freedom 
“to reconstruct and reconstrue” is limited by both efficient causation and the 
telos of the eternal objects. How free are we to “create” the past?
This sounds like the type of narrative freedom claimed by some 
cognitive psychologists such as Bruner (1987) and which seems to be
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implicit in the "collaborative autobiography” approach of Butt, Raymond, and 
Yamagishi (1988), Butt and Raymond (1989), and Butt, Townsend, and 
Raymond (1990). Memorial freedom may also be implied in the work of 
Grumet (1991), not to seek greater facticity but “in order to diminish 
coherence and the ideologies that accompany stories” (p. 108). Presumably, 
while Butt et al. seek the freedom for teachers to interpret their memories in a 
manner which enriches and improves their professional lives, Grumet seeks 
such freedom to find an openness and receptivity in self-creation similar to 
that described above by Watkins (1991) as “that other life ... of art and poetry, 
novels, and prayer” (p. 83). And, one might add, political awakening.
Pinar’s (1992b) “architect of self” concept is more complex, involving 
as it does both construction and deconstruction: “Only via deconstruction 
can a reformulation of self begin” (p. 395). He remains somewhat murky, 
however, on just what such deconstruction implies. It seems more often than 
not to be a psychoanalytic project which takes apart the pieces of self—as 
found in memories, for example—to examine them in isolation and put them 
back together in a less enclosed, schematized, and self-deluding manner. In 
this, he sometimes seems to consider his architectural deconstruction to be a 
teardown meant especially for certain types, such as “the inflated ego of the 
(often male) corporate personality” (p. 395).
The “reformulation of self”—despite our schematized delusions of a 
solid, unitary self extending into the future—is precisely what is always
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occurring, according to ideas involved in Bergson’s duration, Whitehead’s
process, and the more recent formulations of an intersubjective self. Kirby
(1991) indicates the self is always in the process of self-narration, and can
never be complete. As indicated, Hillman portrays the self and its enclosing
memories to be a mask which must “seen through” to “face the gods" and
cure our narcissism (1980, 1989b).
Krell (1990), as a post-structuralist, feels that the self to which we
adhere is always deferred, or absent. It is that which we are “on the verge” of
becoming, or remembering, but never can, just as the present itself is
deferred. Deconstruction, for Krell, is the discovery of the actuality of the
self—in its non-actuality. Krell seems to imply that a more acute present
awareness is possible only through the receptivity to a self always already in
the process of deconstruction, and such deconstruction is not merely a
psychoanalytic deflation of the stuffed-shirts of our world.
On the other hand, Pinar’s version of psychoanalysis seem s more to
resemble that of the post-structuralist Lacan than that of Freud, Jung, or
Adler, especially when he avers to a self composed of both an ego-
consciousness and an unconscious constructed like a language. The
Lacanian unconscious consists, however, of the unsaid or unspeakable:
Even when authentic and learned, it is a self we cannot be confident 
we know, because it is always in motion and in time, defined in part by 
where it is not, when it is not, what it is not. The self who welcomes the 
dawn is a self constantly expanding to incorporate what it fears and 
resists as well as what it desires. (Pinar, 1992b, p. 410)
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This brings to mind Gilbert Durand (1976) whom I quoted in chapter 4 
as saying: “For the sorcerer it is always dawn" (p. 102). Pinar’s architect may 
not be a sorcerer but, when s/he is not understood as self-therapist, s/he may 
represent an allusion to the as  yet unknown—and perhaps unknowable— 
“entity” of the deconstructed self.
I have been indicating throughout this paper how we are constructed 
as masks over an unfathomable abyss, masks whose faith in the given reality 
is dependent on the strength of intersubjective recognition, of one mask’s 
acknowledgement by another. For masks—often narrative schemata—to see 
through each other and themselves, they must deconstruct such cultural 
schemata and be receptive to that “unspeakable" abyss. In other words, a 
deconstructed self, and, perhaps, an architect of self, may be similar to the 
“self-revenant” or “ectoplasmic listener” of chapter 5. Such a self is not really 
a self at all in the manner in which it has been culturally defined—“a locus 
where discourses intersect” (Nussbaum, 1988, p. 149)—but more resembles 
a bodily point of awareness between such intersection and the abyss—or 
“Absolutely Other” (Derrida, 1992).
Such a position is no observable position. For Durand, such a  “life is, 
to say the least, an exile" (p. 99). Such thoughts complexify the influence of 
the unspeakable other, as it manifests between words, in nuance and 
gesture, and perhaps in synchronicity and fate. Casey finally leans far from 
such ancient determinisms and eternal returns and grants the self a
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democratic kind of freedom he calls “in-gathering": “Far from being fated, 
then, my character is altogether an expression of my free remembering in its 
in-gathering power” (p. 296).
Casey’s in-gathering seem s Ricoeurian, according to Krell (1990), and 
Krell much prefers Nietzsche’s recognition and affirmation of fate: “I wanted 
to oppose the affirmation of eternal recurrence and amor fati to what Paul 
Ricoeur was calling ‘consent,’ a word that seemed lukewarm and saccharine, 
whereas Nietzsche’s was fire and wine" (p. xii). In this case, the freedom to 
remember may be more akin to a freedom to dismember the shared 
delusions which keep us hovering in our “reality” (Lacan, 1977) over the 
unfathomable circumlocutions of the abyss.
I have attempted an elucidation throughout of what it means to 
deconstruct the self’s memories and to willingly succumb to the Dionysian 
body and to a position at the mythic doorway of something suggested, but not 
encompassed, by Jung’s notion of a collective unconscious. This “position" 
is somewhat distinguished from a participation mystique by being 
paradoxically aware of its emplacement and aware of the varied personae, 
with variable emotions and memories, available to enact.
Krell (1989) criticizes Casey for falling back on the metaphysical 
tradition of presence by accepting “freedom” as a sort of essence. “It is not a 
matter of oversight,” Krell says. “It is perhaps a matter of profound oblivion at 
the heart of our remembering” (p. 268). He notes that Casey must separate
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memory from narrative, from the narrative self, to hold his position. For Krell, 
there is neither freedom in remembering nor truth. Because memory arises 
from the unknowable abyss of the eternal return, it is we who are 
remembered. My personal memories elide into the Great Memory, the 
Spiritus Mundi of Yeats (1916): “Which means that memory’s autonomy finds 
me always only on the verge of remembering, even when I am in the thick of 
memory’’ (Krell, 1989, p. 271).
What is the content of the "Great Memory” or the hovering anxiety of 
“fate”? Self cannot remember beyond itself so there can be no content per 
se. Instead, there can only be the “forgetting of self" previously alluded to 
with reference to Nietzsche by way of Krell. The change may perhaps be the 
much touted metamorphosis of this paper. This transmutation is not a part of 
the plan of developmental psychology, but is more to do with amor fati or 
what Hillman (1983b) calls soul: “Soul is the point. It’s not to further, to 
lubricate adaptation, to make it slide along better. It’s more a matter of 
evoking the sense of individuality which comes with death, with fate. My 
death. It’s  very hard to stay with that" (p. 63).
This is where I find archetypal psychology and some post-structuralist 
angles meet: in a kind of anarchitecture of self (chapter 1). Soul, for Hillman, 
is an attitude into death, but it is a  land of the dead “peopled” with images as 
he portrays in The Dream and the Underworld (1979a). This polytheistic 
land of the dead later becomes his via negativa to the world soul (1989a)
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and here he finds himself siding with Lacan and Derrida against the earlier 
monopoly of interpretation found in hermeneutics: “Hermeneutics is 
monotheistic. I guess what Lacan and those Yalies, those Frenchies, have 
been trying to do with their destructuralizing is getting hermeneutics off of its 
monotheistic basis and into a kind of talking back to the image that is as 
'crazy, ’ as polytheistic, as the image itself (p. 57).
With soul, metamorphosis, and fate, we find ourselves back in the 
labyrinth from which we had sought to extricate ourselves in the last chapter. 
Is this all talk, all empty theorizing going against the ineluctable evidence of 
Prigogine and Stengers for the irreversibility of time? This question was 
dealt with at length in chapter 3, but here let it suffice to say that even 
Prigogine and Stengers were not content with the one-way road of time 
leading to the inevitable disordering of energy found in entropy. They quote 
Freeman Dyson from a 1971 Scientific American article proposing a potential 
alternative:
It is conceivable however that life may have a larger role to play than 
we have yet imagined. Life may succeed against all of the odds in 
molding the universe to its own purpose. And the design of the 
inanimate universe may not be as detached from the potentialities of 
life and intelligence as scientists of the twentieth century have tended 
to suppose. (1984, p. 117)
A major role of life may be its ability to construct interconnected 
spirals. One of the roles of lifewriting in education may be to assist those 
youthful or unconscious spirals of self to become aware of their storied 
creation, of the narrative schemata which they are, to gain a sense of
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purposefulness—a sense that they too have stories within them to tell and 
are themselves important players in a larger story. This is the ego- 
constructive, empowerment aspect of autobiography which seems to have a 
direct bearing on the confident performance of teachers in classrooms 
(Goodson, 1988; Butt, 1991). This is Jung’s first half of life.
A second major role of life may be its ability to turn back upon itself in 
modes I have been struggling to portray throughout this essay. Once the 
spiral of self becomes aware of itself, it may seek the source of its own gravity 
(Gunn, 1982) in a recoil against time making of life an endless labyrinth, as 
portrayed in chapter 5. This is autobiography in which the “auto" is thrown 
into doubt. It is an attempt to break the hold of the self through which it is 
written by remembering in a mythopoeic, epistrophic manner, as exemplified 
in the fictional autobiographies of Jam es Joyce or Zora Neale Hurston.
This is the very movement into invisible metamorphosis which Brown 
has called the “Dionysian ego" (1959) or the awakening of Love’s Body 
(1966). Action and emotion spring from another, more primary source. 
Micklem (1979) portrays the flight of Hermes and his magic cap which 
renders psyche invisible a s  necessary to escape the stasis of psyche frozen 
by the “intolerable image.” Alchemically, such an awareness is represented 
by opening the floodgates of the unconscious upon the “hydrophobic dog” of 
the habitus, or habitual self. This metamorphic baptism does not render 
unconsciousness, but opens the self to an array of streams whose source
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and end are out of sight—to mercurial inspirations and mercurial emotions.
The deconstructed self may even have attributes of the elusive spirit himself:
Mercurius acts as a fountain of renewal in that he symbolizes a 
continual flow of interest, a sort of vital attention and evocative 
awareness, moving to and from the unconscious. This flow appears 
not only in the superhuman divine heights of the psyche, but also in its 
depths, extending down into “matter”: that is to say, down past the 
deposits of mankind’s past experience to those levels of man’s 
fish-like pre-human past, and to the psychoid processes of the 
sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous systems. Mercurius as the 
arcane substance is the transforming link throughout. (Grinnell, p. 22)
In curriculum theory, the fictional journal-writing of Pagano (1991)
suggests such possibilities, as do the rewrites of Grumet (1991), though
whether the value is placed on a dramatic—or Dionysian—self is very much
in doubt. Perhaps the evanescing blueprints of Pinar’s architect comes
closest to actually opening the habitus to the self-forgetful, mercurial journey
into soul and—who knows?—beyond.
A Dionysian self, suggested by Brown (1959), to liberate the id from
repression through direct action, is already to be entering the territory of the
sacred, as suggested by Eliade in The Myth of the Eternal Return (1954).
This journey cannot, I think, be imposed on anyone, whether in the second
half of life or not. Outward-looking ego-clingers cannot be forced to see their
own transparency, though it often relentlessly reveals itself. This may be
“seeing through” or even deconstruction—lifewriting which “is very hard to
stay with” (Hillman, 1983b, p. 63)—but it is also a way once aligned with that
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which was designated as the sacred: Rife with paradoxes to the outward- 
lookers, as indicated by the sacred path which is constructed of contradiction:
But Zen’s way of viewing or evaluating things differs from the outward 
way of intellection. Zen would not object to the possibility of an 
“unconscious conscious” or a "conscious unconscious”—therefore, not 
the awakening of a new consciousness but consciousness coming to 
its own unconscious. (Suzuki, 1954/64, p. 197).
This has not been the mandate of education, of course: not
psychoanalysis, not imaginal dialogues, not deconstruction, and certainly not
anything smacking of the sacred. Schools were firmly constructed within the
myth of progress—outward-looking in a one-way time—as though even such a
secular myth did not have archetypal themes behind it. T. S. Eliot (1936)
felt that even in our most mundane theorizing we are involved in ultimates:
Questions of education are frequently discussed as if they bore no 
relation to the social system in which and for which the education is 
carried on. This is one of the commonest reasons for the 
unsatisfactoriness of the answers. It is only within a particular social 
system that a system of education has any meaning. If education today 
seems to deteriorate, if it seems to become more and more chaotic and 
meaningless, it is primarily because we have no settled and satisfactory 
arrangement of society, and because we have both 
vague and diverse opinions about the kind of society we want.
Education is a subject which cannot be discussed in a void: our 
questions raise other questions, social, economic, financial, political.
And the bearings are on more ultimate problems even than these: to 
know what we want in education we must know what we want in 
general, we derive our theory of education from our philosophy of life. 
The problem turns out to be a religious problem, (pp. 184, 185)
At the time of the above writing, of course, Eliot was prepared to return
the Western world to a Roman Catholic empire. I am not suggesting a
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desecularization of curriculum. As soon as we have a religion on which the
majority agree, there is, as  always, bound to be those who become
victimized by it. I wish to observe, however, that our memory reaches back
until its solid empirical present wavers and it finds itself forgetting. It may be
said to be forgetting into Memory as a sort of gravity, that is, in its oblivion it
finds itself remembered. Krell (1978) says that “with diligence and practice I
can remember what I never believed I could remember; with greater
diligence, and after much practice, I can also fail to remember. The ‘can’
confronts a ‘cannot’. In remembrance, as in perception, man is neither
sovereign nor subject, neither absolute activity nor total passivity” (p. 142).
I realize I am verging close with my talk of anima mundi and
archetypes to a transcendental conceptualization of the place of memory in
autobiographical theorizing. I have attempted not to translate the
transcendental to the empirical but only to allow my mythopoeic memory to
explore itself. Krell notes that, beyond that, to claim any assurance is to lose
the path of phenomenology:
Suffice it to say that phenomenology of memory must avoid the pitfalls 
of both empiricism and transcendentalism. It must elaborate its own 
methods for the description and analysis of memory sequences as it 
progresses, without the illusory supports of empirically confirmable 
fact or ultimate evidence (p. 142).
And suffice to say that the advocates of some form of lifewriting in 
curriculum and curriculum theory may also "neither be sovereign nor subject" 
and are driven into their own assumptions of memory because of the unique
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environments and phenomena of their experience. The diversity within this
burgeoning field of curriculum theory must be understood in this light only as
supporting the highest ideals of education as explorative and courageous.
Autobiography in education can only proceed within the reaches of the most
oblivious tolerance because the path is unknown and each explorer will
discover different ruins, and this goes for autobiographical theorists, as well.
The opposition, the resistance, to the return of memory should not be
found, it seems to me, within the field of lifewriting researchers in curriculum
theory but in the “skyscraper-building” mentality of the institutional ego, itself:
A university isn’t just a place, and a school isn’t just a building. It’s  a 
collective system with its own systematic unconsciousness which 
makes each person in school unconscious in a collective way, and 
usually about the institution itself.. . .  That’s  what I mean by corruption 
in training institutes: getting caught in a terrible unconsciousness, all 
the while pretending to be developing consciousness and guiding 
soul. It’s  not that I’m clean and uncorrupt or holy.. . .  It’s just that I’m 
wary. I don’t know how to keep the eras alive in an institution.
(Hillman, 1983b, p. 34)
Guggenbuhl-Craig (1980) understands eros as the difference 
between the soldier as mercenary murderer or idealist, between the 
“trickster” as common cheat or con-artist and the playful unveiler of novelty 
and surprise, and between the teacher who expects adherence to his 
demonstration of established truths and the teacher who also learns and 
shapeshifts in response to the life of the students. “It is Eros who makes the 
gods—the archetypes—loving, creative, and involved.. . .  As far as  we 
mortals are concerned, gods are neutral, inhuman, distanced, and cold. Only
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when they are combined with Eros do we sense their movement, do they 
become creative, intimate, and stimulating” (p. 27).
The work now being done to recover personal memory, to discover an 
epistrophic anamnesis, may be the telos of an eros acting synchronistically 
through our shifty unconsciousness to keep itself alive within educational 
institutions: to promote amor fati and return to the world.
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APPENDIX: THE FUTURE OF TIME
One of the most disturbing and fascinating suggestions to emerge 
from this essay is that memory in its farther reaches is not a  human faculty at 
all, but a primary force of the world, akin to gravity. In this sense, everything 
we do, think, say, or perceive is in process through memory. Our sense of 
self comes to us only as we remember it. Our lives are forever dissociated 
from the “moment”: an immediacy of awareness through the veil of the past. 
We live, it seems, through a sort time-delay in which self and world are re­
cognized and emplaced before perception is allowed to occur.
Now, with Stephen Hawking (1988) suggesting that the universe is not 
expanding but contracting, that is, heading toward its ultimate destiny as 
unbounded energy, the whole question of humanity’s fate, amor fati, and the 
eternal return seem to demand another way of looking at memory and 
“eternal objects,” but even more importantly: our metaphysical assumptions 
about time are opened for deconstruction. As David Wood (1989) foresees: 
“Prediction is an uncertain art, but I would venture the suggestion that our 
century-long ‘linguistic turn’ will be followed by a spiraling return to time as 
the focus and horizon of all our thought and experience” (p. xi). The 
deconstruction of the metaphysics of time, time as thought, may open the way 
for the “moment,” as Wood says, “in ways that break utterly with 
representation” (p. xi). This would shatter the myth of progress and schools 
would need to be reconceptualized as spaces to experience 6lan vital.
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